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Abstract 
I use Heidegger’s Being and Time to understand and critique racial discourse, but to also 
determine Heidegger’s reach into issues like racial identity.  I start by examining how his 
introductory statements in Being and Time on the term “existentiell” suggest a path towards a 
conception of identity.  I then go into how a racial identity could, through his terminology, be 
conceived as what I call a “fear existentiell.” I demonstrate how society assists the individual in 
maintaining a racialized existence that is embedded in fear.  I move toward an examination of 
Heidegger’s three concepts of death to demonstrate how two of these death concepts (verenden 
and ableben) are often attached to a racial identity through racial discourse.  I move into a 
discussion that relies on W.E.B. Du Bois’ conception of the black American as a problem for 
America and, using his seminal question, “How does it feel to be a problem?” I show that the 
individual’s existence, as discussed in Heidegger, becomes a problem for itself through the racial 
discourse about its identity.  I call this “Being-a-problem.”  At first, I discuss it as inauthentic, as 
it is driven by social fear and generalized discussions about racial identity; however, I later 
demonstrate how it can move from inauthentic Being-a-problem to authentic Being-a-problem.  I 
end with an analysis of racial discourse, showing that it exemplifies what I call, “race reports,” 
which are comprised of reports about the individual’s racial identity that conceal a person’s 
potential for authenticity. 
 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I use Martin Heidegger’s notion of an existentiell in Being and Time 
(henceforth, BT) as a jumping off point to extend his analysis of Being into our contemporary 
discourse on racial identity.  In discussing the meaning of Being for Dasein (Heidegger’s term 
for the being whose existence is an issue for itself), Heidegger uses an “existentiell,” a term to 
denote the diverse ways Dasein can be itself.  Heidegger explores how das Man (his term for a 
general mass we encounter everyday via influences about how to talk, understand the world, and 
know ourselves) shapes discourses about Dasein, making these discussions idle, what Heidegger 
calls Gerede.  One of the general moods of das Man is fear.  Because of this, I examine a term I 
call a “fear existentiell,” an identity that underlies how society regards certain racial and 
marginalized identities as fearful of, feared by, and feared.  Regarding fear, Heidegger says 
individuals flee their real existential death (Being-toward-death or Sein zum Tod), preferring to 
view death as something remote and not uniquely belonging to one’s existence.  Using 
Heidegger’s three concepts of death (verenden, ableben, and Sein zum Tod), I demonstrate how 
das Man encourages fear existentiell Dasein to dwell on its death as an urgent societal issue 
shared amongst a whole racial group, a phenomenon that helps Dasein obscure the singularizing 
of Dasein that it has with Sein zum Tod.  From this, I conclude that a fear existentiell idle 
discourse on death leads Dasein into being inauthentic. 
Because this dissertation relies on what happens in racial discourse, I use Heidegger’s 
Gerede to explain how fear existentiell Dasein are often talked about as close to death, forcing 
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them to see themselves as a societal problem.  I call this outcome for these Dasein “Being-a-
problem.” Being-a-problem originates in fear, making it an inauthentic racial identity (fear 
existentiell).  I call this “inauthentic Being-a-problem” (iBap).  Since Heidegger also discusses 
how one can be resolute in the face of having inauthentically existed, I discuss how Heidegger’s 
Being and Time can be used to advance a critical and honest assessment of one’s situation as 
iBap, allowing Dasein to not be led by fear and idle talk.  By using W.E.B. Du Bois’ concept of 
“second sight,” I demonstrate how Being-a-problem can be authentic.  I call this “authentic 
Being-a-problem” (aBap) and discuss how it can deconstruct fear and Gerede about its identity.  
With such deconstruction, Dasein can retrieve its own version of “second sight” in what 
Heidegger calls the Augenblick, the “moment of vision,” that starts with Dasein resolutely 
claiming its existentiell; however, this means Dasein as a fear existentiell must drop the fear and 
the death talk of verenden and ableben.  Only in this way can Being-a-problem be authentic.  
Through this modified existentiell, racial discourse can be critiqued as a kind of reporting about 
racial identity that maintains Dasein’s alienation in present-at-hand concepts and assessments of 
how it exists.  Consequently, chapter 7 of my dissertation is a critique of racial discourse through 
what Heidegger calls “ontical reports” (various academic pursuits that study existence).  I 
describe racial discourse as ontical “race reports” that often require present-at-hand (pah) 
assessments of individual experiences to discuss racism.  This pah analysis condemns individuals 
to a subject-object ontology, where people are either objects or subjects to be interrogated.  The 
fundamental Situatedness of Dasein becomes lost in the subject-object analysis of human beings 
and race, as well as Dasein’s capacity to both choose and make its world. A critical self-
understanding from authentic Bap identifies this present-at-hand use, so as to modify these race 
reports that talk in this manner, thereby, opening up a discourse on race that is predicated on 
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seeing how Dasein is covered up by the very kind of talk that seems designed to politically and 
socially emancipate it.  My view of authentic Being-a-problem will serve as an attempt to rethink 
and then free these racial discourses from the present-at-hand terminological obstacles embedded 
in them. 
 My use of Heidegger is necessary in six specific ways: first, to examine an existentiell as 
an identity; second, to show how society influences these existentiells in a fearful way; third, to 
demonstrate how this influence leans in the direction of two kinds of death (verenden and 
ableben), which conceal Dasein’s existential situation; fourth, to analyze the meaning of 
inauthentic Being-a-problem, a fear existentiell Dasein discussed as close to death; fifth, to show 
how a critical self-understanding is the only way to cut through the influence on one’s identity, 
dispensing with fear and the Gerede about Dasein’s death; finally, to be skeptical of discourses 
(academic or otherwise) that purport to represent identities in a generalized manner that would 
not allow Dasein to be free to resolutely claim its existence against the obstacles presented by 
racial discourse. 
Why Care? 
 Philosophers of Heidegger and race studies will benefit from this dissertation as it affirms 
a positive relationship between early Heidegger (Being and Time) and racial discourse that is 
seldom examined.  Although I use Being and Time to critique racial discourse, I seek to 
understand how the way we talk about race runs into crises in which various genuine and non-
genuine claims to racial oppression and marginalization often become entangled.  I aim to 
provide a solution to such conflations by examining what Dasein’s authentic racial identity 
would look like from examining fear.  Additionally, I am fascinated by the link between one’s 
authentic identity and how racial discourse appears to cover such an identity.  My work on 
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Heidegger problematizes race studies as part of a grander issue with how racial discourse 
obfuscates Dasein’s ownmost Being.  My work frames race studies as a discursive practice in 
which all are involved in the spreading of grand narratives that relegate individuals into 
existential concealment despite this discourse’s many attempts to gain more insight about the 
marginalization of racialized communities.  As for Heidegger studies, my work allows us to see 
how Heidegger’s Being and Time can be a way to study racial identity and the issue of 
authenticity within communities.  Instead of looking at Dasein as a person who has roles like 
being a teacher, student, and bartender, we can see the implications of Being and Time for racial 
identity when Dasein is a black American or a Mexican immigrant new to the United States, to 
give a couple of examples.  Thus, by examining race from the perspective of Heidegger’s project 
in Being and Time, we can see that one of Dasein’s daily affairs would be that it deals with its 
racial identity as a way of being.   
Why Racial Identity? 
 Whether in academia or outside of it, one confronts discourses on identity, where identity 
tends to be discussed as the when, where, who, how, what, and why of an individual.  Questions 
of personal identity pervade national discourse, from political discussions of “identity politics” to 
academic discussions of one’s class, race, and gender.  However, from the vantage point of 
philosophy, I ask, “What does it mean to be talked about as a problem?” This question is a bit 
different from Du Bois’ question in the Souls of Black Folk where he asks, “How does it feel to 
be a problem?”1 His concern dealt specifically with race.  In examining racial discourse through 
a Heideggerian lens, I can see what it would mean for Dasein to have an inauthentic racial 
identity, which compels the inquiry into what an authentic Dasein would be.  I argue that 
                                                 
1 W.E.B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1999), 9.  
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existentiell discourses frame and direct our understanding about racial identity through 
Heidegger’s understanding of fear, idle talk, and death.  By examining this framing, I will show 
how racial discourse is often driven by making connections between an identity and one’s fear of 
death. 
Broad Narratives 
 Scholars and non-scholars alike talk about how specific groups of people are under threat 
in the United States and abroad.  Current scholarship writes about this in the form of 
marginalization, according to which certain identities are discussed as under threat.  Iris Marion 
Young states, “all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and 
exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.”2 This is an expansive 
definition of oppression that can encompass nearly all individuals and groups.  It is difficult to 
see how this broad definition can maintain important distinctions.  A wide definition, such as 
Young’s, may cover more people; however, it does little to preserve distinctive claims to 
oppression, and by extension, claims to racial marginalization.  Instead, the discourses on 
marginalization, oppression, and racism promote a general set of narratives to understand those 
issues.  Such discourses can obstruct the nuanced experiences in the daily affairs of people who 
endure such issues or power relations.  As my dissertation will show, this covering up happens in 
racial discourse, wherein racialized communities are broadly discussed in present-at-hand terms 
and narratives.  I discuss how the broad and terminological strokes are the result of a fear-laden 
and idle discourse within racial discourse. 
I explore how discourse about identity forges and selects one’s self-interpretation about 
identity.  I take an unlikely approach:  I use Heidegger’s Being and Time to exhibit how the 
                                                 
2 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 40. 
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pressure of idle talk influences one’s identity, especially when that identity is often connected to 
fear and death.  By examining this influence, I shed light on how our discourse about racial 
identity inevitably conceals an individual’s existential self-understanding where authentic and 
inauthentic identity become blurred by talk.  I demonstrate how the pressure of talk, as it pertains 
to death, exacerbates this blurring and places one in a problematic situation of dealing with a 
fallen discourse about identity and death while trying to authentically claim oneself as a problem. 
Example: A Boy and a Professor 
Throughout the dissertation, my argument for the concept of a “fear existentiell” and 
“Being-a-problem” will use examples to show how idle talk affects Dasein’s interpretation of its 
identity.  By providing examples, I hope to demonstrate how Dasein’s self-interpretative identity 
is often influenced by what Heidegger calls das Man or the They, that entity to which Dasein 
always holds itself accountable.  Such examples also show obvious differences in racial 
experiences, some of which include what it feels like to endure a racial situation, others showing 
racially motivated actions.  I use such examples to demonstrate the distinction between racially 
motivated situations and how we talk about racial situations.  This allows me to consistently 
clarify to the reader that we are dealing with a critique of racial discourse and seeing how the 
descriptions of such racial experiences tend to differ from the racial situation itself.  I offer a 
comparison between a boy, Legend Solomon, and a professor, George Yancy. 
On August 11th, 2016, a ten-year-old New Jersey black boy named Legend Solomon was 
playing basketball outside.  Down the block from Legend were police officers in pursuit of a 
twenty-year-old black man whom they believed to have stolen items from a nearby convenience 
store.  The officers saw Legend, regarded him as their suspect, and pointed their guns at him.  A 
few of Legend’s neighbors shielded him from the police, shouting at the officers to not shoot 
 7 
him.  The officers withdrew. Shortly after, Legend’s mother posted a video of him on social 
media, in tears, trying nervously to express that the police “were trying to shoot me.”3 
Contrast Legend’s experience with George Yancy’s description of racial judgments cast 
upon him.  Yancy is a professor of philosophy at Emory University and he writes in his New 
York Times opinion piece entitled, “I Am a Dangerous Professor,” that 
Honestly, being a black man, I had thought that I had been marked enough — as bestial, 
as criminal, as inferior. I have always known of the existence of that racialized scarlet 
letter. It marks me as I enter stores; the white security guard never fails to see it. It 
follows me around at predominantly white philosophy conferences; I am marked as 
‘different’ within that space not because I am different, but because the conference space 
is filled with whiteness. It follows me as white police officers pull me over for no other 
reason than because I’m black. As Frantz Fanon writes, ‘I am overdetermined from 
without.’4 
 
Yancy observes that his skin color characterizes this idea of the “racialized scarlet letter.” His 
skin color becomes the catalyst for a discourse about his identity as a “different” characteristic in 
a space usually taken up by white people, or what he refers to as “whiteness.”5 Yancy’s 
descriptions suggest that he understands himself as problematic for others.  Legend’s case was a 
specific experience of nearly dying at the hands of the police, but he also bore the “racialized 
scarlet letter,” prompting the police to draw their weapons on him.  Legend’s experience might 
be discussed as being predicated on “white spaces” and “whiteness,” but his almost dying is the 
stand out element of his story.  Legend was marked as a suspect, some body to watch out for, and 
                                                 
3 Edgar Sandoval, Thomas Tracy, Leonard Greene, “Newark boy, 10, chased by cops who thought he was a criminal 
‘thought they were going to shoot me,’” nydailynews.com, August 23, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/neighbors-intervene-shotgun-toting-newark-police-chase-boy-10-article-1.2762158 [accessed August 23, 
2016].  
4 George Yancy, “I Am a Dangerous Professor,” nytimes.com, November 30, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/opinion/i-am-a-dangerous-professor.html [accessed November 30, 2016]. 
5 Yancy’s point about color as a mark echoes W.E.B. Du Bois’ Darkwater: Voices within the Veil, where he writes, 
“Such degrading of men by men is as old as mankind and the invention of no one race or people.  Ever have men 
striven to conceive of their victims as different from the victors, endless different, in soul and blood, strength and 
cunning, race and lineage.  It has been left, however, to Europe and to modern days to discover the eternal 
worldwide mark of meanness, -- color,” (1999), 24. 
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now, because of his experience, he will fear the police.  The difference between the boy and the 
scholar is that the former endures a visceral experience of a proximity to death that ignites his 
fear, while Yancy thoughtfully reflects on his discomfort about being constantly overdetermined 
from without.  Both represent two kinds of racial marginalization: 1) the perception of a bestial, 
“everywhere” and “nowhere,” a criminal, an inferior being, who reflects on racism in society; 2) 
the police almost shooting a boy because of a criminal perception.  The former is a reflection 
while they latter is a violent experience.  The former is prompted by discussion and assessments 
of accrued experiences while the latter is the observation of an actual encounter with being near 
death.  Thus, through an examination of the origins of my meaning of Being-a-problem we can 
see how fear, death, and idle talk all participate in Dasein’s identity. 
Chapter 2 - Racial Identity as an Existentiell: How Heidegger Overcomes the Abstraction      
Critique 
In the next chapter, I develop the notion of an “identity” from Heidegger’s Being and 
Time.  For Heidegger, an existentiell is generally deemed as “the understanding of oneself,” but 
Heidegger tends to be critiqued for being too abstract in his conception of human existence 
(33/12).  Scholars think his work in BT is not grounded enough.  The philosopher, Mariana 
Ortega, argues that Heidegger’s conception of Dasein serves as an abstraction of individuality 
rather than a grounded notion of personal identity.  This chapter provides my interpretation of an 
identity as an existentiell grounded in thrown-projection.  I show that if an existentiell is 
construed as an understanding of oneself that takes hold or neglects possibilities of itself, then 
this is how identities function, in that they are continuously bound by how Dasein takes hold of 
or neglects personal and cultural commitments (33/12).  By seeing an existentiell in this way, we 
can view a racial or a cultural identity in terms of Heidegger’s thrown-projection.  By explaining 
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how an existentiell is Dasein’s identity, I can demonstrate how Dasein is thrown in the world, 
while also explaining how it presses forward into possibilities of itself through projection.  I 
primarily use the works of Heidegger scholars Lee Braver and Thomas Sheehan to support my 
interpretation of an identity as an existentiell based on thrown-projection, which serves as the 
existential ground of an identity. 
One way that concepts of identity have meaning is that people live their identity, whether 
it is imposed upon them by others or chosen by themselves.  We are thrown into our respective 
identities without our consent, just as we cannot control our birth.  We, as Dasein, go on living, 
but in the process of continuing to live we move toward and find ourselves in existentiells.  
Living them fills out many of our choices about what we do; however, the problem is that this 
“filling out” is often involuntary.  I argue that thrown-projection explains this involuntary feature 
about identity.  I use thrown-projection to highlight both the dependence that identity has on 
community and historical narratives, and to show Dasein’s projection of itself onto possibilities 
made up from its always being thrown into the world. 
I reply to Ortega’s critique by demonstrating how my interpretation of Heidegger’s 
notion of existentiell as grounded in thrown-projection creates an identity that has “ontical 
affairs.” As such, Dasein attempts to be its possibilities, neglecting and taking hold of some of 
them in the process of working out its affairs.  From these existentiells, Dasein plays out its 
existence in “multiplicitous” ways, as Ortega discusses in her book In-Between (2016).  The way 
Dasein experiences the world will always be unique to each Dasein, even as Dasein is raced by 
circumstances emanating from its thrown-projection.  By explaining how existentiells function as 
an identity outcome of Dasein’s thrown-projection, I establish that not only can Heidegger’s 
conception of an existentiell function as an identity, but it can also incorporate a racial identity.  
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This result of an existentiell being a possible racial identity allows me to establish what elements 
of Heidegger’s project function in racial identity (for example, das Man, Gerede, and verfallen).  
I argue in the next chapter that a racial identity is an existentiell that tends to be connected to 
fear.  I call this a “fear existentiell.” 
Chapter 3 - Covered Up with Bodies: Dasein as a Fear Existentiell and Societal  
De-Severance 
In this chapter, I elaborate on the idea of a “fear existentiell,” using it to critique a racial 
discourse that uses fear and present-at-hand conceptions of “bodies” and “lives.” I use 
Heidegger’s tripartite analysis of fear to explain how Dasein can be fearful of, feared by, and 
feared about.  This chapter’s analysis allows me to bring Heidegger into the discourse on racism 
and show how racial identities are dominated by the mood of fear.  
I discuss how a fear existentiell is talked about by what Heidegger calls das Man, the 
“They” that idly talks about Dasein through ambiguity and curiosity. Heidegger calls this idle 
talk a fallen discourse, where present-at-hand notions are used to understand Dasein’s existence.  
I argue that this fallen discourse, this Gerede, manifests itself in racial discourse through terms 
such as “bodies” and “lives.” These general terms are used to explain both the black and brown 
community’s experience in relation to suffering and death.  However, with the term “bodies,” 
Dasein is explained by authors like Ta-Nehisi Coates, as encased in a container called the 
“body.”  I explain that such a present-at-hand assessment of the black individual can be critiqued 
through Heidegger’s analysis of spatiality, wherein Dasein is not simply a thing to be put in a 
vessel, but a being in a world, where both “in” and “world” unite to mean Dasein’s engagement 
with existence, not the idea of an object in another object or a subject embodied by an object. 
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I use spatiality once more to discuss Heidegger’s notion of de-severance.  From this 
concept of de-severance, I develop a term called “societal de-severance.” It is an interpretation of 
Heidegger’s notion of “de-severance” wherein what is remote is often brought closer to Dasein.  
In my interpretation, concepts of identity nearest to Dasein become a way for other Dasein to 
“know” each other.  The problem is that this “knowing” is through Gerede.  I use Malcolm X’s 
critique of Americanism and his analysis of the black experience to elaborate on how societal de-
severance and fear bring traditional assumptions about racial identity closer to Dasein.   
Chapter 4 - Bodies and Lives Matter: Death of Dasein as a Fear Existentiell  
This chapter elaborates on three kinds of Dasein’s end: 1) perishing (verenden); 2) 
Dasein as a person passing away (ableben); and 3) existential death (Sein zum Tod).  Fallenness 
is integral to Dasein’s constitution and when Dasein encounters the idea of death, Dasein flees 
into seemingly firm ideas of death, verenden and ableben. Dasein takes comfort in these 
explanations, settling itself, and avoids broaching its existential death.   
Das Man provides these firm, albeit fallen, assessments since the They has answers for 
everything.  Thus, the They promotes these forms of death as common to all living bodies or all 
human lives, with respect to verenden and ableben.  I discuss how verenden and ableben are 
attached to a fear existentiell like notes attached to an identity.  In this context, I call verenden 
and ableben “death notes.” Given that das Man provides Dasein with these death notes and given 
the previous chapter’s claim that idle talk is Dasein’s usual mode of discourse, the racial 
discourse on Dasein with a fear existentiell amounts to having an identity that is specifically 
geared toward fleeing one’s confrontation with itself in Angst.  This suggests that a fear 
existentiell identity helps Dasein flee its authenticity, where authenticity means Dasein’s 
ownmost Being a a structural and existential whole that can choose to be itself. 
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Fear existentiell Dasein is discussed as closer to verenden and ableben, and such 
discourse compels an individual to think that death is near.  However, I explain how this is a faux 
certainty, encouraged by idle talk.  This certainty pushes Dasein farther from understanding its 
existential ground and conceals Sein zum Tod.  Furthermore, whole groups, not a singular 
Dasein, are talked about as sharing in ableben and verenden.  Death becomes shared within a 
fear existentiell.  This is how marginalized and oppressed communities are talked about in 
relation to death, and I discuss how Dasein is compelled to feel the urgency of this constant 
fallen death situation by das Man’s talk about racial identities.  I discuss how it even becomes 
socially acceptable in the media and academia to discuss racial identities in this manner.  
Chapter 5 - Being-a-problem and Du Bois’ Double Consciousness 
I discuss an existentiell I call “Being-a-problem” (Bap), defining it as a fear existentiell 
with the death notes of verenden and ableben.  My use of the term “Being-a-problem” originates 
from W.E.B. Du Bois’ Souls of Black Folk.  Du Bois asks in his text, “How does it feel to be a 
problem?”6 He poses this question within the context of race relations in the United States during 
the early 20th century and he discusses the problem in two ways: 1) white Americans who 
perceive black Americans as problems; 2) black Americans who question who they are in 
America.  I elaborate on these issues and how they present an internal struggle that creates what 
Du Bois calls “double consciousness.” Connecting this to Being-a-problem, I show that Dasein 
has its own struggle as it wrestles with the fear of verenden and ableben promoted by das Man 
even though both deaths may not be genuine to the daily ontical affairs of Dasein.  This may turn 
into a disconnect, where there are warring interpretations of what Dasein self-interprets versus 
what it knows das Man to interpret. 
                                                 
6 W.E.B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1999), 9. 
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I show that because Being-a-problem is a confluence of idle talk and fear about ableben 
and verenden, this makes Being-a-problem an inauthentic existentiell, indicating that Being-a-
problem can be authentic.  Fear, Gerede, ambiguity, and curiosity all guide inauthentic Being-a-
problem (iBap), letting Dasein settle into the idea that it is merely a “body” or a “life” that is 
constantly under threat.  On an individual level, this becomes an issue of subscribing to the talk 
and fear of racial discourse, even if the talk might not be a genuine connection to Dasein.  Fear 
about ableben and verenden become the key component to Dasein inauthentically Being-a-
problem.  The issue of inauthenticity is particularly important to Dasein, as ambiguity and 
curiosity will make Dasein certain of itself as a “problem” in society.  As das Man and Dasein 
agree with this assessment of a racial identity that is Being-a-problem, the reaffirmations from 
das Man normalize the fear of death.  The fear of ableben and verenden that helps create the 
identity of Being-a-problem then becomes a constant narrative about one’s identity. 
The problem with inauthentic Being-a-problem becoming normalized is that the 
normalcy interferes with Angst, that fundamental and latent mood of Dasein.  Angst becomes 
muffled by what Heidegger calls the “loudest idle talk,” only with inauthentic Being-a-problem, 
the loudness is about fear of verenden and ableben (218-219/174).  Heidegger says that Angst is 
the mood that allows for Dasein’s existential death, Sein zum Tod, to emerge for Dasein to 
confront itself in a resolute way.  Only through Angst can Dasein authentically Be-a-problem.  
The issue is then about how Dasein has the possibility for this authentic version of Being-a-
problem to emerge.  I lay the foundation for this possibility in the conclusion of this chapter and 
elaborate on how Dasein can modify its inauthentic Being-a-problem to become authentic, 
wherein “authenticity,” for Heidegger, means that Dasein takes over “from itself its ownmost 
Being” without influence from das Man (308/254). 
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Chapter 6 - “Second Sight” and the Augenblick: Seeing Authentic Being-a-problem’s 
Situation 
In this chapter I compare Du Bois’ idea of “second sight” to Heidegger’s notion of 
resoluteness which leads to the “moment of vision” (Augenblick), which is Dasein’s coming back 
from fallenness and affirming its existence to be authentic (376/328).  I examine Du Bois’ idea 
of second sight as an existentiell critical stance on its existence, in which black Americans begin 
to see more clearly the interpretations of who they are in America.  With Heidegger, I point out 
an existential version of “second sight,” as Dasein’s resolute “moment of vision.” With the 
Augenblick, the fear discourse has been dispensed with, as well as the idle talk about death notes 
as being verenden and ableben. 
Dasein’s resoluteness toward the Augenblick provides the separation between inauthentic 
Being-a-problem and authentic Being-a-problem.  Through the Augenblick, Dasein as Being-a-
problem claims this way to be as an existentiell for itself.  Dasein chooses its problematic 
identity in society into which it has been thrown and from which it must project.  Through the 
“moment of vision,” Dasein removes fear and breaks down how idle talk produces racial 
identity.  In contrast, inauthentic Bap continues to be cast by das Man as an identity to fear and 
this Dasein continues to fear and subscribe to the idle talk that has supported those claims about 
it through its existence without choosing any of those narratives for itself.  This means that 
despite the possibility of not even experiencing racial abuse or racist situations, inauthentic 
Being-a-problem will continue to appropriate the discourse as a “genuine” understanding of 
itself, bolstered by ambiguity and curiosity.  With authentic Being-a-problem, Dasein has its 
“second sight” as the Augenblick and Dasein resolutely confronts itself as being marked as a 
 15 
problem, understanding that the genuine problem is that of affirming one’s existence versus 
reaffirming the fallen discourse about who one is. 
The question of authenticity is the essential issue with Being-a-problem; the existentiell 
modification from inauthentic Being-a-problem to authentic is the movement from fear to 
fearless engagement with one’s daily affairs.  Such engagement allows Dasein to freely choose 
itself as Being-a-problem in anxiety.  Free from the influence of Gerede and being in the mode 
of fear, Dasein can deconstruct its fear existentiell and reassess the attached death notes of 
verenden and ableben.  In this modification, Dasein can appropriately Be-towards-death.  Given 
that Heidegger’s project starts with the presupposition of “time as the horizon of any 
understanding of Being,” I address how authentic Being-a-problem can reclaim itself as time 
(19/1).  In reclaiming itself, Dasein affirms it is already and always Sein zum Tod.  Through this 
affirmation, Dasein no longer subscribes to das Man’s insistence that iBap has no time or is 
running out of time.  Rather, authentic Bap takes over its time in the Augenblick and disrupts the 
normalizing of such death talk.  As a result, claiming oneself as authentically Being-a-problem 
becomes a productive step toward reframing racial discourse.  Claiming oneself as aBap also 
allows Dasein to genuinely claim its racialized existentiell in a fearless manner wherein Dasein 
genuinely understands itself as an existentiell that belongs to oneself and no one else. 
Chapter 7 - Tottering Ontical Reports: Authentic Being-a-problem and Philosophies of 
Struggle 
At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger writes 
The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in 
its basic concepts.  In such immanent crises the relationship between positively 
investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a 
point where it begins to totter (29/9).  
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I argue that present-at-hand issues and idle talk in racial discourse place Critical Race Theory, 
Race Studies, and Philosophy of Race in a crisis.  These academic fields have their own 
investigative inquiries that are based on generalizations about racial identities, racial groups, and 
systems of power that are often discussed as looming threats.  The farther these inquiries go 
toward monolithic understandings of their subject matter (people enduring racial marginalization 
and oppression), the more these fields experience a crisis and begin to totter as they reveal a 
disconnect between Dasein’s singular existential existence versus the investigations into racial 
issues that tend to conceal this issue as demonstrated in earlier chapters. 
I examine what I call a “race report,” as a kind of “ontical report.”  Instead of assuming 
the concepts of racial discourse like “white supremacy” and “white privilege,” I problematize 
these terms by showing how authentic Being-a-problem provides a way of seeing these terms as 
present-at-hand, totalizing racial identity rather than allowing Dasein to assert its singular 
existence against such a totalizing.  This allows me to question what racial discourses do in 
dealing with issues like identity membership and self-interpretation.  For instance, Dasein might 
ask itself about its fear existentiell:  If I frame this discourse as Gerede and fear, then what would 
it mean to be a member of that existentiell?  Should I understand myself as a body or as a life that 
is near verenden or ableben to be that identity? How integral is that fear of those two kinds of 
death to my identity?  What would it mean for me to not have this fear or recognize those deaths 
as relevant to my existence?   
I deal with these questions through Frantz Fanon’s work, concluding that we will have to 
deal philosophically with the fact that the Gerede about existentiells tends to conceal Dasein in 
favor of a practical idle talk that is well-intentioned toward historically marginalized groups, but 
that ultimately runs into problems as it asserts terms like “white privilege,” “white supremacy,” 
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and even the meaning of “racism” as connected to a monolithic power.  These concepts are part 
of present-at-hand race reports that attempt to recognize racial marginalization and oppression.  
The result of recognizing marginalization in this manner is two-fold: first, while we continue to 
discuss racism and race in the ways just mentioned, we always risk covering individual Dasein’s 
real ontical affairs even though we wish to recognize them as oppressed and marginalized; 
second, that if we aim at authentic Being-a-problem then we can see how such a concept exposes 
the problems of racial discourse, though we seem bent on continuing to talk in this way, and will 
continue to do so on the basis of our certainty that we know how to talk about these issues.  I 
present authentic Being-a-problem as a disruption of that tendency and show that we can at least 
be skeptical of our commitments to certain terms in racial discourse, asking ourselves practical 
questions about whether the moral commitments and gains we achieve in using such terms are 
worth covering over authentic Being-a-problem.  And in demonstrating this, I aim to show how 
taking an emancipatory approach toward authentic Being-a-problem can help us understand how 
we can go beyond racial discourses, allowing race scholars to reflect and be critical of their 
participation in such a discourse rather than become automatic subscribers to it.   
Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 I conclude with an overview of my project and I elaborate on the utility of my analysis 
for future research.  Being-a-Problem (inauthentic or authentic) is not exclusive to any group and 
person.  Anyone can have and accept an identity imposed upon them.  By expanding beyond race 
and interrogating the idea of what inauthentic and authentic Being-a-problem is, we can examine 
how any Dasein operates in the world when the talk of Dasein is about fear, ableben and 
verenden.  My dissertation can expand into issues of how we talk about gender identity, 
discourses on “identity politics” in media, politics, and even our current national debate on 
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migrant caravans and immigrants.  In what follows, I narrow the scope of this dissertation to how 
the marginalized and oppressed are talked about in terms of racial identity; however, I hope to 
continue this project in other discourses on identity. 
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Chapter 2 
Racial Identity as an Existentiell: How Heidegger Overcomes the Abstraction Critique 
“Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to 
be itself or not itself.” 7   
- Martin Heidegger, Being and Time  
Introduction 
 In Being and Time (henceforth, BT), Martin Heidegger uses the term “Dasein” to 
describe what is usually called human existence. Dasein is defined as that being for whom its 
existence is an issue (33/12).  Heidegger describes the term “existentiell” as a way for Dasein to 
exist in the world that is made possible by our existential structures, (referred to in BT as 
existentialia in the plural and existentiale in the singular), some of which are what Heidegger 
calls “thrownness,” and “projection.”  We inhabit existentiells by our having grown up in them, 
choosing to be them, and sometimes neglecting to be them.  This chapter’s main argument is that 
Dasein can have a racial identity, which is an existentiell for Dasein, based on thrown-projection.  
I demonstrate that Dasein’s existentiell being a “thrown-projection” means that Dasein is always 
existing in the world by no control of its own (thrownness), yet it always moves toward 
possibilities of how to be itself in the world (projection), both constituting what Heidegger 
means by the term “existentiell,” which becomes a way to understand what is usually meant by 
the term “identity.” 
                                                 
7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: HarperCollins, 
2008), 33/12.  
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Some scholars critique this characterization of human existence as too abstract to be 
relevant to marginalized and oppressed people.  I explain this critique through the philosopher 
Mariana Ortega.  In her book, In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the 
Self (2016), Ortega argues for a notion of identity being a multiplicitous self, an identity tethered 
to various commitments, economic classes, cultures, histories, races, and ethnicities.  In 
explaining her concept of identity, she critiques Heidegger for his lack of insight into the identity 
of racialized people and the marginalized.  With Mariana Ortega’s idea of a multiplicitous 
identity in mind, I subject her critiques of Heidegger’s Dasein to my interpretation of a racial 
identity that is an existentiell grounded in thrown-projection.  The link between an existentiell as 
thrown-projection occurs in Lee Braver’s Heidegger (2014) and Thomas Sheehan’s Making 
Sense of Heidegger (2016).  I use both works to support my development of an existentiell, 
Heidegger’s term for an identity, grounded in thrown-projection.  Using Mariana Ortega as a 
representative of the “Abstraction Critique,” I argue that my analysis of an existentiell, as an 
identity, immunizes Heidegger from the “Abstraction” criticism.  My goal is to provide an 
understanding of how Ortega’s use of identity could work in Heidegger while also tracking how 
his concept of an existentiell works on her notion of multiplicitous being.  In this union of Ortega 
and Heidegger, I show how an existentiell as an identity could be extended into the notion of 
Dasein having a racial identity.  For this dissertation’s main purpose, in developing this point 
about an existentiell being an identity and then concluding that Dasein can have a racial identity, 
I connect Heidegger to a larger issue on racial discourse, with respect to how society talks about 
racial identity. 
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Mariana Ortega’s Abstraction Critique 
 In explaining her critique of Dasein as too abstract to speak to the issues of marginalized 
identities, Ortega elaborates on Heidegger’s view that Dasein’s authenticity is that it resolutely 
(entschlossen) chooses its past.  Resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) is “Dasein’s distinctive mode of 
disclosedness,” which reveals Dasein’s factical possibilities in terms of its engagement with 
things and other Dasein (343-44/297-98).  By factical, Heidegger means Dasein’s definite and 
concrete Being that is bound up with everything and everyone it encounters in the world (82/56). 
Heidegger explains that for Dasein to be “authentic” (eigentlich) or be its “authenticity” 
(Eigentlichkeit) it must be “something of its own” (68/43).  Thus, Dasein’s authenticity will be 
about a sense of ownership about its facticity (its factical existence).  Inauthenticity 
(Uneigentlichkeit) is Dasein’s having lost itself by being absorbed into existence through no 
choice of its own.  Thus, Dasein’s inauthenticity is about its lack of owning up to its facticity.  
Authenticity and inauthenticity are both modes of Dasein which come out of Dasein’s 
“undifferentiated character,” or its “averageness” (69/43).  The tendency of Dasein’s average 
mode is to move toward the inauthentic one, and away from authenticity.8  Each mode is 
Dasein’s, but the distinction is with respect to Dasein being swept up in life. “Dasein has in each 
case mineness [Jemeinigkeit],” but Dasein often gets influenced into other ways of being that do 
not authentically belong to it because it has not chosen those things out of its own accord yet 
(68/42).  For much of Dasein’s existence it has “lost itself and not yet won itself” (68/43).  One 
                                                 
8 Dasein’s tendency from averageness to inauthenticity is a contentious point for Heidegger scholars.  Taylor 
Carman writes, “in its average everyday mode Dasein is neither especially authentic nor inauthentic, neither ‘owning 
up’ and gaining a proper sense of itself nor ‘disowning’ itself and losing its proper self-understanding,” (286),while 
Richard Polt writes that Heidegger “will almost always portray everydayness as inauthentic” (45), and Hubert 
Dreyfus writes, “in its undifferentiated mode Dasein has always already fallen in with publicness” (235).  Lee Braver 
writes that “Heidegger is playing on two registers of the notion of averageness,” where averageness is valuable as a 
phenomenological concept to avoid “ideal” and “transcendent” overtones, while the second register is that 
“averageness represents a pressure to conform, to force oneself into the standard, losing what is unique and great” 
(46).   
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of Heidegger’s tasks throughout BT is to eventually explain how Dasein can win itself in a 
resolute manner, meaning that Dasein will claim its responsibility to choose its entire existence 
as its own.9 Mariana Ortega counters Heidegger’s idea of authenticity as a resolute choice with 
the following point:  
This sounds well and good until we take into consideration the experience of 
multiplicitous selves that are multicultural or that are on the margins.  Just what exactly is 
the shared history that the new mestiza is going to inherit, the one in which she is the 
conquered, the colonized, the bastard, the impure, the problem? … Heideggerian 
existential phenomenology cannot answer this question.  It is stuck in the model that, 
despite being revisionary in terms of its attack against the unified, epistemic subject, fails 
to capture the experience of multiplicitous selves.  Heidegger wishes the resolute, 
authentic being to find that one history that she shares with others and to repeat it, 
enhance it, or modify it, all while being part of the one destiny and fate of her people.  
The multiplicitous self, however, is caught between histories and traditions and is forging 
new histories as well.  She cannot be the resolute authentic Dasein that Heidegger has in 
mind.10  
 
Ortega says that Heidegger’s existential phenomenology cannot explain the multifaceted history 
that makes up the facticity of the “new mestiza,” the person that formidably maintains a diverse 
past and does not compromise it by assimilating into dominant narratives about identity.11 For 
Ortega, the new mestiza has intersecting histories and traditions (“the conquered, the colonized, 
the bastard, the impure”) and so it is difficult to determine how Dasein, as the new mestiza, 
would choose one, when the new mestiza is “caught” between many.  Mariana Ortega also 
questions Dasein’s relevance to the self as a lived experience, asking, “What does Heidegger’s 
authentic self have to do with me?” For Ortega, the “me” is a multiplicitous self.  What is the self 
                                                 
9 This is a simplified summation of when Heidegger writes, “The resolution is precisely the disclosive projection 
and determination of what is factically possible at the time.  To resoluteness, the indefiniteness characteristic of 
every potentiality-for-Being into which Dasein has been factically thrown, is something that necessarily belongs” 
((345/298).  I have incorporated the notion of Dasein’s Being-guilty, as in Dasein taking responsibility for itself, 
from (343/296) right before he offers his first definition of “resoluteness.” 
10 Mariana Ortega, In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self, (New York: SUNY 
Press, 2016), 130. 
11 Ortega, In-Between, 131. 
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a multiple of?  Ortega takes on the concept of Maria Lugones’ “world-traveler,” and she refers to 
Lugones’ work on the idea of a collective struggle.  Ortega writes,  
The new mestiza that I have in mind is the one that keeps the multiple histories alive and 
does not try to reconcile them so as to assimilate.  She needs to examine her experience 
of world-traveling, dissect it, and never let it lose its force; she needs to practice critical 
world-traveling.12  
 
What are these worlds that Ortega travels through?  This question is important to understanding 
her perspective because it takes us to the core self that Ortega identifies as multiple selves:  
Ortega identifies herself as a woman, scholar, and Latina.  These are more than just 
characteristics for Ortega; these are among a wide range of selves (identities) Ortega lives.  Thus, 
the “me” for Ortega has a range of personal histories.  Her critique of Heidegger is that he does 
not provide enough of a critical assessment of the self, where the word “critical” is, in Ortega’s 
book, italicized to distinguish it from traditional philosophical and critical assessments.  For 
Ortega, the idea of being critical is the sharp dissection of one’s experiencing of the world 
through a social, gendered, and academic lens.  It is less of the usual usage of critical in the 
analytic sense, and more critical in the social and political sense.  Critical in both the social and 
political sense is the acknowledgment of those who have been marginalized and pushed into the 
periphery by dominant features, narratives, and figures within society.  Thus, critical world-
traveling speaks to this element that Ortega finds missing in Heidegger.  Distinct from 
Heidegger’s idea of Dasein’s reflexivity, Ortega writes that critical world-traveling  
requires even more awareness. Continually traveling worlds is already a departure from 
the nonreflective understanding of life that Heideggerian being-in-the-world is supposed 
to be, but multiplicitous selves have to be even more vigilant so that the very experience 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 131. 
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of world-traveling does not lose its possibility for transformation.  Consequently, critical 
world-traveling entails both a personal and a broader component.13 
 
Ortega holds that the critical world-traveler traverses more theoretical and political terrain than 
the average Dasein and so the world-traveler requires more reflection as opposed to non-
reflective Dasein.  I will demonstrate that if we construe Dasein’s being an existentiell as an 
identity, founded upon thrown-projection, then we can account for Ortega’s critique of Dasein 
not being a critical world-traveler.  Exploring how an existentiell is formed by Dasein’s 
ontological structural whole as care (Sorge) will bring out a number of factors that are important 
for Dasein’s identity, such as thrownness, projection, facticity, mood (Befindlichkeit), and 
understanding (Verstehen), all of which will show that Dasein’s existentiell as identity is 
multifaceted in the way Ortega’s critique requires for a critical world-traveler to be. 
Heidegger’s Existentiell 
 As Heidegger explains in the beginning of Being and Time, to be is to be born into the 
world in a way that is one’s own (Jemeinigkeit). “To be or not be itself” becomes a crucial issue 
for Dasein (33/12).14 The issue implies that we are capable of both being ourselves and not 
ourselves, which implies that we somehow lose ourselves throughout our existence.  Dasein has 
what Heidegger calls “ontical affairs” to deal with (33/12).  Ontical affairs are detailed according 
to the content of our respective lives.  Heidegger dubs Dasein’s certain way and understanding of 
its existence as existentiell.  He writes 
Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of 
itself: to be itself or not itself.  Dasein has either chosen these possibilities itself, or gotten 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 131. 
14 The Macquarrie and Robinson translation of Being and Time writes about Dasein “that Being is an issue for it,” 
while Joan Stambaugh’s translation says that Dasein “is concerned about its very Being.” The “issue” and “about” 
elements are both important to the notion of an existentiell as identity because both indicate Dasein as both a 
particular problem for itself insofar as it is a particular entity that exists and deals with existence, and also a general 
problem insofar as it must deal with existing until it does not. 
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itself into them, or grown up in them already.  Only the particular Dasein decides its 
existence, whether it does so by taking hold of or by neglecting.  The question of 
existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.  The understanding of 
oneself which leads along this way we call “existentiell” (33/12). 
 
A concrete example of this passage is in Heidegger’s 1920 letter to his doctoral student, Karl 
Löwith, where Heidegger writes 
I work concretely and factically out of my “I am”—out of my spiritual and thoroughly 
factical heritage, my milieu, my life contexts, and whatever is available to me from these, 
as the vital experience in which I live.  This facticity, as existentiell, is no mere “blind 
existence”—this Dasein is one with existence, which means that I live it, this “I must” of 
which no one speaks.15 
 
Heidegger has characteristics that help shape his existence.  He refers to his “facticity,” as “a 
characteristic of Dasein’s Being--one which has been taken up into existence, even if proximally 
it has been thrust aside” (174/135).  It is a fact that one simply exists, but this largely gets 
concealed by the more specific and obvious characteristics of existing: the details of our daily 
lives.  Heidegger articulates to Löwith that he has grown up in a particular time, with a specific 
heritage, and a context that make up his life, which he “takes hold,” declaring to Löwith, “I 
must,” which is rooted in Heidegger’s “I am.” Heidegger appears dedicated to “straightening out 
the question” of his issues through “existing itself.”  An existentiell can extend to anyone as it is 
not about a certain type of person, but simply about the way one exists in the world.  For 
instance, I am a man, of Mexican heritage, born in the U.S., a teacher, and a student.  I do not 
have control over the fact that I grew up in a world with a preset idea of any of those factors 
about my existence, but I exert some sense of ownership over myself by being the person that 
lives those factors.  My living requires me to respond to these roles and characteristics as they 
accumulate in what can be called my identity or, for Heidegger, my existentiell.  I substantiate 
                                                 
15 Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 
1910-1927, (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 199. 
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myself with an existence that is mine.  I fill in these identities and unite them into one singular 
identity that is mine, even though the idea of them as possible roles preceded my existence.  My 
existence as those roles is simply the way I am those roles as they factor into my ontical affairs.  
I emphasize “my” and “mine” to demonstrate Heidegger’s point that Dasein is the kind of entity 
in which “The Being of any such entity is in each case mine,” expressing Dasein’s Jemeinigkeit, 
or “mineness” (67/41).  It is not enough to say that “I” exist and am engaged in various things, 
but that my existence is just that, mine.16 
 The concept of Dasein’s living as an existentiell is part of Heidegger’s grander picture of 
Dasein as care (Sorge).  In the chapter, “Care as the Being of Dasein,” Heidegger says that 
“Being-in-the-world is a structure which is primordially and constantly whole” (225/180).  Part 
of this structural whole is Dasein’s being factical or having facticity.  This point about one’s 
facticity is important because it establishes that one is always thrown into the world, wherein 
there are ontic facts about Dasein that belong to it.  Dasein does not choose this thrownness, but 
is tasked with confronting the situation it is in (that of thrownness) and eventually being 
responsible for it (taken up through always going toward possibilities of itself, projection).  As 
thrown, Dasein is always having to deal with “how, what, when, where, who, and why” it is in 
terms of possibilities of itself.  Dasein always projects itself onto these possibilities.  Heidegger 
writes, “But thrownness, as a kind of Being, belongs to an entity which in each case is its 
possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in terms 
of them, projecting itself upon them” (225/181).  While an existentiell tells Dasein certain things 
                                                 
16 François Raffoul, in “Otherness and individuation in Heidegger,” cautions readers on the concept of Jemeinigkeit 
because, he writes, “The possessive ‘mine’ should not be understood in the sense of a substantial property.  Dasein 
is not ‘mine’ as I had myself as a property.  Rather, I am “mine” in the sense that I have the entity that I am to be.  In 
fact, mineness lies in this possibility of existence.  I am ‘mine’ only to the extent that I am such a ‘to-be.’ Therefore, 
in the expression ‘Being-mine,’ the stress should be on ‘Being:’ Being-mine” from “Otherness and Individuation in 
Heidegger,” Man and World 28 (1995), 344.  
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about itself, it does not complete the structural whole, but is part of what makes Dasein’s being 
care, Sorge.  Additionally, Dasein being a structural whole that is Sorge means that Dasein must 
be “there” to engage with the world as a thrown-projection.  In its “there,” Dasein has both state-
of-mind or mood (henceforth, Befindlichkeit) and understanding (Verstehen).  With 
Befindlichkeit, Dasein always has a mood underlying its everyday handling of the world.  This 
mood is “prior to all psychology of moods,” and disclosive in the fact that it gives Dasein insight 
into its “there,” or as Heidegger puts it, “that it is and has to be” (174/135).  In the understanding, 
Dasein is not cognizing: That is how we commonly take “understanding” to be.  For Heidegger, 
Verstehen is an existentiale, a fundamental feature of our existence.  Understanding is that 
disclosive part of Dasein’s structural whole that frees Dasein to get involved with the world, 
making one free to move toward its possibilities.  Thus, although existentiells are important to 
this chapter’s project of seeing how they underlie what we typically see as identity, there is an 
underlying structural whole that relies on Dasein being Sorge.  By grasping this important 
grounding of an existentiell, we can see what it means for Dasein to be itself or not be itself as it 
engages with its world. 
Dasein as Ontico-Ontological 
 Heidegger uses “existentiell” and “ontic” synonymously in his discussion of Dasein’s 
ontico-ontological being when he says “the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are 
ultimately existentiell, that is, ontical” (34/13).  Heidegger explains a concept called the 
“ontological difference.” He contrasts the ontological and ontical to eventually unite them.  
Ontic is the various facts about an entity.  The ontological is how Dasein takes issue with its 
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existence.17 Dasein being ontological is not merely the fact that it takes issue with existence, as 
that would only demonstrate that Dasein is ontically distinctive in the fact that it is ontological.  
Rather, Dasein’s always “taking issue” with itself is what makes it ontological.  “Taking issue” is 
what Dasein is always doing.  Thus, Dasein is both ontic and ontological: It is ontico-ontological.  
It is a fact that Dasein exists.  It is also a unique fact that Dasein is in the process of working 
through the issue of its very Being.  Such a characteristic of wrestling with one’s Being cannot 
be said of mere things that do not “take issue” with existing.   
 The analysis of Dasein as an existential Being depends on clues about Dasein’s Being as 
both ontical and ontological.  I emphasize this distinction because Dasein is not traditionally 
understood as “Being-there,” but as a subject and in the chapters that follow, we will encounter 
examples from scholars that demonstrate how one’s identity is akin to a subject, even an object.  
However, Dasein is not a subject or an object.  Heidegger’s term for one’s existence, Dasein, 
with “Da” meaning “there” and “Sein” meaning “Being” helps him move from subject-oriented 
language like “human being,” “person,” or even “human life.” Viewing one’s existence as just 
another ontic subject or object conceals the ontological structure of Dasein, as a structural whole 
that is Sorge.  About this ontic focus, Heidegger writes that  
Ontological inquiry is indeed more primordial, as over against the ontical inquiry of the 
positive sciences.  But it remains itself naïve and opaque if in its researches into the 
Being of entities it fails to discuss the meaning of Being in general (31/11).   
 
Heidegger pushes against the focus on the ontic, by explaining that the ontological is the 
primordial ground for Dasein that needs elaboration.  Heidegger determines the meaning of 
Being by looking at its structural and ontological basis, as well as the ontico-existentiell factors 
                                                 
17 Hubert L. Dreyfus makes the distinction “between that which concerns beings and that which concerns ways of 
being,” Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and Time,” Division 1, (1994), 19. 
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of Dasein’s existence.  However, from this basis, he can make the point that there is a way to be 
that any Dasein has as its own and that the factical and ontical arrangement of characteristics 
govern the way to live in the world.  If you have the characteristics of a tall man, for example, 
there will be a way to be that goes along with such a stature.  Yet, your tallness will not be the 
same for all tall Dasein.  Similarly, if one has the characteristics of being light-skinned and dark-
skinned in a society that has diverse perspectives on those characteristics, then having such skin 
(light or dark) will be loaded with meaning.  Despite these different views, there will be several 
ways for any Dasein to be its skin color.  Only a Dasein, in its own way, will determine how to 
make that characteristic a part of its way to be in the world.  The way to be that any Dasein has 
as its own, Heidegger calls “existentiell”; I call this “identity.” 
Heidegger Scholars on the Many Uses of “Existentiell” 
 At different points of BT, an “existentiell” serves as a descriptor or adjective for various 
terms in both divisions of Being and Time. In Division 1, Heidegger uses existentiell to describe 
a kind of “manner,” “interpretation,” “primordiality,” and “signification.” Then in Division 2, he 
uses existentiell as a kind of “Being-towards-death” (Sein zum Tod), “question,” “projection,” 
“modification,” “understanding,” and most notably with terms like “way,” “manner,” 
“understanding,” and especially, “possibility” during his discussion of resoluteness.  Heidegger’s 
different uses of “existentiell” provides Heidegger scholars with many ways to define 
“existentiell.”   
Some scholars use existentiell as something more concrete and substantive than a 
descriptor, like a role or life path.  For instance, Hubert Dreyfus says that an existentiell is a way 
of expressing Dasein’s roles in life, writing that it is a “kind of understanding,” namely “an 
individual’s understanding of his or her own way to be, that is, of what he or she is” (Dreyfus; 
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1994), while other Heidegger scholars view this term as a choice about how to live (Braver; 
2014).  Thomas Sheehan writes that an existentiell is any specific person, but he also explains 
that it can be an act and a kind of understanding (Sheehan; 2015).  William Blattner concisely 
writes that an existentiell is simply “pertaining to some ontic aspect of us” (Blattner; 2006).18 
Richard Polt defines an existentiell as “pertaining to some individual Dasein’s own existence” 
and asserts that this kind of “understanding is defective” and that we are “partially aware of it” 
(Polt; 1999).19 He further implies that the idea of an existentiell is implicit, limited in what it tells 
Dasein about itself in contrast to our existentiality, which provides a general structure for all 
Dasein.  Thus, “existentiell” is the source of an immense amount of theoretical work for initially 
just being a term for Dasein’s understanding of its ontical affairs.  The different renderings of 
existentiell demonstrate that the term stands for the “how, what, when, where, who, why” of 
Dasein’s ontical existence.  
 In addition to his use of the term as a descriptor, Heidegger points out how an existentiell 
is a type of understanding.  For example, he writes that “Unless we have an existentiell 
understanding, all analysis of existentiality will remain groundless” (360/312).  If an existentiell 
is a kind of understanding of oneself that we grow up in, got ourselves into, deliberately choose 
or neglect, then he seems to be saying, “Unless we have an individualized understanding of 
Dasein then all analysis of existentiality will remain groundless.” What is likely the case, given 
his other uses of existentiell (especially with reference to “possibility”), is that he means, “Unless 
we have an individualized ‘how, what, when, where, who, why’ understanding, all analysis of 
existentiality will remain groundless.” Another related possibility is that he means, “Unless we 
deal with my existence, existential inquiry remains groundless.” 
                                                 
18 William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time, (New York: Continuum, 2006), 24. 
19 Richard Polt, Heidegger, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 35. 
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 “Existentiell” is also a kind of existence, but as the term increases in use, especially when 
Heidegger connects it to “possibilities” in Division 2, the term turns into a way of saying “single 
identity of Dasein.” An “existentiell” allows Heidegger to emphasize that Dasein deals with the 
world in its way.  An existentiell is then a way of being that expresses Dasein’s Jemeinigkeit.  
Given this move toward mineness, an existentiell can be about any Dasein.  Recalling 
Heidegger’s first discussion of an existentiell in BT, this issue is still about whether Dasein is 
“itself or not itself.” All at once, this existentiell living is about the six questions of my existence 
previously mentioned, indicating that Heidegger requires incorporating the possibilities that 
Dasein has taken up and neglected into the ontic conception of who Dasein is.   
Sheehan on Existentiell and Meaning 
Thomas Sheehan describes an existentiell as a specific person, way to be, mediation, and 
act. “I use the adjectives ‘existentiel’ as referring to any specific person.”20 An “existentiell” 
(Sheehan spells it as “existentiel”) points to an individual Dasein.  Sheehan explains mediation 
as Dasein “making sense of things both practically and theoretically,” as opposed to unmediated, 
which is an “intuitive grasp of things.”21 Mediation is an act, an “existentiel act,” a “productive 
seeing,” which is the way Dasein makes sense of its world.  Sheehan writes  
To have things meaningfully present requires a “productive seeing”—or better, a 
productive doing, a finite and fallible “taking-as” on the part of ex-sistence.  This entails 
the ever-present possibility of taking something incorrectly, as well as the need to always 
re-take things over and over again as new evidence and new hermeneutical possibilities 
emerge.22 
 
The person, the way to be, mediation, and act are packaged in a set of ontic characteristics that 
are shaped by a ready-made meaning.  Sheehan writes, “Being-in-the-world-of-meaningfulness 
                                                 
20 Thomas Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), xvi.   
21 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 60. 
22 Sheehan, 94. 
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is what makes possible the existentiel-personal aheadness-and-return of our everyday 
activities.”23 Every day and in every activity, Dasein projects itself through the existentiell as a 
personal way, an act, and mediation, which are all grounded in Dasein’s thrownness.  Dasein is 
thrown into the world with a certain arrangement of ontical facts that “fill in” the meaning of 
one’s identity.  Dasein then projects: It is always making moves toward its possibilities, whether 
through neglecting or taking hold.  Thus, Dasein is a thrown-projection.   
 Thrownness is part of the basis of Dasein.  About this basis, Sheehan writes that “As 
thrown-open, human beings are a priori thrown into the labor of mediation, condemned to (or 
better, liberated for) making sense of things both practically and theoretically.”24 Dasein makes 
practical and theoretical sense of things from its existentiell understanding of the world.  
Dasein’s facticity provides the content for an existentiell understanding to work with.  In one 
sense, for Sheehan, we are trapped and forced into dealing with our existence because we are 
always thrown into the mix of things.  However, in a liberating sense, being thrown sets us up to 
freely choose or neglect possibilities to be or not to be. 
Braver on Thrown-Projection 
Thrownness is not unique to Sheehan’s assessment of what contributes to an existentiell.  
Lee Braver also shares this view of thrownness and connects it to projection.  Returning to my 
interpretation of an existentiell, we can call Heidegger’s existentiell an identity and not 
compromise the idea that thrownness and projection co-produce the basis of an existentiell.  
Thrownness provides the setting and characteristics for which Dasein will eventually be 
responsible.   
                                                 
23 Ibid, 146. 
24 Ibid., 101. 
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Lee Braver’s assessment of an existentiell as thrown-projection emphasizes Heidegger’s 
explanation of existentiells in Section 4 of BT when Braver writes “Dasein has either chosen 
these possibilities itself or got itself into them,” where the “chosen” part is “projection” and “got 
itself into them” is “thrownness.”25 He states 
But we are to some degree unformed, which means that it is up to us to form our selves. 
We become a particular kind of person by living a particular life, making what Heidegger 
calls “existentiell” decisions, which means that they pertain to specific Dasein, as 
opposed to “existential” features that all Dasein have.26  
 
Braver connects the concept of “existentiell” with deliberate decisions about one’s life, these turn 
out to be a manifestation of Dasein’s projection onto possibilities.  Braver says  
When we are in-the-world we know how to move along its lines of significance: we 
understand how to be a student by knowing how to use pens and paper and desks and 
chairs properly.  Heidegger explains this understanding as projecting things onto their 
possibilities.27   
 
Projection is Dasein’s forward movement into its possibilities.  Braver explains this in terms of a 
student “knowing how to use pens and paper and desks and chairs properly.”28 The “know how” 
is important as Dasein’s individual acts, mediations, and choices are guided by an understanding 
of what it is doing in a very average and minimal sense, but fulfilling enough of the “how” and 
“what” of being a student. 
For Heidegger, thrownness constantly places Dasein into a factical arrangement of 
characteristics that comprise the details about our respective selves.  An individual did not have a 
say in its origin, nor in the facts surrounding it.  It is only later in life where Dasein has to play 
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catch up and assume responsibility for the things it has decided and not decided on.29 Because of 
this, Dasein literally plays catch up to its possibilities, in the form of attempting to decide, 
inauthentically or authentically, to act, mediate, and choose a way to be.  Braver writes, “Dasein 
is its thrown basis by projecting itself ‘upon possibilities into which it has been thrown’” 
(330/284), which means that the range of possibilities open to us is limited by the facts we are 
thrown into.30 Braver writes 
As we said, thrownness and projection are equi-primordial, braided together in complex 
and deep ways.  Projection is the more active aspect, meaning what I chose to do, 
whereas thrownness indicates those facts which I simply find to be the case, but rather 
than being in conflict, the two can only exist together.31 
 
Projection is Dasein’s always doing something about its situation.  For example, imagine a 
surprise birthday party was thrown for you.  Whether you wanted it or not, the party is happening 
to you and you to it.  Now you find yourself within the boundaries of that event that dictate how 
you act, how to think about it, and the choices you make as an “all-of-a-sudden-party goer.” In 
virtue of the party being a surprise, you find yourself in a party, and so are forced to project 
yourself into a limited range of possibilities.  You can leave, you can stay and be bored, you can 
stay and have fun, but whatever you do it is a possibility that is tethered to the thrown party.  
“Suddenly being a party-goer” is your temporary possibility that you are currently engaging in, 
and you can neglect it or take hold of it.  Whatever you do in your projection will be a response 
to the situation that comes across as happening to you, since it did not occur out of your own 
accord.  Yet, since the party is about you, you are somehow responsible for the whole thing.  
                                                 
29 Braver writes, “we were born, ‘thrown’ into this life and a host of particular features about our particular life 
(collectively called facticity), but not of our doing and not by our choice.  We did not decide to be born, or where or 
when or as what, nor did we enact our own creation.  We are, before our first breath, beneficiaries of people and 
events that we had no part in, even though we owe our very existence to them” 86. 
30 Ibid., 87. 
31 Ibid., 55. 
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Now imagine a different “party” that is “thrown” for you. You are born in Venezuela and the 
government, for many reasons that are too various to get into here, cannot provide basic life 
necessities for you to survive.  It is 2019, and every day this is the “party” that is “thrown” at 
you.  Though you may strongly identify with being a Venezuelan and leaving your country 
would make you feel deeply conflicted about who you are, you decide to make the long trek to 
the Colombian border where there are more economic options.  In moving from the example of 
being a party-goer to the example of being a potential refugee, we can see that in being a thrown-
projection (regardless of the setting and ontic facts about one’s situation), Dasein’s identity 
reveals itself to be an ontical affair.  It is an ontical affair in the sense that Dasein must decide to 
be or not be itself, to assess what possibilities remain, given all the ontical factors of its existence 
in play. 
 With the two examples above in mind, an interesting idea emerges from Braver’s and 
Sheehan’s account of an existentiell: Dasein’s deliberate choice can sustain an existentiell, but an 
existentiell can also be Dasein just doing things.  Dasein, sometimes by choice and, most of the 
time, just by thoughtlessly acting in the world, projects possibilities and these can vary.  Dasein 
projects its identity by Dasein either deliberately choosing or by just always moving toward 
possibilities for itself. 
Acting on and thoughtless responsiveness to one’s situation appear to dominate the way 
in which Dasein sustains its identity as a possibility of itself.  Dasein’s identity is what it actively 
moves toward and the possibilities it leaves behind.  As Braver puts it, we “live our thrownness” 
by projecting our possibilities that are limited to the facts that we find ourselves in.32 If 
possibilities are taken as “ways to be” and these “ways” are taken as identities and roles, then we 
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see that one’s thrownness provides a factical template for Dasein to act on.  An existentiell, seen 
as an identity means that Dasein’s ability to be itself is always limited to its ontical arrangements 
and ontical circumstances.  Such arrangement and circumstances can be limited by history.  With 
history in mind, we can begin to see how some Dasein find themselves as being, for example, 
thrown-projected as raced, sexed, gendered, and classed.  These are all crucial factors in what we 
typically call “identity.” 
Replying to Ortega’s Abstraction Critique 
 Ortega says Heidegger’s project, for all its revolutionary aims and accomplishments in 
phenomenology, “fails to capture” a certain kind of self, but in what sense are we to take “fails to 
capture”?  If that phrase means that Heidegger is unable to evaluate the specific content of an 
individual, then this is correct, as accomplishing that goal is not his project.  However, if the idea 
of “capture” means that his project would then allow us to phenomenologically frame those 
experiences as ones about Dasein being itself or not itself, then Heidegger successfully captures 
all experiences of Dasein to the degree that those experiences are Dasein’s ontical affairs, which 
it takes hold of or neglects and which Dasein must authentically own through resoluteness.  To 
that end, understanding an existentiell as an identity demonstrates that any Dasein, in a sense, is 
a “multiplicitous self… caught between histories and traditions” and “forging new histories.”33 
To Ortega’s critique of Heidegger as not historically considering one’s multiplicitous 
identity, we can see that Heidegger’s view of Dasein’s historicity, in conjunction with the 
understanding of existentiell as an identity, encompasses the process of Dasein’s past constantly 
presenting itself in Dasein’s future.  Dasein’s historizing is the fact that it deals with a range of 
possibilities limited by past and tradition.  Heidegger writes that “Dasein has grown up both into 
                                                 
33 Ortega, In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self, 130. 
 37 
and in a traditional way of interpreting itself” (41/20). Dasein studies its history, engaging in 
historiology.  However, Dasein need not research history to be historical.  Dasein, by virtue of its 
kind of being, is its historicity. Dasein necessarily engages with its past, and since Dasein is its 
past, Dasein always deals with its historicity and questions the meaning of Being.  Engaging the 
question means dealing with the traditional answers clung to by researchers of history (41/20).  
The issue is with concealment.  Heidegger believes that clinging to tradition conceals Dasein’s 
historicality.  The critical point for Heidegger is that Dasein cannot just deal with its traditionally 
understood history at the risk of concealing itself further than it already has.   
By looking at historicity, we can see that Dasein’s clinging to the idea of an objective 
tradition prevents it from understanding its responsibility for its circumstances.  By 
responsibility, Heidegger means Dasein’s resoluteness.  Resoluteness is the choosing of oneself 
where the self is comprised of one’s past, present, and future.  There are a range of possibilities 
that exist within that framework, where the said framework can be cultural, political, and 
personal, all depending on the Dasein in question.  Therefore, to be resolute for Dasein as a 
critical world-traveler would be to say “yes” to all the questions Ortega poses as a world-traveler.  
Ortega asks, 
Just what exactly is the shared history that the new mestiza is going to inherit, the one in 
which she is the conquered, the colonized, the bastard, the impure, the problem?  Or is it 
the one in which her ancestors fight and resist until they no longer can?  Or is it the newly 
formed history of the good mestizos, “Hispanics,” the ones who assimilate and become 
part of the great large family of this “America”?34  
 
As discussed before, Ortega says that Heidegger’s existential phenomenology cannot answer 
these questions because Dasein is an abstraction that does not have to deal with its history.  On 
the contrary, to the extent that Heidegger’s historicity manifests itself in Dasein’s ontical affairs, 
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the answer to Ortega’s questions involve everything about Dasein’s identity.  For example, at 
various times, I am a Chicano, Mexican-American, student, and teacher, and I must live these 
roles because, in a way, I have no other choice, but in another way, I choose to.  Additionally, as 
an existentiell, there is a talk about my ontic existence that I cannot avoid.  I must live these roles 
and even deal with the talk about them because, as Dasein, I am always thrown into an existence 
that I did not choose, but always project.  It is in this that the tension Ortega observes in her idea 
of the multiplicitous self takes root.  It is then up to me to deal with the tension emanating from 
the dynamic of an existentiell being comprised of thrownness and projection.  I think this is what 
Ortega wants to tease out from her notion of the multiplicitous self; therefore, her view and my 
interpretation are consistent with each other, and by implication, her view appears to be 
consistent with Heidegger’s project.   
 An existentiell taken as an identity provides an opportunity for Dasein to reflect on how it 
exists in a world where its identity is center stage.  Whether Dasein takes on this opportunity 
would then be a matter of Dasein’s will to inquire about the kind of discourse surrounding one’s 
identity and then how one deals with that talk.  Individually, the idea of an existentiell identity 
fleshes out the dynamic of a world-traveler that Ortega finds missing in Heidegger’s view of 
Dasein.  I argue that it is not missing.  On the contrary, it is because of the dynamic composition 
of Dasein as a thrown-projection, which makes it have an existentiell in the first place and if 
one’s existentiell is one’s having an identity then the concept of an identity becomes the 
condition for Dasein to have any identity, including that of a critical world-traveler.   
Dasein’s Racial Identity 
 Earlier, I discussed an existentiell as an identity.  An existentiell is the outcome of 
Dasein’s thrownness and projection.  An existentiell, as an identity, has ontic characteristics and 
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Dasein deals with these aspects of itself as it lives, reacts to people, and receives reactions.  An 
existentiell understanding of one’s racial category can influence how it projects itself into 
possibilities of what roles it can be or not be.  The racial categories serve as roles that Dasein 
ends up finding itself in and acting through.  Dasein has existentiells which are forced upon 
individuals.  They are thrown into roles.  For example, Luis J. Rodriguez writes about the 
imposition of an identity that he had to confront as a high school freshman from the East Hills in 
Los Angeles.  In his autobiography Always Running: La Vida Loca; Gang Days in L.A., he 
writes 
If you came from the Hills, you were labeled from the start.  I’d walk into the counselor’s 
office for whatever reason and looks of disdain greeted me – one meant for a criminal, 
alien, to be feared.  Already a thug.  It was harder to defy this expectation than just accept 
it and fall into the trappings.  It was a jacket I could try to take off, but they kept putting it 
back on.  The first hint of trouble and the preconceptions proved true.  So why not be 
proud?  Why not be an outlaw?  Why not make it our own?35 
 
As seen from Rodriguez’s experiences as a youth, the performance of being this existentiell 
comes with acknowledging a threatening element to how he is regarded by another Dasein.  In 
Rodriguez’s case, the prejudicial stereotype about his identity precedes him.  He is thrown into a 
world where his existentiell means something.  Not seeing a way out of his existentiell, 
Rodriguez gets closer to deliberately confirming his counselor’s expectations.  Thus, Rodriguez 
simply becomes that existentiell.  Rodriguez has both got himself into his possibilities and he has 
grown up in them.  In this instance, he takes hold of this identity of being someone to be feared.  
He chooses to make it his own.  His world has possibilities that are about his existence and those 
possibilities do not require his input.36  As Dasein, Rodriguez expresses an idea about existence 
that is like what Heidegger interrogates in BT: the idea that we are influenced by a general kind 
                                                 
35 Luis J. Rodriguez, Always Running, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 84. 
36 I mention this example again in the section entitled “Existentiells” as we see how Rodriguez ends up “choosing” 
the existentiell imposed upon him by his counselor and other high school staff. 
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of talk about others.37 Rodriguez has an ontical arrangement that we can call his racial identity.  
He is Latino, he lived and still lives in East Los Angeles; he was a gang member; he is a writer; 
he is a father.  We would probably need to speak with him to understand the “how” and “why” of 
his existence as he understands it, and we would then know his existentiell understanding of his 
being.  Another way of saying this is that Dasein finds itself inhabiting various roles.   
Existentiells like one’s cultural upbringing, ethnicity, and race, do not usually arise from 
choice.  These kinds of roles or identities are the ways of being that people find themselves in.  
While people may deliberately choose their existentiells as exemplified by Rodriguez, people are 
also bound to existentiells that have their respective assumptions about how one must act.38  
Whether such existentiells are chosen or not, Dasein must engage in the world through an 
identity. (an existentiell).  For example, if an ontic arrangement of facts is that one is Latina then 
that has its own existentiell assumptions.  Such a phenomenon occurs in The Moths and Other 
Stories.  In this book, Helena María Viramontes writes about the hardships of various young 
women growing up as Chicana and dealing with the background of roles that precede them.  She 
writes about a girl named Naomi confronting her father’s prejudices about what women should 
and should not do: 
It was Apá who refused to trust her, and she could not understand what she had done to 
make him so distrustful.  TÚ ERES MUJER, he thundered like a great voice above the 
heavens, and that was the end of any argument, any question, because he said those 
words not as truth, but as verdict, and she could almost see the clouds parting, the 
                                                 
37 I will elaborate on how this something else that informs Dasein’s existentiells is what Heidegger refers to as the 
They, the Anyone, and das man.  I use the terms interchangeably as Stambaugh and Macquarrie & Robinson use the 
They and the German term das man interchangeably in their translations of Being and Time, while Charles Guignon 
and Hubert Dreyfus tend to use the Anyone in Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and 
Time,” Division 1 (1994) and Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge and Being-in-the-world (1983), 
respectively. 
38 In Making Sense of Heidegger (2014) Thomas Sheehan says that to understand oneself and how one wishes to 
project oneself out into the world and future, Dasein require existentials (components that make Dasein’s existential 
structure) in place so that the existentiell act can come about.  According to Sheehan, Dasein has its possibilities 
because the existential background is already there.   
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thunderbolts breaking the tranquility of her sex.  Naomi tightened her grasp with the 
thought, shaking her head in disbelief. ‘So what’s wrong with being a mujer?’ she asked 
herself aloud.39 
 
Here, Naomi, as Dasein, is bound to her existentiell possibilities as governed by her father’s 
authoritative stance about what a woman should be.  The existentiell possibilities become a 
limiting factor.  They are not only managed by Naomi, but to a grander extent they are already 
set out for her by her father.  Her father, in his own way, has an idea of what it is to be a woman 
and he intends to make Naomi be that way, not for her to choose it, not for her to be proud of it.   
With Naomi’s story, we see how Dasein exists as an existentiell governed by both Dasein and its 
world, which can be at odds with other assumptions regarding those existentiells.  One’s racial 
and cultural identity is given meaning by all the circumstances of its existence, including those 
circumstances that other people use to impose ideas of identity on others.  
Conclusion 
My interpretation of an existentiell allows me to say that Dasein is born into an 
identity/role in which it is a recipient of circumstances, but that Dasein also chooses factical 
aspects of itself through action and reflection.  Critics like Mariana Ortega remark that certain 
existentiells have an advantage over non-world-travelers when it comes to critically reflecting on 
different ties to history and various current life situations.  Her criticism suggests that the 
existentiell of being a critical world traveler has more critical substance than other identities.   
Given my interpretation of an existentiell as an identity, Ortega’s assessment seems at 
least partially true because there are some identities that require more reflexivity than others, but 
this is not because of a multiplicitous self that is tied in different directions like with the example 
of Naomi in Maria Viramontes story.  Rather, the reflexivity has to do with how existentiells are 
                                                 
39 Helena María Viramontes, The Moths and Other Stories, (Houston: Arte Público Press, 1995), 36. 
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already meaning-laden in society versus how Dasein identifies with these existentiells.  For 
instance, Viramontes’ Naomi character was dealing with the expectation of what her father 
deemed a woman to be versus Naomi’s experience.  Rodriguez’s autobiography contends that he 
was thought of as a gang member by his own high school counselor, though this was not how 
Rodriguez identified himself prior to the judgment his counselor imposed upon him.  The 
existentiells of Dasein versus society’s ideas of them bring us to the primordial in-betweenness 
and tension with identity.  And so, we have arrived at how Heidegger’s existentiell can serve as a 
phenomenological and ontological source for Ortega’s world-traveler. 
As Braver discusses, as Dasein, “We will always ‘lag behind’ our selves because we must 
rely on something given just in order to examine our beliefs.  However, even though we didn’t 
create our selves, this doesn’t mean that they’re not really us.”40 I think this is right.  There is 
always a possibility that Dasein is lagging behind because it was never choosing itself “from the 
ground up.”41 In all of the examples presented (with Rodriguez and Viramontes) the issue is how 
Dasein will catch up from lagging behind, given that these notions of identity were those that 
Dasein found itself in by way of existing.  In what way can any of these Dasein figures be 
themselves if they are always playing catch up?  The answer is in the Eigentlichkeit of their 
existence, their authenticity.   
Finally, I think Mariana Ortega’s concern about Heidegger’s project not being able to 
speak to the concerns of the marginalized and multiplicitous self is worth further consideration 
beyond my current interpretation of an existentiell in this chapter.  There is something about 
certain identities that needs clarification from an existential and ontological perspective, and this 
can happen with Being and Time.  There are existentiells that, through their ontical content, 
                                                 
40 Braver, 87. 
41 Ibid., 87. 
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evoke a heightened atmosphere of threat and fear.  The next step in dealing with how 
Heidegger’s Being and Time can explain specific content about Dasein is by examining how 
certain identities have the sense of fear and threat about them.  I develop this issue of an 
existentiell as established in fear in the next chapter.  I will examine Heidegger’s analysis of fear 
to demonstrate a kind of identity I call a “fear existentiell.” Thomas Sheehan writes, “Our urge to 
survive resists death and the chaos of things going their own way apart from us—and yet our 
mortality is our very bondedness to the chaos that will finally swallow us.”42 In the next chapter, 
I will develop an argument as to why such chaos takes its toll on an existentiell, making it 
fearful, feared, and feared for.  Showing this fear existentiell to be rooted in Gerede and Dasein’s 
mood of fear, I will demonstrate that this “chaos of things” can be attributed to the way we talk 
about certain identities in relation to fear.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Sheehan, 114. 
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Chapter 3 
Covered Up with Bodies: Dasein as a Fear Existentiell and Societal De-Severance 
“I’d walk into the counselor’s office for whatever reason and looks of disdain greeted me – one 
meant for a criminal, alien, to be feared.”43   
- Luis J. Rodriguez, Always Running: La Vida Loca, Gang Days in L.A. 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I elaborate on what it would mean to have an existentiell sustained by 
fear.  Building on the work of the last chapter where I discussed how an identity is an existentiell 
with an underlying structure of thrown-projection, I show in this chapter that an existentiell can 
be influenced by the inauthentic mood of fear and idle talk, a fallen discourse that Heidegger 
calls Gerede.  I call the union of an existentiell and the mood of fear in a single identity a “fear 
existentiell.” Given that Heidegger discusses the phenomenon of fear in three ways within Being 
and Time (BT), I argue that a fear existentiell encompasses all three, where Dasein can be fearful 
of, feared by, and feared for by other Dasein.  
Taking Dasein as Present-at-hand: Dasein as a Body 
Our current analysis of existentiells will take us along this path of dealing with the nature 
of the discursive type of covering up that occurs with Dasein.  Some Dasein are more 
interpretatively layered because they are “taken as” something they are not more than other 
Dasein are.  Heidegger alludes to the general possibility that Dasein is “taken as” something it is 
not when he says 
                                                 
43 Luis J. Rodriguez, Always Running. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 84. 
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for even entities which are not worldless—Dasein itself, for example—are present-at-
hand ‘in’ the world, or, more exactly, can with some right and within certain limits be 
taken as merely present-at-hand.  To do this, one must completely disregard or just not 
see the existential state of Being-in (82/55).  
 
We see that though Heidegger has already established that Dasein is not a present-at-hand entity, 
it is taken as that and when this kind of covering occurs, the likely reason is that one is 
neglecting important existential features of Dasein.  When Dasein is interpreted as having just an 
ontical identity, it becomes theorized about in a present-at-hand way.  That Dasein might be just 
overly interpreted, causing Dasein’s existentiality to be overlooked via a present-at-hand 
interpretation.  Ontic things are analyzed in the mode of being present-at-hand (pah), vorhanden, 
but Dasein is not merely an ontic thing.  For Heidegger, things have modes of being: one mode is 
pah and the other is ready-to-hand (rth), zuhanden.  A person works toward a goal, grabbing 
whatever available to complete that goal: Heidegger calls this availability ready-to-hand (rth).  
When something goes wrong in the completion of a task (no matter how simple or complex), the 
ready-to-handness breaks down; it is then in present-at-hand mode.  The breakdown suspends the 
availability and the absence of the tool presents itself to Dasein, becoming present-at-hand.  
Heidegger argues against the notion that Dasein is either ready-to-hand or present-at-
hand, but he consistently addresses the issue of Dasein being “taken as” present-at-hand.  In 
section 7 of Being and Time, Heidegger elaborates on “discourse” and “letting something be 
seen” (56/32).  Discourse allows something to be seen that is already discoverable within the 
world and Dasein gets the truth of that entity through inquiring about it.  As a result, whether the 
discussion is about the truth or falsity of a thing, discourse hinges upon the discoverability of an 
entity, how that leads to truth, the covering up of something, and how the discovery leads to 
falsity (57/33).  The idea of an entity (Dasein or non-Dasein) being covered up is a constant issue 
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in BT.  Heidegger’s covering up is a “putting something in front of something (in such a way as 
to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not” (57/33).  Dasein is 
covered through an over-reliance on the ontic themes about entities as seen through various 
disciplines that tend to side step or forget about the question of Being.  Consequently, Dasein can 
be taken as something it is not through discourse.  That this occurs does not necessarily make 
Dasein become that very pah portrayal under analysis, but the portrayal still functions as a 
covering that is taken as a substitute for Dasein’s Being, however mistaken such a substitution 
may be.  Dasein then has the capacity to become clothed in discourse to the point where it is 
taken as something it is not. 
Heidegger explores the idea of Dasein that are less interpretatively covered up by 
remarking on “primitive Dasein.”  Primitive Dasein is an extreme case of very little 
interpretation.  Heidegger says it is nearer to how Dasein engages the world because it has fewer 
interpretations to cover it up.  The opposite extreme is the over-interpretation of Dasein we see 
when Dasein is taken as something with many present-at-hand interpretations.  The purpose of 
Heidegger’s synopsis of a primitive Dasein is to demonstrate that when we discuss individuals, 
we often throw interpretative layers over Dasein’s everydayness, characterized as one’s 
averageness or “undifferentiated character” (69/43).  About this primitive Dasein, Heidegger 
writes that it would be “less concealed and less complicated by extensive self-interpretation on 
the part of the Dasein in question” (76/51).  If primitive Dasein is prone to be more bare in its 
“bringing out the ontological structures of phenomena in a genuine way” then this implies that a 
heavily interpreted Dasein has an everydayness that is more covered up by discourses, meaning 
that a primitive Dasein would be more authentic in the bareness of its ontological structures.   
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Dasein’s Fallenness  
 Dasein’s everydayness is characterized by idle talk (Gerede), curiosity, and ambiguity, all 
of which help Dasein embed itself in das Man’s world (219-220/175).  Heidegger calls Dasein’s 
absorption in the world of das Man “falling,” (Verfallen).  Rede, as discourse, is an existential 
structure (existentiale) of Dasein, but Gerede is the fallen version of such discourse.  It reveals to 
“Dasein a Being towards its world, towards Others, and towards itself—a Being in which these 
are understood, but in a mode of groundless floating” (221/177).  Idle talk helps Dasein interpret 
everything about existing. “Curiosity discloses everything and anything” and ambiguity lets 
Dasein see everything, “but only in order that Being-in-the-world should be suppressed” so that 
“Dasein is everywhere and nowhere” (221/177).  Although I discuss Gerede, ambiguity, and 
curiosity more in depth in the next chapter, it is crucial to understand that these are features 
assisting in Dasein’s embeddedness in the world.  Verfallen shows us that Dasein is not itself in 
an eigentlich (authentic) way but is always absorbed in an uneigentlich (inauthentic) 
understanding of itself, allowing it to interpret itself in any way that makes it tranquil and 
assured of its everyday existence.  Thus, if Dasein has a manner of speaking that covers up its 
ownmost Being-in-the-world, then we can call this a “fallen discourse.”  If Dasein has a present-
at-hand ontological understanding of human existence, then this can be called a “fallen 
ontology.”  And whether one is speaking of a fallen discourse or ontology, it should be noted that 
Heidegger is not saying that Dasein’s fallenness itself is “bad” or “deplorable” (220/176), but 
just demonstrative of Dasein’s not being itself, being inauthentic, being alienated from itself, and 
“entangled [verfängt] in itself” (223/178).  
A heavily interpreted Dasein suggests that Dasein has a fallen interpretation that covers 
up its ownmost Being.  With the discussion of existentiells as identity in the last chapter, Dasein 
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can be interpreted as an existentiell that it is not.  Thus, whereas Heidegger offers a positive 
significance to primitive Dasein being understood as phenomenologically bare for analysis, 
“extensive self-interpreted Dasein” provides a positive opportunity to analyze the extensive 
discursive interpretation of that Dasein.  In other words, if we compare a naked Dasein to a 
clothed Dasein, the bare version would give a positive analysis for genuine phenomena, while a 
layered Dasein would give us a positive analysis of a layered version.  The issue, for Heidegger, 
is that if we are attempting to understand Dasein with the fewest interpretative layers, then 
refraining from taking Dasein as a present-at-hand entity becomes a key part of accomplishing 
that goal.  Thus, primitive Dasein is one extreme that Heidegger presents, while the opposite 
extreme is how we tend to layer and conceal Dasein through present-at-hand treatments of 
individuals. 
When Dasein is treated as present-at-hand, it is theoretically removed from its everyday 
engagement with the world and becomes a locus of examination.  For example, in the Rodriguez 
quote from the top of this chapter, he recalls being taken as a thug.  He was treated as someone to 
be feared by his counselor.  The counselor regarded Rodriguez as a present-at-hand theme.  If we 
take Rodriguez’s assessment as true and see that the counselor indeed took him to be a thug and 
treated him as such, then we have an individual imposing a present-at-hand assessment on 
another person.  Thus, despite Heidegger saying that the rth/pah categories only apply to non-
Dasein, we exhibit a tendency to take each other as these categories.  Thus, even in using terms 
like “bodies” in place of “individuals” or “persons,” we take another Dasein as present-at-hand.  
At that point, it does not matter the intention that guides the use of the term “body.”  We have 
already made Dasein into an externalized entity, objectified for our analysis and separated from 
its daily engagement with the world.  It is still a “taking as,” a present-at-hand “taking” where 
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Dasein is taken something that it is not.  Regarding Dasein as a “body,” however, is incomplete 
as it does not address Dasein as a structural whole, but rather imposes a present-at-hand theme 
upon Dasein.  Additionally, such imposition also conceals Dasein, as it puts Dasein’s ontic 
characteristics in front of the individual; thereby, the term, “body,” hides Dasein.  We need only 
look to our everyday discourse, including academic discussions, to see examples of this 
phenomenon of taking Dasein as a “body.”  Furthermore, when psychological and sociological 
analyses discuss persons as bodies, then this talk can transfer to non-expert discourse, as shown 
by the heavy use of terms like “black and brown bodies” within the media and social discourse.  
This is a point I will address in the next section of this chapter. 
 The “cover up” continues in the form of taking Dasein as present-at-hand when we use 
themes to analyze individuals.  Examples of themes are the analyses of individuals as soul.  For 
philosophy, this helped Descartes explain the rational soul.  For Christianity, an individual as a 
soul helps explain one’s transcendence into heaven.  Themes about the individual help people 
understand the world.  Even the idea of the individual as a subject can be a theme.  Heidegger 
attends to how Dasein is conceived as a subject early on in Being and Time, pointing out that 
various disciplines “thematize” Dasein as a subject by explaining Dasein as merely a biological, 
anthropological, and psychological subject, to name a few.  When Dasein is treated as a theme, it 
becomes thematic.  Despite Heidegger saying about Dasein that “So neither is it be presented 
thematically as something we come across in the same way we come across what is present-at-
hand,” we still interpret Dasein as pah theme in our studies of the individual (68/43).  Heidegger 
provides examples of thematic studies of Dasein in Section 10 of Being and Time, referring to 
how we often study individuals through “anthropology, psychology, biology” (75/50) and later 
on “ethnology” (76/51).  In those studies, scholars assume conceptions of individuals to explore 
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them within the preset boundaries of those studies.  A psychologist, for example, does not need 
to explore the meaning of Being to understand why a patient is afraid to ask his boss for a pay 
raise.  Assumptions about what an individual is within the domain of psychology will be enough 
for a psychologist to determine the patient’s issue with his boss.  The psychologist needs to know 
the necessary present-at-hand interpretations that are instantiated in the discipline and then apply 
them.  Connecting this to Heidegger’s analysis of the present-at-hand, scholars tend to take 
Dasein as present-at-hand.  Dasein becomes a theme, a category because it treats itself as an 
object of analysis. As mentioned, some Dasein are described as black and brown “bodies” in 
contemporary discussions of racism and prejudice.  This description evokes fear, which itself 
gives Dasein a sense of urgency and worry when dealing with its racial identity. 
Bodies as Present-at-hand or Ready-to-hand? 
 A heavily interpreted Dasein, as opposed to primitive Dasein, is noticeable in the talk 
about the “body” or “bodies.” One of the most notable uses of the terms “body” and “bodies” 
with regard to race in academic and popular culture is Ta-Nehisi Coates’ Between the World and 
Me (2015).  The “body” is a persistent theme in his book.  Starting off as an extended letter to his 
son, Coates’ work turns to social commentary on race. “Son, Last Sunday the host of a popular 
news show asked me what it meant to lose my body.”44 He continues to reflect on the term 
“body” as if it were imposed upon him, saying, “I am accustomed to intelligent people asking 
about the conditions of my body without realizing the nature of their request.”45 A few pages 
later, Coates ruminates on the destruction of the body by authorities, saying 
                                                 
44 Ta-Nehisi Coates, Between the World and Me, (New York: Speigel & Grau, 2015), 5. 
45 Coates, Between the World and Me, 5. 
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 Sell cigarettes without the proper authority and your body can be destroyed.  Resent the 
 people trying to entrap your body and your body can be destroyed... All of this is 
 common to black people.46 
 
It is at this point where Coates begins to take what started as an imposed term by society at large, 
the body, and then appropriates it for his project, wherein the body, constantly threatened to be 
destroyed by the police, is “common to all black people.”47 Consequently, Coates moves from 
the body as societally imposed to appropriating that imposition and then thematizing himself as 
an existentiell that is a present-at-hand thing.  He objectifies himself.  Using Heidegger, Dasein 
is “taken as” an object in Coates’ text, even though Coates is also commenting on being taken as 
an object.  He writes a few pages later: “I tell you now that the question of how one should live 
within a black body, within a country lost in the Dream, is the question of my life, and the 
pursuit of this question, I have found, ultimately answers itself.”48 Here we have Heidegger’s 
ontico-existentiell manifested in Coates’ writing.  Coates, as Dasein, has ontic characteristics (his 
black body) that he identifies as historically and socially loaded with significance and how he 
finds himself in it (thrownness into facticity), trying to handle this issue of his life (his 
projection), or to put the issue another way, Coates is dealing with his ontical affairs as a self-
interpreted body.   
 For Coates, the black body is a term he takes on as a theme for his existentiell.  Because 
he seems to constantly take himself as merely an ontical object, and because he argues that 
others do as well, the ontical object turns into a present-at-hand objectification of himself as an 
available idea for study.  And in this way, Coates and others who subscribe to a similar 
construction of their identity as present-at-hand, make themselves available to themselves and to 
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other Dasein as a present-at-hand theme that is also available, on the ready, for discussion.  The 
“body,” the “black body,” the “brown body,” turn into quick and accessible terms for the sake of 
the grander project of determining one’s racial identity in U.S. society.  Coates even suggests 
how the body is foundational to all kinds of inquiries when saying, “You must always remember 
that the sociology, the history, the economics, the graphs, the charts, the regressions all land, 
with great violence, upon the body.”49 So the “body,” becomes an accessible term, ready to go, 
to assess one’s existentiell, until it cannot serve this function, which would be the death of the 
body and/or life.  In using “bodies,” Coates gains the urgency of the black individual being under 
constant threat by society.  The placement of bodies at the fore also emphasizes how society 
treats black individuals as merely bodies.   
One might ask, “What does Coates lose in using ‘bodies’ if it provides the moral urgency 
and rhetorical framing he needs to draw attention to racial issues?”  Ontologically, Coates loses 
Dasein.  Applying Heidegger’s terminology, the use of “bodies” puts an ontic characteristic in 
front of Dasein.  While “bodies” grants insight into social issues experienced by individuals of a 
racial group, “bodies” also covers up those individuals who do not take themselves as “bodies,” 
though they may be taken as such by others.  Covering up is one loss, but Coates’ use of 
“bodies” also loses the authentic disclosure of Dasein, where the disclosure means that Dasein 
can authentically see itself rather than an inauthentic disclosure.  He effectively loses authentic 
Dasein.  This is because he appropriates “bodies” from a society that he understands as treating 
black people as merely “bodies.” However, his goal of critiquing that concept does not change 
the fact that he appropriates the concept to self-interpret.  Thus, Coates participates in a fallen 
ontology that loses Dasein by covering Dasein in a present-at-hand theme of “bodies.” This 
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places Coates in a problematic position: He needs the term and uses it, but he does not want 
society to reduce him to this appropriation.  Yet, Coates is doing what society always does 
anyway to participate in racial discourse. We use terms to critique any discourse and, in that 
effort, we sometimes adopt those terms as designations for our identities, thereby losing the 
rhetorical force of the critique and covering up Dasein as well.  This outcome gets to a paradox 
that Heidegger addresses throughout Being and Time: Dasein tries to get to the root of its issues 
with existing, but does so in ways that conceal those very issues.  Thus, not only does Coates 
lose Dasein in a racial discourse that appears to rely on “bodies,” but we all lose authentic Dasein 
in our racial discourse when taking Dasein as present-at-hand. 
When we take Dasein as a bodily theme, we treat it as present-at-hand.  It is a mistake to 
do this because we treat Dasein as something it is not, but the mistake happens throughout 
Dasein’s discoursing.  When Dasein’s existentiell is “taken as” present-at-hand, but then 
becomes readily accessible in its identity, the identity (not Dasein itself, but just the ontico-
existentiell identity of Dasein) becomes ready-to-hand.  In this way, the identity usage is subject 
to a breakdown, which means it goes back into the present-at-mode mode.  The implication is 
that when we use thematic terms about our identity (for example, terms in racial discourse like 
“bodies”), Dasein thematizes itself as present-at-hand.  This presents the possibility that a term 
like “bodies” functions as a tool for a racially discursive project.  Though this is, according to 
Heidegger, a phenomenological misapplication of a non-Dasein mode onto Dasein, the 
breakdown works in a similar fashion to that described in Being and Time. 
In the current investigation, Dasein thematizes itself as pah through self-interpretation, 
involving itself in a constant process of interpreting oneself as this pah mode.  By doing this so 
frequently and with regularity, what seemed to start as a pah concept is now a recurring theme 
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that becomes more regular, ready, and available for more self-interpretation.  The breakdown 
occurs, as in Heidegger’s explanation, when that regularity is disrupted in one way or another, 
when the thematizing no longer functions as it did.  The pah theme’s lack of workability is 
perhaps attributed to the theme, or concept, being incongruent to Dasein’s everydayness.  
However, the Dasein that has already been thematizing itself in this manner, has already 
established that this is part of its identity, its existentiell, so the breakdown may never even 
occur.  The existentiell, having already been imposed upon throughout history and tradition, is 
then taken up to the point that this is how such a self-interpreting Dasein takes itself as.  The 
reason why taking oneself as a body recurs is due to the persistent theme of fear attributed to the 
particular body under investigation, a body (as brown or black) under societal stress and threat.  
However, if that fear does not align with the everyday dealings of Dasein, then the breakdown of 
that regularity occurs, with Dasein’s existentiell re-emerging as something to address.  Dasein’s 
identity becomes an ontical affair. 
The problem with the process just described is that identifying oneself as an object or 
theme answers too little and sometimes nothing about Dasein’s everyday existence.  For 
instance, I deal with other Dasein not just as an individual with the ontic characteristics of a 
brown body, but of the existentiells of student, teacher, son, Chicano, and so on.  When these 
existentiells are taken as a whole, one can engage with a world more appropriately wherein the 
engagement pertains to one’s own existence.  Jeff Malpas refers to this as a “unity” to one’s life, 
wherein he writes 
the unity of my life, and of myself as a person, is the unity, always incomplete, of an 
ongoing and interconnected set of activities and projects as worked out in relation to an 
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encompassing environment or locale—it is also a unity that is recognized as such by the 
one whose life it is.50 
 
One’s existence becomes the emphasis and pivot point to address the extent to which narratives 
about its ontic characteristics are indeed about oneself.  I can itemize myself and pick out an 
ontic feature, but such a determination would be incomplete in assessing my interactions in the 
world.  Such a thematic or object reduction may hit a breaking point.  Once that break occurs, 
that very pah thematizing and objectifying concept may prove incomplete in its ability to 
represent my identity. 
Fear Existentiell 
In the basic way we know fear, people are scared for themselves, each other, of things, 
and situations.  Dasein and non-Dasein beings can be considered threats, reduced to objects of 
fear.  Oren Magid writes, “In fear, when Dasein is faced with a determinative entity within the 
world that threatens a determinate detrimentality, entities within the world can be more or less 
relevant to its attempt to flee a threat.”51 The mood of fear highlights what is at stake for a 
fearful individual, prompting Dasein (the individual) to consider other beings as relevant to its 
fear.  Not only are people fearful, but they are scared on behalf of others, perhaps thinking they 
recognize threats to others that everyone else may not see clearly.  From these considerations, we 
see how an existentiell can be loaded with a fear-laden meaning.  I call this fear-laden meaning 
in which Dasein can be fearful of, feared by, and feared for, a “fear existentiell.” 
                                                 
50 Jeff Malpas, “Death and the End of Life,” from Heidegger and the Thinking of Place, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press), 185. 
51 Before this, Magid provides an illustration of Heidegger’s examination of fear, saying “If I fear a head-on-
collision with a sixteen-wheeler that has crossed into the wrong lane and is headed for my Smart Car, this sixteen-
wheeler functions as that before which fear is fearful” from “The Ontological Import of Heidegger’s Analysis of 
Anxiety in Being and Time” Southern Journal of Philosophy 54, Issue 4 (December 2016), 450-451. 
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Examining Heidegger’s tripartite notion of fear as a fallen mood gives us a lucid 
understanding of how fear takes hold of Dasein.  Unpacking fear allows us to see how the talk 
about certain existentiells can reinforce fearful and threatening themes that seem genuine to 
one’s experience.  Heidegger describes three features of fear: 1) the fearsome; 2) the definiteness 
of our fear; 3) what is feared about.  I incorporate all three into the term “fear existentiell.” The 
first one, the “fearsome,” is “in every case something which we encounter within-the-world and 
which may have either readiness-to-hand, presence-at-hand, or Dasein-with as its kind of Being” 
(179/140).  Something is threatening and possesses this fearsomeness when it adversely affects 
Dasein’s “Being-alongside.” That which is fearsome is definite, and discomforts Dasein.  
Although the fearsome is definite, it threatens because Dasein does not know when or if it will 
come.  As Heidegger says, “it can reach us, and yet it may not” (180/140).  Thus, if Dasein has 
fear attributed to it then it may become the fearsome by the They’s idle talk.  In such a situation, 
the societal fearsomeness provides content for one’s racial identity. 
 The fearsome occurs when the fear approaches and increases its relevance for Dasein.  
The more significant to Dasein, the clearer this fear gets.  Dasein figures it out.  Threatening 
assumptions about certain roles and identities in society become definite content for an 
existentiell.  The fear becomes part of Dasein’s space.  It is unavoidable.  Thus, Dasein’s clarity 
as to this fearsomeness increases the possibility of disrupting Dasein’s everydayness.  The 
discomfort from this disruption makes the fear and the threat more salient to Dasein, producing a 
“fear existentiell.” Dasein, now established as a fear existentiell, has an existentiell that is related 
to a fallen mood: fear.  As such, Dasein is out of its undifferentiated character and toward the 
mode of inauthenticity.  With fear, Dasein has lost itself.  As a fear existentiell, Dasein’s anxiety 
(Angst) is covered up.  As a fear existentiell, Dasein is inauthentically itself, regardless of the 
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idle talk about its identity being true or false.  It is here where we can see a phenomenological 
basis for what is often called “prejudice,” “racism,” and “stereotyping.” These notions that come 
about in our idle talk about racial discourse necessarily cover up Dasein’s disclosure in an 
inauthentic way, disclosing Dasein as a fear existentiell. 
 We might ask, “Who embodies the fearsome that becomes articulated in a fear 
existentiell?” The answer lies in an examination of what the They talks about when dealing with 
identities.  For instance, we know of a general discussion about concepts like black and brown 
bodies where the word “body” is often connected to its annihilation.  We discussed this with 
Coates’ use of the term.  We have discussions about institutions and systems that are unequal in 
their distribution of power, characterized by police brutality, gang violence, and impoverished 
living conditions usually related to how black and brown communities are affected.  Such 
discussions take place in fields like Critical Race Studies (CRT) in which editors Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, put forth two common interests in 
CRT, 
The first is to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of 
people of color have been created and maintained in America, and, in particular, to 
examine the relationship between that social structure and professed ideals such as ‘the 
rule of law’ and ‘equal protection.’ The second is a desire not merely to understand the 
vexed bond between law and racial power but to change it.52 
 
Even the notion of “white supremacy” is something to regard in a somewhat fearful manner if 
you are a person of color, as this supremacy subordinates whole groups in a large social 
structure.  The idea from society’s general discussion on race is that if one is black or brown, one 
is in a situation of “fear,” an embodied fearsomeness.  However, for some, the connection is 
                                                 
52 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, eds. Critical Race Theory: The Key 
Writings that Formed the Movement, (New York: The New Press, 1995), xiii. 
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hazy: there is a fearsomeness, but it may be a general idea of threat in society that is so vague 
that such a threat merely could be detrimental to Dasein, but could also not be detrimental to 
Dasein without a clearly articulated threat.  For instance, how would one talk about the fear of 
“white supremacy” without a white person actively subordinating a person of color?  One would 
need to appeal to an already available articulated notion of both the threat of white supremacy 
and the concept of white supremacy itself.  White supremacy would be discussed as an always-
there system, though an individual may not “see” it, in which case it is “there” in one sense and 
“not there” in another.  Some may even reply that the simultaneous “there and not there” 
validates the insidious nature of white supremacy; however, this would only reassert an 
assumption of white supremacy as an articulated object of fear.  For some though, a concept like 
white supremacy would be clearly articulated through a present-at-hand analysis where fearing it 
would constitute a “fearing as such,” an “articulated” fear where racial identity may be discussed 
as that which is always systemically threatened by discriminatory institutions, policies, and 
people in power.53   
The fear of white supremacy would then produce an articulation about the concept that 
animates it into our daily existence, making it relevant, even if it had not been relevant to our 
lives before such conceptualizing took place.  Such a concept like white supremacy would then 
be an example of “That which fear fears about,” revealing Dasein’s “there-ness” (180/141).  An 
idea, a notion, a concept would then serve as something to fear about.  If something is going to 
hurt me and I sense it, then I clearly understand that I exist in the world because I respond by 
wanting to survive.  Even though being afraid distorts our perception about threats, we are clear 
                                                 
53 Keep in mind that we needn’t appeal to the veracity of racial discrimination within institutions that cause the 
deaths of black and brown individuals.  We need only identify that the talk about it exists.  The talk is enough to 
help us understand the way existentiells can operate for people with “fear existentiells” imposed upon them by the 
They, a They that Dasein (as a fear existentiell) is also part of because Dasein is a they-self. 
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about the fact of our existence and the fact about our desire to survive.  In the case of a fear 
existentiell, Dasein becomes aware of circumstances about the way it exists, perhaps even how 
one performs that identity to keep its “there-ness” intact.54  
Dasein’s ontic characteristics tie into narratives (the talk) about Dasein just being an ontic 
entity, concealing Dasein’s ontological structure.  For instance, other Dasein probably regard me 
as an ontic entity before considering me as an ontological Being.  The phenomenon of other 
Dasein assessing me as ontic or as present-at-hand does not negate my Being an issue for myself 
or transform me into something non-Dasein.  However, it might compel me to think about myself 
as present-at-hand.  In a fallen understanding, I am taken as something non-Dasein, a theme or a 
concept.  The phenomenon highlights the way in which one’s existentiell can conceal Dasein’s 
fundamental ontological issue by being covered in idle talk.  Someone might look at my ontic 
characteristics for clues about my existentiell identity: perhaps my brown skin or my appearing 
to be of Latino descent would suffice as clues to my identity.  Looking at ontic features of 
Dasein means that another Dasein may incorporate an available (ready-to-hand) theme about 
who I am.  For that reason, we can say that the narratives about Dasein’s ontic features may 
reveal an individual to be a fear existentiell if the talk pushes it in that direction.   
Finally, existentiells, as thrown-projections, have histories (due to Dasein’s facticity) 
influenced by talk that leads to Dasein’s situatedness.  That situatedness of Dasein’s ontic 
existence connects to ideas about it, ranging from its race to its gender (although this is not 
                                                 
54 Being-with participates in this sense of clarity because other Dasein will sometimes make the idea of one as a 
threat more salient by “fearing for” this Dasein or perhaps fearing Dasein.  For instance, I am brown-skinned, and as 
a Mexican-American, I am a member of a community that is sometimes talked about as a threat.  Another Dasein 
might respond by “fearing for” me and saying, “Wait a minute! He is law-abiding and does not do anything wrong!” 
This other Dasein might even “leap in” for me and take over my interactions regarding this notion of threat. 
“Fearing for” may derive from a sense of justice (a generous interpretation for the sake of argument), but it still 
counts as participating in a kind of talk that is very much making salient that my fear existentiell is threatening.   
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exhaustive).  Here, of course, we are only discussing race, but the logic holds when discussing 
gender as well.  If there is a historical narrative about Dasein’s existentiells, then its history is 
understood through that discourse in very general ways.  Such talk serves as an ontical report 
about Dasein’s existentiells, not its existentiality.55  Therefore, the inclusion of those identities 
talked about as near death (as the end of the black, brown, poor, and marginalized body and/or 
life) in these narratives is a logical extension of Heidegger’s skeletal framework for existentiells 
outlined in Being and Time, allowing for what I have been calling “fear existentiells.” The 
construction of this talk about Dasein as a fear existentiell derives from Dasein’s structural 
connection to other Dasein and in the next section we will see how this structural connection 
makes the link between talk and existentiells possible through Being-with. 
Given a certain history and tradition, an existentiell may be influenced by fear where 
some consider that identity a threat, that identity might think it is threatened, or that identity 
might be feared for.  From the perspective of one living through an existentiell guided by fear, 
one might be spurred into self-reflection.  For instance, if I think people fear me, I may want to 
ask: “What is it about me that people consider threatening?” The answer to this question partly 
rests with how I understand the way in which others and society construe me in a general way.  
Whether or not the threat is real, the talk about a threat is real.  For Heidegger, the fallen 
concept of general talk is referred to as Gerede or “idle talk,” a way of discussing Dasein that 
covers up existentiality.   
Idle Talk and Fear 
 A Dasein with an existentiell that fears is compatible with the easy accessibility, 
                                                 
55 Heidegger mentions an “ontical report” about entities, saying that “We are not going to make an ontical report on 
those entities which can often and for the most part be ‘fearsome’” (BT 179/140). I hold that “ontical report” 
functions as an idle way to refer to Dasein as a fear existentiell, where even though “ontical report” refers to entities, 
this does not prevent Dasein from idly using it to regard another Dasein. 
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superiority, and influence das Man has on Dasein.  Das Man is the “They,” the Others that 
Dasein lives according to throughout its existence.56 Das Man is influential.  When the mode of 
fear is added to idle talk, all these attributes of the accessibility, superiority, and influence of the 
They are heightened.  Heidegger says that in idle talk, the They are “bringing the hearer to 
participate” and what this means is that you and I, as Dasein, are easily welcomed into the 
discourse of das Man (212/168).  Since we are brought to participate, we take on the average 
way that the They understands things.  Heidegger writes, “What is said-in-the-talk gets 
understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially” 
(212/168).  Since the superficial and approximate ways of talking are welcoming to Dasein, one 
is settled and does not have to engage in any kind of talk that singularizes Dasein because idle 
talk has everything covered with its general ways of dealing with matters.  Such superficial ways 
of talking make Dasein understand only the average and obvious pronouncements of das Man.  
The surface level of the talk makes spreading the understandings of the They an easier task.   
 The accessibility of the talk also assists with how it maintains superiority, as it invites all 
in and even begins to prescribe what Dasein should do, think, and how to talk.  The 
pronouncements become the focal point and, as Heidegger says, “Things are so because one says 
so” (212/168).  However, this also indicates that another reason why idle talk is easy is because it 
authoritatively dictates how one talks and what Dasein says.  Heidegger says that the talk  
even spreads to what we write, where it takes the form of ‘scribbling’ [das 
“Geschreibe”]. In this latter case the gossip is not based so much on hearsay.  It feeds 
upon superficial reading [dem Angelesenen].  The average understanding of the reader 
will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial sources with a struggle 
and how much is just gossip (212/169).  
 
                                                 
56 Heidegger writes “But this distantiality which belongs to Being-with, is such that Dasein, as everyday Being-with-
one-another, stands in subjection [Botmässigkeit] to Others.  It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the 
Others” (164/126). 
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The fact that all topics seem to be covered in idle talk demonstrates that even the act of disputing 
opinions is already embedded in Gerede.  For example, if there is general idle talk about the 
subject of race existing there will also be counter claims of race not existing. When compared to 
each other, both are diverging opinions; however, if both opinions remain general and superficial 
then a genuine critical analysis of that issue will elude the discussants.  At which point, Dasein 
will skim the surface of the issue as is usually done in idle talk and the They will remain, saying 
“everything without previously making the thing one’s own” (213/169).  The They’s authority, 
when idly speaking, helps set the stage for how Dasein struggles to think for itself when living as 
an existentiell dominated by idle fear talk. 
We talk how They talk.  We like what They like.  We generally do what the They do 
because of our absorption into das Man.  Heidegger writes that the They’s publicness obscures 
Dasein.  The They presents more acceptable and comfortable interpretations of Dasein that 
tranquilize it.  The They placate Dasein.  Because the They provides so much, Dasein rarely 
realizes its responsibility to itself.  The problem is that while this is true of the They, das Man is 
not existentially responsible for what Dasein does; Dasein is still accountable to itself, it must 
clear away any obstacles that prevent it from taking responsibility for its existence.  Heidegger 
writes, “Dasein has to clear away and break up the disguises with which Dasein bars its own 
way” (167/129).  Clearing away the disguises is extraordinarily difficult to do, considering what 
Heidegger says a few pages before: “Everyone is the other, and no one is himself” (165/128).  If 
I am not myself and I am as much of the They as the They is me, then my understanding of 
myself is limited to das Man.   
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Das Man Listens to Dasein 
Heidegger implies how das Man superficially listens to Dasein.  The They listens to 
Dasein in its fear, hearing about the general threats scaring Dasein.  Dasein fears a threat that 
may or may not occur.  The threat may or may not arrive.  Dasein is fearful, held in suspense, of 
what may arise to threaten it.  This feeling of fear is fallen.  It covers up Dasein’s constant 
anxiety.  In Angst, Dasein confronts itself as groundless.  It has no foothold in anything and 
rather than contend with this unsettledness, Dasein flees into fear where being scared and fearful 
is more definite and its issues about threats clearer.  Dasein is more at home in fear even though 
it is a threatening feeling, whereas anxiety is not at home.  The They cannot listen in on Dasein 
in its uncanniness, but the fallen mood of fear is something the They can deal with.  In fear, das 
Man still has a grip on Dasein’s behavior and language, but anxiety is alien to the They.  
Heidegger discusses how das Man makes sure Dasein behaves as one behaves, talks as one talks, 
and fits into the broad idea of what They have of Dasein.  Heidegger writes that “Everyone keeps 
his eye on the Other first and next, watching how he will comport himself and what he will say 
in reply” (219/175).  This demonstrates that while das Man holds on to what Dasein says and 
does, this does not necessarily imply that the They is listening in any meaningful way.   
Rather, given Heidegger’s later discussions of authenticity and hearing Dasein’s “call to 
conscience,” das Man can only listen to Dasein in the they-self mode, a mode in which it only 
understands familiar and unnuanced speech.  The they-self cannot reflect on the authentic call 
that comes from Dasein’s anxiety; hence, the they-self is fallen.  In this inauthentic and fallen 
mode, Dasein has no roots and is alienated from itself.  As a result, das Man is limited to 
listening to a privative variation of itself, leaving authentic Dasein, hushed and concealed.  When 
the They listens to and hangs on every word of Dasein then das Man is communicating with a 
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pluralized and commonplace entity, not a singular Dasein.  It may seem then that das Man is 
scrutinizing Dasein without knowing Dasein in any substantial way.   
Interpretation is already embedded in Gerede.  Heidegger writes that “In language, as a 
way things have been expressed or spoken out [Ausgesprochenheit], there is hidden a way in 
which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted” (211/167); language conceals this 
interpreted understanding, making it present-at-hand despite being Dasein-like.  This 
interpretedness already disperses the possibilities of the average understanding and its 
Befindlichkeit.  The perverse interpretation is taken as Verstehen.  Das Man speaks in an average 
and routine way that perpetuates this interpretation.  Therefore, there is no genuine connection 
between Dasein and idle talk.  There is only that non-genuine connection wherein Dasein is 
alienated from itself.  There is no involvement with Dasein outside of its they-self.  With such 
listening, das Man acquires a brief account of Dasein that already fits with the judgment of who 
Dasein is to the They.  
Dasein-with, Being-with, and “Bodies”  
Heidegger’s notions of Being-with (Mitsein) and Dasein-with (Mitdasein) help establish 
the origins of how Dasein co-constructs talk in a fallen way, which leads to the problem of taking 
Dasein as present-at-hand or ready-to-hand.  As discussed earlier, ready-to-hand and present-at-
hand are modes of Being for non-Dasein entities.  A non-Dasein entity is ready-to-hand when it 
is available for use.  It is present-at-hand when it breaks down or goes missing.  Dasein has a 
mode of Being called “Being-with” in which Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is already a with-
world.  The “withness” of the world entails that Dasein is automatically with other Dasein.  
Heidegger holds this to be a positive mode of Dasein, so that when Dasein is ontically alone, that 
solitude is just a variation of Dasein’s Being-with.  From Being-with, Dasein deals with other 
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Dasein in many ways (i.e., not merely just physically being with another Dasein, but working 
with another Dasein, sharing the same norms, etc.).  The dealing with other Dasein is 
Heidegger’s Dasein-with.   
 Dasein-with occurs through our ontical affairs with others and we have existentiell 
understandings of how these affairs play out.  With these understandings are also the various 
identities that help us function in the world and those are loaded with their own facticity: 
Histories and traditions help make up Dasein’s facticity, which then governs all our different 
existentiells.  Dasein has a history that it did not choose or create and now it is thrown into a 
world in which it must deal with ramifications of that history.  In concert with this thrownness, 
Dasein can make decisions about being itself or not itself and so projects possibilities of itself 
within its world.  Thus, Dasein may take up a tradition and move forward into some possibility, 
which will then be its response to being thrown into both history and tradition.  Since Dasein is 
not isolated, but is a Being-with, other Dasein participate in these existentiells in many ways by 
believing in them, judging from them, and acting from a tradition and history about the 
existentiells.   
Being-with and Dasein-with are always happening as part of Dasein’s “Being-in” the 
“world.” “Being-in” the “world” is not like how coffee is in a cup or how the Cartesian mind is 
in the body.  Rather, Dasein’s “Being-in” relates to space. “Space” is not the distance between 
objects or outer space.  The “Being-in” of Being-in-the-world is what Heidegger calls an 
existentiale.  “Being-in” cannot be in the world in an ontical sense.  The “world” in an ontical 
sense “signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world” 
(93/64).  Heidegger says that the “world” refers to the “realm which encompasses a multiplicity 
of entities” (93/64).  “World” is also where Dasein lives, its environment (93/65).  Finally, 
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“world,” as an ontological concept is Dasein’s worldhood, which is Dasein’s context of 
involvements that Dasein is always involved in.  Heidegger says, “The world is therefore 
something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an entity already was” (106/76).  Dasein’s ontological world is 
that which Dasein is “Being-in” and this “is a state of Dasein’s Basic Being” (79/54).  Thus, 
Dasein’s state of being is different, unlike the Being of ontic things that are in ontical worlds.  A 
human body can be in an ontical space.  Unlike the ontological conception of Being-in-the-
world, a body can be in a space and we can talk about that “body” and “space” in present-at-hand 
ways that cover up Dasein’s ontological Being-in-the-world.  For example, Coates essentially 
talks about the body in the space of the United States and how that space threatens the black 
body.  The problem with this conception of the body and of space is that it reifies an idle 
conception of Dasein’s existence that covers up Dasein’s anxiety by using present-at-hand 
language that gives way to discussions of fear.  
With a body conceived as an ontic thing, space becomes non-ontological too.  For 
Dasein, one might say that, as an ontico-ontological being, it is also “in” a present-at-hand space, 
but since Dasein is ontological, its “Being-in” is about how it is involved in projects, those tasks 
that make up its ontological world.57 The focus on Dasein being just a body is important to a 
grand conception of Dasein’s existence, but it is not enough and in certain discourses it is often 
prioritized over Dasein’s Being, as we already examined with Coates’ prioritizing of the body.  
A more elaborate conception of Dasein as an ontico-ontological being will then allow us to 
understand not only what Dasein is but how Dasein exists.  The how of an individual’s existence 
then involves how it is viewed by others and the availability of roles, identities, stereotypes, and 
various other psychological assumptions in the space that is Dasein’s world.  To avoid reducing 
                                                 
57 Hubert Dreyfus writes about this in Being-in-the-world, saying that Dasein’s Being-in is how it is involved in a 
situation that requires ways for Dasein to engage in it.  See Chapter 9, “The Three-Fold Structure of Being-In.” 
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one’s existence to a mere entity, as can often occur, Heidegger says that conceiving Dasein as 
being “inside” space is tantamount to saying that Dasein is an object within a larger object.  
Thus, a person’s existence is not just a thing contained in space. 
Fear Existentiells in Space 
 Fear existentiells exist within a context of involvements and Dasein utilizes the concept 
of a fear existentiell and applies it to others.  Heidegger’s analysis of spatiality allows us to 
understand how we are always involved in this phenomenon.  Dasein is born into the world, the 
valuations and significance of identities in society are already in the world; it is just a matter of 
which one Dasein is thrown into.  In looking at Heidegger’s spatial framework, he is not saying 
that useful entities (and existentiells) are empty and then fill up in significance to the extent that 
Dasein has projects and tools that it needs to use to accomplish them.  Such a rendering of 
Dasein’s relation to spatiality suggests space itself is just present-at-hand, but Dasein does not 
merely measure distance.  If Dasein needs to analyze something scientifically then, yes, Dasein 
measures, but this is an exceptional way to deal with things compared to Dasein’s usual 
comportment.  Similarly, with fear existentiells, one does not fill the value of the other individual 
as if, at first, a person was an empty vessel.  Rather, the societal assessments about threat and 
fear are already in the world, with some of them being closer to a person, while other 
existentiells are not.  The nearness and proximity depend on many factors about Dasein 
(psychological, cultural, and so on).  The spatiality of Dasein helps us see that even roles and 
identities are in a general “region.” Heidegger writes that in a region, Dasein is always in a 
context of involvements where the ready-to-hand is “yonder” and then brought back “here.” For 
example, as I write this, my cup of water is “yonder” and I retrieve it, bringing it back “here.” 
These terms, “yonder” and “here,” are relational.  Given that Dasein is engaged in a world of 
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involvements, when Dasein tries to accomplish tasks, like say, understanding another Dasein, it 
takes something that is “yonder” and brings it “here” to where it is.  Dasein uses these concepts 
to make sense of the identity of another Dasein.  
Bringing something from “yonder” to “here” requires de-severance.  Dasein makes the 
“remoteness of something disappear” (139/105).  De-severance is what makes measuring 
possible because Dasein eliminates the “farness” of something, brings it into its purview, and 
then opens the possibility for a present-at-hand analysis like measuring points between two 
objects.  Dasein is spatial, which has the characteristic of both directionality and de-severance, 
and this, in turn, makes possible our ontic notions of distance.  Heidegger says, “In Dasein, there 
lies an essential tendency towards closeness” (140/105).  With de-severance being an 
existentiale (i.e., a structural feature of Dasein’s Being), the fact that Dasein tends toward 
closeness is then a structural part of its essence as an ontico-ontological entity.  The proximity of 
things also comes about from technology.58 The nearness of things through technology can also 
mean that ideas and concepts are brought nearer to Dasein in the sense that Dasein increases its 
relations of significance by using technology to make things closer. 
For Heidegger, Dasein’s relation to things is much more than what is in space.  He writes 
how regions, the “wheres” and “yonders,” are always ready-to-hand and that Dasein works 
within a context of involvements.  The “wheres” in Dasein’s world have “directionality” and 
“de-severance.” Directionality is the goal of Dasein’s involvement in a region.  Within these 
regions, “Places themselves either get allotted to the ready-to-hand in circumspective concern, or 
                                                 
58 Heidegger writes in section 23 of Being and Time, “With the ‘radio,’ for example, Dasein has so expanded its 
everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the ‘world’—a de-severance which, in its meaning 
for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized” (140/105).  In our current social media days, the Internet has brought the world 
toward clarity.  Dasein are closer to each other, in a way.  I will expand on this to say that the closeness has veiled 
such an opportunity through Dasein’s tendency toward idle talk via its fallenness.   
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we come across them” (137/103).  Take Heidegger’s illustrative example of how regions work 
when he discusses churches and graves.  Both ontic things are in a region that is part of Dasein’s 
project.  Heidegger says that “the regions of life and death, which are determinative for Dasein 
itself with regard to its ownmost possibilities of Being-in-the-world” are where the sun sets and 
rises for certain Dasein (137/104).  The regions of life and death are abstract, yet Dasein makes 
sense of these regions in relation to where things are at.  This sense making helps Dasein realize 
possibilities integral to the way it understands the world, and we can include how Dasein 
understands others in terms of their existentiells. 
Dasein’s de-severance annuls distance and this de-distancing occurs with fear 
existentiells.  To examine fear existentiells, we see that the narratives leaning towards the ontic 
and present-at-hand are a kind of talk that is more available in Dasein’s space.  Dasein 
“measures” other Dasein from available existentiells.  Such a measuring allows Dasein to get the 
gist of another Dasein.  To this end, we may say that this is a “societal de-severance” that 
includes ideas of “existentiells” as racial, prejudicial, monolithic, and generalized stereotypes, 
assumptions, fears about people, threats, and so on.  This is consistent with Heidegger’s idea that 
we are in regions where things have directionality.  From such determinations, we can see that 
something like societal de-severance would help us understand how concepts and ideas are 
conceptually near to Dasein.   
Societal De-Severance 
Fear existentiells are spatially available to Dasein as available concepts.  While the 
analysis of zuhandenheit explains that a thing or even a concept is available to use, the notion of 
spatiality examines the proximity of something, and so spatiality tells us about the conditions for 
why something is just always there for us versus far away.  For example, if a person is 
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stereotyped by the color of their skin and this prejudicial judgment turns out to be inconsistent 
with how the person engages with the judging Dasein, then the regularity of that stereotype 
breaks down and the individual is regarded differently.  The project of stereotyping is disrupted.  
Dasein is taken as a theme or object with regularity, but because of the disruption, the theme or 
object turns into a present-at-hand concept, gets removed from its regular usage, and the 
misjudged Dasein is still taken as present-at-hand, but now that becomes suspended.  Our 
continual engagement with each other reflects that we make these mistakes, even though 
Heidegger writes that we are not present-at-hand entities, nor can we be made into them.  I think 
this is right, but it is also the case that Dasein tends to frequently make this mistake, which 
results in the covering up of other Dasein.  Heidegger writes 
When Others are encountered, it is not the case that one’s own subject is proximally 
present-at-hand and that the rest of the subjects, which are likewise occurrents, get 
discriminated beforehand and then apprehended… Theoretically concocted 
‘explanations’ of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too 
easily; but over against such explanations we must hold fast to the phenomenal facts of 
the case which we have pointed out, namely, that Others are encountered environmentally 
(155/119).   
 
Since we have this kind of engagement with each other through existentiells, I interpret 
Heidegger’s spatiality to elaborate on a term I call “societal de-severance.” Heidegger views de-
severance (de-distantiality) as a distance that makes something seem close, despite it being 
ontically far away.  In societal de-severance, existentiells are close to us, yet far away from 
Dasein’s existentiality.  In response to this distance, Dasein attempts to bring something closer 
by upholding a way to identify it.  The process starts with existentiells about another Dasein 
already being available to Dasein in a ready-to-hand way.   
 Societal de-severance does not bring other Dasein ontologically closer, but only 
seemingly closer and remains so because we simply think we know the other person.  Malcolm 
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X’s speech, “The Ballot or the Bullet” is a case of this.  His analysis of being branded as a 
threatening black man by white America is an example of societal notions about existentiells 
being readily available.  Malcolm X writes: 
I’m one of the 22 million black victims of the Democrats, one of the 22 million black 
victims of the Republicans, and one of the 22 million black victims of Americanism. And 
when I speak, I don’t speak as a Democrat, or a Republican, nor an American. I speak as 
a victim of America’s so-called democracy. You and I have never seen democracy; all 
we’ve seen is hypocrisy. When we open our eyes today and look around America, we see 
America, not through the eyes of someone who has -- who has enjoyed the fruits of 
Americanism, we see America through the eyes of someone who has been the victim of 
Americanism. We don’t see any American dream; we’ve experienced only the American 
nightmare. We haven’t benefited from America’s democracy; we’ve only suffered from 
America’s hypocrisy. And the generation that’s coming up now can see it and are not 
afraid to say it. 
If you -- If you go to jail, so what? If you black, you were born in jail. If you black, you 
were born in jail, in the North as well as the South.59  
When Malcolm X talks about the treatment of blacks in the excerpt above, he is discussing a 
kind of dealing with other Dasein that happens automatically.  In his experience, his fear 
existentiell of being “born black” becomes that which is societally de-severant for other Dasein.  
Since this societal de-severance is constant, what is spatially close to Dasein (Malcolm X, in this 
case) is the notion of being “born black” and how one becomes the recipient of American 
hypocrisy that talks of dreams but bestows nightmares.  The fear existentiell about Malcolm X is 
available to other Dasein and X understands that he is perceived as a threat, but he also addresses 
black American fear.  The existentiell is a role rooted in the time that Dasein exists in and X is 
pointing out that to exist as a black man in the 1960s means one is constantly viewed as an object 
of fear and that this inevitably means black Americans will have to be on guard and fearful of 
individual and institutional reactions to them.  He understands himself as a person, but also 
                                                 
59 Malcolm X, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” 1964, Digital History 
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=3&psid=3624, (accessed August 1, 2018). 
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recognizes he is not seen this way by many people in the country and certainly not by those in 
power. 
Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein is useful to understand this passage from Malcolm X.  
X’s account of black Americans being the victims of American hypocrisy demonstrates how 
Dasein is thrown into a world where it is forced to move into possibilities related to identity.  For 
Malcolm X, the possibility of being an American, like white Americans, is a dream that he 
cannot take hold of because America will not allow it.  America participates in Malcolm X not 
taking hold of a possibility to align with an idealized national identity.  Rather, X’s passage 
complicates what it means for Dasein to even have a possibility.  X, as a fear existentiell, is a 
Dasein existing in a part of the world, the United States, with a history of overlooking the plight 
of black people; thus, whether in the North or South of the U.S., the black individual is relegated 
to being perceived and treated as a criminal.  A person may come to exist (be thrown into) being 
an identity and be regarded as feared, making this issue one of Dasein’s principal ontical affairs 
that it must deal with through projection.  Furthermore, the notion of being an American like 
white Americans are is not de-severable for Malcolm X.  If that concept is “yonder” it certainly 
cannot be brought to Malcolm X’s “here.” Thus, Malcolm X’s speech, combined with a 
Heideggerian analysis, allows us to see what a fear existentiell looks like when one is raced as 
black.  To the degree that X engages with a more substantive physical threat to his existence as 
he lives it is something that only he can deal with as it would be his affair, but his passage 
discloses what being a fear existentiell Dasein who is black may look like for others.  The 
problem though, is that his issue does not belong to anyone else but him.  His identity as a black 
American becomes an affair of his everyday existence, given the events in his life, as well as the 
idle talk imposed upon his identity.   
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Reinforcing Imposed Identities: Solicitude and Leaping In 
The limitations by the They continue as Dasein’s Being-with and Dasein-with can 
sometimes produce an outcome in which threatened Dasein are taken over by other Dasein.  
When Dasein is marked as threatened in society (Malcolm X’s speech on black America reflects 
this) there may be a tendency for other Dasein to take over for Dasein with a fear existentiell.  In 
short, a non-fear existentiell Dasein may try to “save” a fear existentiell Dasein by pointing out 
societal threats on Dasein’s behalf, trying to save that Dasein from harm.  Such a phenomenon 
can be explained by Heidegger’s analysis of solicitude (Fürsorge).   
With solicitude, Heidegger distinguishes between “leaping in” (einspringen) and “leaping 
ahead” (vorausspringt).  Solicitude comes from Dasein’s care (Sorge), where Dasein is 
concerned (Besorge) about another Dasein (157/121).  Heidegger says that “leaping in” and 
“leaping ahead” are two extremes of solicitude. “Leaping in” is the attempt to take Dasein’s 
place and absolve it from handling its situation.  It is an attempt at substitution.  François Raffoul 
writes of “leaping in” that  
This solicitude is clearly inauthentic, in at least three respects: first, because it treats the 
other Dasein as something ready-to-hand; second, because it consists in taking the place 
of the other, such a substitution representing for Heidegger an inauthentic relation to 
others; and third, because it disburdens the other Dasein of his/her care, a third 
characteristics, which represents for Heidegger inauthenticity par excellence, if it is the 
case that inauthenticity consists of a fleeing Dasein in the face of its own existence and of 
its weight.60 
 
“Leaping in” is protective and restrictive, but “leaping ahead” liberates and lets Dasein choose 
for itself (158/122-159/122).  However, I hold that when other Dasein are afraid for another fear 
existentiell Dasein, the saving, or “leaping in,” restricts a “feared for” Dasein to the point that its 
own assessment of its spatial world is not considered.  Consistent with Raffoul’s observation of 
                                                 
60 François Raffoul, “Otherness and individuation in Heidegger,” Man and World 28 (1995), 351. 
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einspringen, a fear existentiell, as it relates to another Dasein, is taken as ready-to-hand and is 
treated as an object that another Dasein can control.  The inauthentic mood of fear will compel 
other Dasein to “fear for” the racial identity under threat.  Consequently, other Dasein will take a 
paternalistic approach to the fear existentiell Dasein (ontico-existentielly viewed as a raced 
identity) and try to handle everything for the fear existentiell.  The issue, as Raffoul points out, is 
that in “leaping in,” other Dasein disburden the fear existentiell Dasein from its care, allowing it 
to comfortably flee its own situation. 
Rather than “leap in,” Malcolm X is an example of how other Dasein can “leap ahead” 
for individuals who have a fear existentiell.  In his speech To Mississippi Youth, he says that, 
“One of the first things I think young people, especially nowadays, should learn is how to see for 
yourself and listen for yourself and think for yourself.”61 He then describes what I interpret as 
“leaping in” on an everyday level, by saying that “it is very important to think out a situation for 
yourself.  If you don’t do it, you’ll always be maneuvered into a situation where you are never 
fighting your actual enemies, where you will find yourself fighting your own self.”62 Malcolm X 
understands that individuals who share in this identity of fear are under a threat of violence in 
America, but also under the threat of people trying to disburden them of their freedom by 
attempting to think for them.  
I emphasized Malcolm X’s speech as exemplifying his life because a key point in Being 
and Time is Dasein not getting alienated by Gerede.  X is speaking to a large audience and 
talking about “Americanism” and the struggle of black Americans, providing a narrative of the 
black American experience.  This makes X’s speech subject to Heidegger’s critiques of 
ethnology, anthropology, and psychology, which demonstrate how Dasein is taken as present-at-
                                                 
61 Malcolm X, Malcolm X Speaks, “To Mississippi Youth,” (New York: Grove Press, 1966), 137. 
62 X, Malcolm X Speaks, 138. 
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hand.  These disciplines take the regularity and patterns of human behavior, whether past or 
present, and hold them up for analysis to create an ontical report about Dasein, creating a 
regional ontology, a localized way to understand people.  As such, Dasein is held up in 
suspension to be examined.  However, sometimes we experience breakdowns in the regularity of 
our daily experiences that compel us to regard ourselves in suspension.  Such a break occurs with 
Malcolm X’s examination of “Americanism.” His analysis identifies a breakdown between the 
normal experience of “Americanism” when one is white versus the break in that normalcy when 
one is black.  A Dasein (Malcolm X), construed by other Dasein as a fear existentiell, is thrown 
into a society with a government that demonstrates institutional privileges for other existentiells.  
Malcolm X even says that he sees this democracy through the eyes of a victim of it and not a 
beneficiary.  Thus, Dasein tries to exist through a fear existentiell and this allows X to question 
the imposition of such talk about his identity: he questions the circumstances of how this 
existentiell is imposed on him.  He says, “If you black, you were born in jail,” which is to say, in 
ontological terms, that the narratives about your ontic embodiment precede your existence.  One 
cannot doubt that in 1964 this was the case for black persons.   Certain features of civic life are 
better now in the U.S., but we are still in a country where Dasein are born into discriminatory 
narratives.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I attempted to understand what Heidegger’s Being and Time can say to 
readers about race and identity.  I accomplished this by advancing an idea I call “fear 
existentiells.” I agree with Heidegger that seeing space in a present-at-hand sense is a hindrance 
to identifying the ontological features of space and this setback prevents us from seeing that 
spatiality can include something I call “societal de-severance.” Space in a present-at-hand sense 
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is especially problematic for racial discourse when examining how the terms “body” and 
“bodies” serve as a vessel for an individual to be in.  This conception results in turning the body 
into a container (an object) that you put something in (that something being the individual).  By 
using Heidegger’s idea of space to examine the use of “body” by thinkers like Coates, we see 
that, once again, Dasein is covered up.  For Heidegger, Dasein’s space is nothing like an object 
in another object; instead, space is a Being-in, exemplified by Dasein’s engagement with what is 
close and near.  Seen in this way, concepts like identity can be conceptualized as near or far to 
Dasein.  As it turns out, in a society with a fallen racial discourse, idle talk concepts about 
Dasein’s identity are often near to Dasein.  They are around.  I examined how the nearness of 
conceptions of identity could be influenced by fear, which is a phenomenon that specifically 
relates to individual Dasein often referred to as “black and brown.” The kinds of things brought 
nearer to Dasein from societal de-severance are fear existentiells.  Our Dasein-with, and thus our 
Being-with, makes our interaction determinative for Dasein’s identity and in the case of Dasein 
who are often discussed as historically marginalized, coercive.  So influential are we toward each 
other, that we co-construct each other’s existentiells.  The ideas of these existentiells are made 
available to a society that talks about certain existentiells in terms of fear.  I used Malcolm X’s 
“Ballot or the Bullet” as an example of this point regarding fear existentiells and their connection 
to societal fears and threats.  Malcolm X repeatedly says that the black experience deals with 
threats from a larger democratic system that does not allow the black person to thrive.  I gleaned 
ontological and existential Heideggerian interpretations from his statements.  Hence, I spoke of 
thrownness in Malcolm X’s statements and I examined a notion of conceptual spatiality in 
keeping with my notion of “societal de-severance” to develop the closeness of fear existentiells. 
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The spatial closeness of existentiells deals with Dasein’s Being-with because they are 
concepts that are sometimes available to Dasein, while at other times these concepts emerge out 
of a regular availability to become present-at-hand.  The more encumbered and communal 
interpretation of Dasein does not mean that Dasein is reduced to subjectivity and being relative, 
but it means that when you conceive of it as Being-in-the-world in which its Being is an issue for 
it, you must consider the community of involvement and its dealings with that.  Perhaps some 
people’s lives are marked by specific motifs.  Perhaps a community is marked in a certain way, 
but this is not a controversial claim because it states a fact that some lives seem more 
interpretatively layered by society than others.  If true, then the societal representation of certain 
existentiells sets the stage for certain Dasein to reckon with time and death in a way that might 
steer them toward inauthenticity.  Consequently, one of the “talks” is about what it means to talk 
about black and brown bodies.  We have, in our society, targeted ways to discuss death aimed at 
specific identities.  For political, rhetorical, expedient, and moral reasons, we talk about certain 
Dasein; however, this talk about certain fear existentiells prohibits a fuller discussion of a 
Dasein’s existential and possibly authentic relation to death. 
Utilizing ontical and present-at-hand analyses is helpful for types of knowledge, but they 
may also obstruct underlying existential issues for Dasein when such knowledge binds Dasein to 
its body.  Take, for instance, a Dasein construed as a body.  Present-at-hand analyses are 
particularly evident in disciplines and movements that discuss “black bodies,” “brown bodies,” 
and so on.  By viscerally talking about the body, the talk holds the public’s attention, promoting 
recognition of the issue.63 What might Heidegger say about this?  He writes, “But even if Others 
become themes for study, as it were, in their own Dasein, they are not encountered as person-
                                                 
63 I say “attempt” because the rhetoric also risks normalizing threats for a fear existentiell Dasein.  I discuss that risk 
further in chapters four and five. 
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Things present-at-hand” (156/120).  Dasein does not choose its body, nor the societal gossip 
about its body, but Dasein confronts the talk about it and that talk could be arrived at through a 
present-at-hand analysis in Dasein’s everyday dealings with others.  The talk reifies Dasein as an 
objective theme.   
To conclude, if certain Dasein have fear existentiells, if societal talk motivates those 
existentiells and if that talk deals with notions of death, then some existentiells appear closer to 
threats than others; however, what must still be clarified is how those threats constitute a 
closeness to death.  In the next chapter I outline one kind of threat that Dasein is instructed by the 
They to be always fearful of: death.  I hope to have problematized existentiells with my addition 
of the concept I call “fear existentiells” to clarify that certain Dasein have a peculiar relationship 
to society when it comes to threat and in the next chapter, I will examine how the two main 
discussed threats of ableben (which is Dasein’s passing away in an ontic sense) and verenden 
(the perishing of a biological body) often conceal Dasein’s Sein zum Tod (Being-toward-death).  
By outlining what Heidegger means by these three kinds of death, I hope to demonstrate how 
Dasein becomes a societal problem for itself and other Dasein as the threat of death looms over 
its fear existentiell.   
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Chapter 4 
Bodies and Lives Matter: Death of Dasein as a Fear Existentiell 
“Bigger, you’re going to die.  And if you die, die free.  You’re trying to believe in yourself.  And 
every time you try to find a way to live, your own mind stands in the way.  You know why that is?  
It’s because others have said you were bad and they made you live in bad conditions.”64 
- Richard Wright, Native Son   
Introduction 
The They gossips about Dasein’s death.  As Dasein lives through a fear existentiell, its 
identity is constructed by das Man through Gerede.  In the last chapter, I discussed how the idea 
of Dasein as a body can be used as content for what I call a “fear existentiell.” Fear existentiell 
discussions are various notions and ideas spread through academia, the news, and social media 
that talk about specific identities in relation to fear, like race and ethnicity.  Anything that can be 
construed as idle talk is a medium for themes and concepts about existentiells to travel through.  
For example, George Yancy discusses the idea of race as embodied, that black individuals 
essentially live their history and political status via their body.65 We also saw this with Ta-Nehisi 
Coates in the previous chapter.  Another example is found in the 2016 journal article, “Brown 
Bodies and Xenophobic Bullying in U.S. Schools: Critical Analysis and Strategies for Action,” 
where the authors Monisha Bajaj, Ameen Ghaffar-Kucher, and Karishma Desai explain how 
“misinformation about youth who inhabit brown bodies (in the U.S. and abroad) have given rise 
                                                 
64 Richard Wright, Native Son, (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 499. 
65 Yancy describes the black body as a “historical text" in Black Bodies / White Gazes, (2008). 
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to behaviors identified as bullying.”66 However, when death is included in the discussion of fear 
existentiells, Dasein’s identity becomes about death.  Since the death discussion about fear 
existentiells tends to talk of Dasein as a body or a life, death talk for such existentiells leans 
toward one’s body ending (verenden) or one’s life ending (ableben), as Heidegger would label 
them in the second division of Being and Time.  I call the application of these terms to a fear 
existentiell a “death note,” meaning a brief account of one’s ontico-existentiell end, a memo of 
sorts to put a fear existentiell Dasein on notice about its end.  Such talk reminds Dasein about its 
verenden or ableben, depending on the context of the talk.  Heidegger has a third kind of death 
that is non-ontic and non-existentiell, Dasein’s existential death, Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-
Tod).  The problem is that the death notes of fear existentiells hide this Being-toward-death from 
Dasein.  When a fear existentiell is talked about as near death, more layers of concealment are 
applied to it than what I will refer to as “average Dasein,” an entity that does not have consistent 
death notes applied to its existentiell.67  
I begin by exploring Heidegger’s analysis of how curiosity and ambiguity connect to idle 
talk and how it provides optimal conditions for the maintenance of a fear existentiell.  Gerede 
tranquilizes Dasein, immersing and bombarding people with definite narratives about the world.   
I discuss curiosity and how Dasein quickly attends to different things of importance to its 
existence.  Within curiosity, Dasein lightly engages with people, things, and subjects, but does 
not deal with them beyond a superficial interaction.  I point out how curiosity helps in fostering 
fear existentiells.  Additionally, ambiguity helps in the spread of fear existentiells because it 
                                                 
66 Monish Bajaj, Ameena Ghaffar-Kucher, & Karishma Desai, “Brown Bodies and Xenophobic Bullying in U.S. 
Schools: Critical Analysis and Strategies for Action,” Harvard Educational Review, Winter 2016, 86, pp.481-505. 
67 Save for the application of death notes about humans in general dying, the fear of death one has about getting 
older, or notions of death that arise from being diagnosed with a terminal illness, the fear existentiell death note is a 
societal diagnosis that one is likely to die sooner than others simply by being a member of a group considered as 
being near death. 
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legitimates contrary claims and generalizations about individuals.  The They promotes the truth 
of opposing claims and this tranquilizes Dasein, allowing it to be settled in whatever it thinks is 
true.  In the case of a fear existentiell, das Man supports Dasein’s fear of threat being near or not 
near by allowing Dasein to accept both situations as true.  By examining how curiosity and 
ambiguity support Gerede, I discuss how both features of idle talk make it such that a fear 
existentiell has a sense of urgency from das Man.  I point out that Gerede urges Dasein to 
speculate about itself in a way that seems like it is alienated from society, when Dasein is, in 
fact, existentially hidden from itself. 
 I examine how a fear existentiell is connected to what I call a death note.  This note is not 
about Heideggerian existential dying, but verenden and ableben.  I explain Heidegger’s 
discussion of perishing (verenden), the kind of death that is the end of organic bodies.  Dasein is 
often talked about as a body that perishes, especially when the discussion refers to Dasein with a 
fear existentiell.68 I then turn to the more robust notion of death, the passing away of Dasein’s 
human life (ableben).  I discuss how ableben is closer to Dasein’s existential meaning because it 
addresses Dasein living as, at least, a conscious entity in a world with which one can engage.  
Though despite such involvement, ableben is still encumbered by Gerede and only allows 
Dasein to flee its existential death (Sein zum Tod).  Finally, we arrive at Sein zum Tod.  Being-
toward-death is the kind of existential and ontological ending of Dasein that is concealed by idle 
discussions from the They.  Sein zum Tod is Dasein’s death as an existential Being and deals 
with Dasein’s main concern of “being an issue for itself” and how Dasein comes to understand 
                                                 
68 This notion of verenden is also a way of interpreting the idea of “black and brown bodies” in current discourses on 
bullying, hate crimes, systemic racism, and police brutality. 
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itself as the possibility of its impossibility (32/12).69 Heidegger emphasizes this kind of death 
through his concept of Sein zum Tod.   
Curiosity About Fear Existentiells 
A fear existentiell is susceptible to concealment in curiosity and ambiguity through idle 
talk.  To begin with, curiosity has no real focus, allowing das Man to dictate what issues are 
important for Dasein and how anything should be understood.  The They automatically 
understands the world in an ontic and existentiell way.  If one takes on the understanding of das 
Man then one is rewarded with calm, which means one will not have to wrestle with difficult 
problems that would lead to any existential restlessness arising from anxiety (Angst).  Since das 
Man prescribes what to be curious about, one is implicitly guided to find out more about the 
familiar.  Heidegger writes  
Curiosity, for which nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is 
not understood, provide themselves (that is, the Dasein which is in this manner [dem so 
seienden Dasein] with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’ 
(217/173). 
 
The They compels Dasein to submit to a quick generalization that gives Dasein a sense of 
sharpness and acuity about its existence.  In other words, the lively Dasein in idle talk is the one 
who curiously understands its world and the manner of engaging it.  If this is the case, then such 
conditions are fruitful for all kinds of judgments, even those stemming from prejudice, no matter 
whether the judgments turn into positive or negative stereotypes.  Incorporating all views and 
merely touching upon them makes Dasein arrogant about its existence.  Dasein becomes a “know 
it all” of sorts.  Heidegger writes that curiosity “concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just 
                                                 
69 Heidegger writes, “Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein” (294/250) and “Death reveals 
itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped, 
[unüberholbare]” (294/250-251). 
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in order to have known” (217/173).  Rather than investigate its existence to the point of getting 
nearer to understanding itself in its Angst (Dasein’s fundamental Befindlichkeit, which is always 
there, but concealed), Dasein takes up whatever judgments it wants to remain settled and tranquil 
with itself.  Dasein tries to take hold and dabble in all perspectives, when all it is really doing on 
an ontological level is evading its Angst.  Dasein, with its “versatile curiosity and restlessly 
‘knowing it all,’ regards itself as knowing everything about its existence, even allowing itself to 
be certain about its death” (222/178).  
The ramifications for Dasein as a fear existentiell are that it will accept any fallen views 
about its identity, even the ones that are steeped in the urgency about its death.  The issue with 
such acceptance is two-fold: 1) the views of das Man may not align with Dasein’s everydayness; 
2) even if some of the views were true, Dasein is still evading a confrontation with itself in Angst 
that is necessary to authentically modify a fear existentiell and turn it into an authentic 
existentiell.  Authentication of a fear existentiell cannot happen in curiosity.  In curiosity, Dasein 
skims over itself and if a fear existentiell is applied to Dasein’s identity then that fear will be 
skimmed over as well.  Heidegger writes “When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns 
itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen but just in order to see.  It seeks novelty 
only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty” (216/117).  Curiosity bolsters a cursory 
glance at fear, even when the object of that fear is death.  Glancing does not allow Dasein to 
break from idle talk so that it may arrive at its primordial issue with itself: Being-toward-death is 
always the case for Dasein. 
Ambiguity About Fear Existentiells 
The ambiguity regarding fear existentiells allows das Man to say as much as it wants to 
Dasein.  In ambiguity, any entity of the They can have a say about someone.  Consequently, 
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ambiguity produces multiple points of view to consider and they can be regarded as accurate and 
true for any Dasein.  Heidegger writes, 
When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we encounter the sort of thing which is 
accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes 
impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not 
(217/173).  
 
Ambiguity answers questions from curiosity and leaves Dasein making all sorts of claims that 
are legitimate within the context of its general understanding.  Dasein cannot make a genuine 
decision when it is difficult to assess what counts as genuine understanding in the first place.  
Without clarity, a fear existentiell Dasein can entertain any synopsis of a threat, however 
legitimate or not.  When Dasein eventually decides on what to be fearful about then it is 
questionable as to whether there is even an actual threat that afflicts Dasein.   
Any Dasein can, in fearing another Dasein, cast a Dasein as a being to be feared, as 
someone to be threatened by.  For example, when I was a senior in high school in 1999 and saw 
video footage of two white high school kids in black trenchcoats shooting their school mates at 
Columbine High School, I became fearful of white teenagers in black trenchcoats walking 
around school.  I cast them as individuals to be feared.  I was not the only one fearful of kids in 
black trenchcoats because my high school briefly banned any student from wearing black 
trenchcoats at school.  Between classmates and I, the white kids in black trenchcoats became 
feared existentiells.  Consequently, we became fearing existentiells.  These kinds of problems 
come about from ambiguity because Dasein can assess any of das Man’s available 
interpretations, even if such a narrative comes from fear.   
There are two more issues with ambiguity that are important to remember with regard to 
fear: 1) “Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood” (217/173); 2) “Dasein is always 
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ambiguously ‘there’—that is to say, in that public disclosedness of Being-with-one-another 
where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keeps ‘things moving’” (218-
219/174).  When things look genuinely understood, Dasein has “made its mind up,” so to speak.  
It knows what it needs to know about a situation, a topic, and even another Dasein.  That 
semblance of genuine understanding combined with fear means that Dasein becomes firm in the 
idea that another Dasein merits fear.  Relatedly, if Dasein fears for another Dasein then all the 
information that it thinks it understands about the situation is all that is needed to “protect” that 
other Dasein.  And if Dasein fears about some threat in its life, perhaps the idea of death looming 
around the corner, then convincing Dasein otherwise would not work.  The semblance of genuine 
understanding may make Dasein stubborn about actual circumstances that may suggest there is 
nothing to fear.  This last point relates to the second issue with ambiguity: The “loudest idle talk” 
convinces Dasein to believe in its “genuine” understanding.  For example, the “loudest idle talk” 
could be news reports about terrorism, and then “curiosity keeps ‘things moving’” to tap into 
Dasein’s fear about it.  Even in scholarly articles, Dasein may read about the fear of what is now 
known as terrorism from the “alt-right”, and things are kept moving because of the talk.  The 
“loudest idle talk” goes from one thing to the next, not caring about the veracity of those items.  
Instead, Dasein’s subscription to that ambiguous and curious idle talk is all that matters; 
combined with fear, the talk becomes more convincing. 
Existential Alienation for a Fear Existentiell 
A further consequence of Dasein’s being influenced by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity 
when it is a fear existentiell is that it becomes exposed to an existentiell version of existential 
alienation.  Heidegger examines how Dasein is always uprooted in an existential sense: One is 
always lost in das Man.  However, in idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, Dasein does not regard 
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itself as lost in anything.  In the case of a fear existentiell, the talk of such a Dasein is that it is 
ousted by society, which makes it seem as if it is existentially alienated.  Yet, this societal 
ousting has its source in the fallen mood of fear.  The difference for Dasein as a fear existentiell 
(as opposed to existential alienation) is that there is an increasing sense of urgency to reconciling 
issues of curiosity and ambiguity because it is constantly told and reminded of its existentiell 
social alienation.  For example, in Richard Wright’s Native Son, the main character, Bigger 
Thomas, speaks with his lawyer, Max, about being executed.  Max says,  
Bigger, you’re going to die.  And if you die, die free.  You’re trying to believe in 
yourself.  And every time you try to find a way to live, your own mind stands in the way.  
You know why that is?  It’s because others have said you were bad and they made you 
live in bad conditions.  When a man hears that over and over and looks about him and 
sees that his life is bad, he begins to doubt his own mind.  His feelings drag him forward 
and his mind, full of what others say about him, tells him to go back.70 
 
Bigger Thomas serves as an example of a fear existentiell Dasein who has lived with stress.  As 
Max points out, Bigger has been told about a certain way to be and, try as he might to resist such 
pressure and urgency about his identity, Bigger is thrown into a form of existentiell alienation.  
Max advises Bigger that “what others say about him” will always influence his being.  Later, 
Max tells Bigger to try to believe in himself.  In this example, Bigger (Dasein) has a sense of 
urgency and Max provides a way for Bigger to take his existence and impending death with a 
sense of calm.  Heidegger writes, 
When Dasein, tranquilized, and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with 
everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [Entfremdung] in which its ownmost 
potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it.  Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting 
and tranquilizing; it is at the same time alienating (222/178).  
 
This is Dasein in its “Versatile curiosity and restlessly ‘knowing it all’” masquerading “as a 
universal understanding of Dasein” (222/178).  An individual, as a fear existentiell, may be 
                                                 
70 Richard Wright, Native Son, 499. 
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ousted by both societal judgments and actual institutions regarding identity, and such a person 
may even feel the pressure of death approaching.  In an existentiell sense, Dasein as a fear 
existentiell is Being-hurried because it is running out of time.  The ousting is not necessarily an 
existential alienation, though it is an existentiell one.  Heidegger would demarcate existential and 
existentiell alienation.  The former would be Dasein confronting itself in its nothingness through 
Angst, whereas the latter kind of alienation does not necessarily require such a confrontation. 
Bigger’s lawyer seems to be addressing the possibility of existentiell alienation by 
emphasizing how Bigger’s feelings have been dragged forward and that others have made him 
skeptical of himself.  His lawyer pin points the issue that, in a way, Bigger has not had a chance 
to be himself.  If his lawyer is correct about Bigger, then this sounds like Dasein drifting “along 
towards alienation.” Both cases have an impending kind of alienation, one existential and the 
other existentiell.  With the former, das Man helps tranquilize Dasein in its movement away 
from itself, and with the latter, Bigger’s lawyer seems to suggest that society somehow pressured 
Bigger into murder; thereby, emphasizing how society has assisted in shaping him into a fear 
existentiell. 
Dasein’s Many Deaths and the Presentation of Death Notes to a Fear Existentiell 
When it comes to death, Dasein as a fear existentiell tries to complacently understand its 
end and the They obliges, providing Dasein with consistent reminders about its death via what I 
have been calling a death note.71 My assessment of a fear existentiell being led into death note 
talk contradicts Heidegger’s claims that the They find such talk to be a nuisance because, as we 
will see, das Man is more than willing to discuss the death of a fear existentiell as verenden and 
                                                 
71 This represents a twist on Heidegger’s claim that death is something often addressed as a nuisance to the They. 
Heidegger writes, “Indeed the dying of Others is seen often enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a 
downright tactlessness, against which the public is to be guarded” (298/254). 
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ableben.  In our time, Dasein as a fear existentiell is welcomed to identify his existence with 
death in those two forms.72 Such Dasein are reminded about it to the point that it becomes a note 
to oneself about one’s end; hence, the term death note.  One example of a death note being 
attached to a fear existentiell is in the way non-white people are discussed as bodies.  In the last 
chapter, I focused on Coates, but here is a response to such “body” talk by Tanya Steele, a writer 
for the popular online site IndieWire.  
This term, “Black body,” should be reserved for art, for the canvas.  A canvas is a flat 
surface. A child sitting in a chair is not.  Somehow, this term has made its way into our 
conversation about Black lives. #BlackLivesMatter disrupts the idea that violence is 
simply done to our bodies.  Yet, I see writers continue to use the term “Black bodies.” 
Why?  What purpose does that serve?  Why do we detach the body from the person?  No 
one attacks, solely, a Black body.73 
 
Steele identifies that the black body is discussed as near death, its personhood removed from 
common discourse.  As I noted in the last chapter regarding Coates’ use of the body, one 
response might be that the use of “bodies” is a critique of how society reduces brown and black 
people to objects, as “bodies.”  However, as discussed in the last chapter, the critique loses its 
rhetorical force because the term reinforces the reduction to “bodies” by implicitly reasserting a 
traditional and fallen ontology.  Steele points out how a flawed term like the “body” has entered 
racial discourse and detaches the body from the person.  In the last chapter, I pointed out that not 
only is there a detachment, but the body is placed in front of the person.  Such placement, seen 
through Heidegger’s ontology, conceals Dasein.  The fallen terms that permeate racial discourse 
reduce it to an idle discussion that is promoted by das Man.  The idle talk on race continues with 
death.  With respect to Heidegger’s work on this issue, I discuss two kinds of death for Dasein: 
                                                 
72 For instance, the idea of being “woke” includes the notion that a person of color in the U.S. is woke when he or 
she understands that their life is near death because of unequal treatment under the law or through police violence. 
73 Tanya Steele, “I Am Not a Black Body - #SpringValleyHigh,” IndieWire, October 30, 2015, (accessed on October 
14, 2018).  
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Verenden, which means the perishing of biological bodies, and ableben, the passing away of 
human life.  Das Man attaches death notes of ableben and verenden to Dasein’s fear existentiell.  
When a fear existentiell is talked about as a body-toward-perishing, then this signifies verenden 
and when this Dasein is discussed as a human-passing-away, then that is ableben.  For verenden, 
such death notes reduce a fear existentiell Dasein to a body.  For the ableben death note, human 
life is recognized, but not its existentiality. 
Verenden of Fear Existentiells  
 Heidegger first examines verenden: the end of the living.  This is often translated as 
“perishing.” In Being and Time, Heidegger writes, “In our terminology the ending of anything 
that is alive, is denoted as ‘perishing’ [Verenden]” and then he later states that when studies of 
Dasein originate from a more biological view, “Dasein moves into that domain of Being which 
we know as the world of animals and plants” (284/240-241).  Since verenden does not address 
Dasein’s existentiality no longer existing, he does not dwell on the ontic end that is verenden.  
Consequently, verenden is a neutral end when it comes to authenticity and inauthenticity.  Such 
terms do not apply to perishing.  However, the notion of verenden being applied to Dasein as a 
fear existentiell is normalized through Gerede; verenden becomes a common possible 
occurrence for all black and brown bodies, which reasserts the “body” as being in front of 
Dasein. 
 The Gerede about the death note of fear existentiells tends to be about being embodied as 
black and brown, producing specific talk about raced bodies where verenden is the object of fear.  
Dasein becomes scared that death might occur.  For example, Tommy Curry, often discusses the 
black individual as a black body.  Curry writes about the effect of the black body on the white 
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mind in a news item about a black man in a wheelchair killed by the police.  Curry writes about 
this man,  
 The mere contact with his Blackened body activates the neurosis of the white mind 
 whereby the physical proximity the white observer has to the Black male body triggers a 
 fleeing of the white mind from the reality, or more accurately the relation to Blackness, 
 the white body cannot escape.74  
 
Providing what I interpret as an example of a fear existentiell with a death note, Curry argues 
that the “Blackened body” ignites both fear and fleeing by the “white mind” and we can discern 
the purpose of such body talk: to warn individuals about death by the police and to examine the 
urgency of the near end of the black body by explaining how this point is a matter of survival for 
those embodied in the “Blackened Body.” 
 Such body talk is not relegated to scholars of philosophy of race and Critical Race 
Theory like Curry.  The Gerede about Dasein as a fear existentiell is commonly accepted on 
social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.  For example, a quick search of 
“black bodies” on Twitter yields the following:  
 Horrifying. This is exhibit A of the root to many recent events. There is an inherent & 
 deeply subconscious implicit fear of black bodies in many in our culture today. And that 
 is evil and a problem. And that’s where the conversation (and justice) should be 
 centered.75  
 
Jefferson Bethke, a self-described family man and lover of Jesus Christ, has 157,000 followers 
with the above tweet receiving 190 retweets as of this writing.  Despite the differences between 
the mode of communication for each respective thinker, the body idle talk is similar in both 
                                                 
74 Tommy Curry, “This Nigger’s Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role of Physical Disability in White 
Anxiety Toward the Black Male Body,” Journal of Social Philosophy, September 1, 2017 (accessed October 15, 
2018), 326. 
75 Bethke, J. [JeffersonBethke]. (2017, September 7). [Tweet]. Retrieved from 
https://twitter.com/JeffersonBethke/status/1038171338488201216 
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kinds of media: a fear existentiell is discussed as a body with a death note.  The purpose of each 
mode of communication is likely similar as well: both authors, in their own way, are using the 
talk of objectification to highlight the emergency society faces regarding the death of the black 
body. 
 Reports about the death of black and brown people by police actions compel discussants 
to talk about violence against these communities, but the philosophical and layperson 
commentary on these reports becomes part of the Gerede about fear existentiells when deaths are 
framed as verenden.  Even in a moral defense of non-white communities, scholars and non-
scholars participate in the spread of death notes among fear existentiells. However, in using the 
notion of fear existentiells and death notes, I critique their defenses as reifying verenden 
narratives, as their applicability to individual Dasein requires more philosophical scrutiny.  If we 
remove such moral commitments from these defenses of “black and brown bodies,” we are left 
with influential idle talk about non-white communities as bodies near verenden.  In other words, 
we are left with idle talk that reduces Dasein’s death to perishing.  
 When people talk about Dasein as verenden, they are reporting about death reports 
related to historically marginalized groups.  The critique of my claim would be that authors of 
body-related death notes, like Curry and Bethke, are reacting to the plethora of actual deaths of 
black and brown lives by fearful racist institutions and actors; therefore, these authors are exempt 
from “participating” in Gerede about the end of fear existentiells.  Yet, the purpose of such body 
death note talk demonstrates that the goal is to have Dasein recognize the urgent plight of fear 
existentiells.  If you are non-white, then it is deathly important for you to understand the reality 
of these matters.  If you are white, then it is crucial, albeit not mortally so, to understand what is 
happening to non-whites, particularly those classified as black and brown bodies.  In any case, 
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Dasein is persuaded into recognizing a certain kind of reality for a certain kind of people.  
Whether or not this reality is existentially true of an individual Dasein is not considered because 
the Gerede is related to one’s membership in a group identified as a fear existentiell body.   
 The best-case scenario for the advocates of such body and death talk is that Dasein as a 
fear existentiell subscribes to this talk, believing its body to be near death.  But to do this, the 
authors of body death note talk must convince Dasein that they are under an atmospheric kind of 
threat, essentially diagnosing Dasein as a feared body that is societally near the end.  In such a 
scenario, the Gerede about the body and its end objectifies the individual as no more than a 
bodily member of a general community that is afflicted with a near death problem.  To diagnose 
the community with this societal problem, scholars who take on such body talk are doing 
something quite interesting: they are applying what could be taken as a singularized existential 
event (Being-toward-death) to a whole community, which turns “death” into a relational 
community event.  As a community event, death becomes the death of a marginalized group to 
the point where it is “our” death when one is a member of that fear existentiell community.  
When one member of the group dies, the community takes over that individual death.  
Discursively, that death is no longer about the individual, but about the death of the group.  In 
this way, one’s death is shared by everyone to the point of no longer being one’s death.  
Consequently, the singularizing Being-toward-death is taken as pluralizing death, which conceals 
the “ownmost” feature of existential death. 
 Such a passing over of one’s existential self being towards its end is what Heidegger aims 
to avoid in his discussion of Dasein’s death.  For Heidegger, to solely consider Dasein’s end as 
verenden is to withdraw both the ontological and existential features of Dasein’s death. 
Heidegger writes 
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From the foregoing discussion  of the ontological possibility of getting death into our 
grasp, it becomes clear at the same time that substructures of entities with another kind of 
Being (presence-at-hand or life) thrust themselves to the fore unnoticed, and threaten to 
bring confusion to the Interpretation of this phenomenon--even to the first and suitable 
way of presenting it (285/241). 
 
The concept of verenden cannot handle an analysis of Dasein’s existential end and instead invites 
more confusion.  Talking about a fear existentiell as verenden entangles Dasein in a way of 
talking about itself that automatically conceals its existential issue.  It does so in a manner that 
requires a proximity to death that may not even be true for a Dasein who is a member of a fear 
existentiell group.  
Ableben of Fear Existentiells: How Ableben Talk Falls Back on das Man 
 With a fear existentiell, Heidegger’s ableben is expressed as the death of lives in 
racialized communities, rather than just black or brown bodies.  For Heidegger, ableben is 
Dasein’s dying off or passing away. More than the perishing of a body, ableben is Dasein’s end 
as a human being.  Unlike verenden, ableben is not neutral when it comes to the issue of 
authenticity or inauthenticity: Ableben is Dasein’s inauthentic end.  Heidegger writes 
 In so far as this is the case (the reference to Dasein as ontically as well as ontologically 
 ending), Dasein too can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua 
 Dasein, it does not simply verenden.  We designate this intermediate phenomenon as its 
 “demising” or “ableben” (247/291).  
 
Ableben lets Dasein deal with death inauthentically while possibly catalyzing existential death, 
but this seldom occurs and most Dasein die inauthentically in ableben.76 Despite the 
inauthenticity of ableben, it represents a step toward a more robust idea of death that is divested 
of “existentiell commitments,” as Heidegger described (292/248).  From the view of a fear 
                                                 
76 David Krell, in Daimon Life (1992), says that ableben is “in between perishing and dying in order to prevent an 
inappropriate Dasein from dying like an animal, to preclude its collapsing into just-plain-life when it dies ignobly, 
but also in order to preserve a certain propriety for Dasein when it dies properly” 97. 
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existentiell that is encumbered in Gerede about death notes, those existentiell commitments tend 
to conceive Dasein as a life member of a racialized group rather than Dasein in its existentiality. 
The Certainty of Ableben for a Fear Existentiell 
If ableben is the inauthentic ending of Dasein and if it provides a sense of certainty of 
one’s end then Dasein, as a fear existentiell, only engenders fallenness towards its end.  
Heidegger writes 
The fact that demise, as an event which occurs, is ‘only’ empirically certain, is in no way 
decisive as to the certainty of death.  Cases of death may be the factical occasion for 
Dasein’s first paying attention to death at all.  So long, however, as Dasein remains in the 
empirical certainty which we have mentioned, death, in the way that it ‘is’, is something 
of which Dasein can by no means become certain (301/257). 
 
Dasein is empirically certain about death, may believe death to be around the corner, and may 
even have empirical certainty about who will kill it.  John D. Márquez writes about this empirical 
certainty of death from a sociological perspective in his description of Latinos as the “living 
dead.” He says 
This essay argues that while entrapment and exploitation account for the economic 
exploitability of Latin American immigrants and of Latinos writ large, the border death 
toll is more a reflection of the role that race has played in structuring modern nation states 
like the United States. The death toll, moreover, is largely the result of how Latinidad has 
been produced as an ethno-racial signifier of peril within the sociologics of U.S. 
sovereignty. To account for this condition, this essay introduces the term racial state of 
expendability.77 
 
Gonzalez takes the immigrant death toll at the U.S. border as an “ethno-racial” sign that Latinos 
are expendable.  He incorporates the language of author Achille Mbembe to say that segments of 
the Latino population are the “living dead.”78 This demonstrates that death as ableben is 
                                                 
77 John D. Márquez, “Latinos as the Living Dead: Raciality, Expendability, and Border Militarization,” Latino 
Studies, 2012, (Vol. 10, No. 4), 473. 
78 John D. Marquez, from Achille Mbembe on “the living dead.” Marquez writes about Mbembe that “Colonial 
formations and the ‘post-colony,’ Mbembe argues, are describable as ‘death worlds’ in so much as the lives of 
natives are characterized by an evolution from ‘living dead’ to ‘plain dead’” 478. 
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perfectly compatible with what I have described as fear existentiells and death notes.  Through 
being a fear existentiell, Dasein is almost guaranteed to ableben because the idle talk about 
Dasein, as a life member of a racialized group, sustains its fallenness right up until the death.  
Even with legitimate claims to certainty about death tolls regarding fear existentiells, the 
certainty is about Dasein as merely a “case of death,” that then reduces Dasein to somehow being 
lifeless.  With respect to Gonzalez’s project, Dasein need only be Latino/a to be a possible case 
of death.  If Gonzalez is correct and the Latino/a is a possible case of death, the “living dead,” 
then the Latino(a) becomes a theoretically “unalive” being that is also “an object of ‘concern’” 
(282/238).  Heidegger writes about the unliving that  
From a theoretical point, even the corpse which is present-at-hand is still a possible 
object for the student of pathological anatomy, whose understanding tends to be oriented 
to the idea of life.  This something which is present-at-hand-and-no-more is ‘more’ than a 
lifeless material Thing.  In it we encounter something unalive, which has lost its life 
(282/238). 
 
For Heidegger, Gonzalez would be regarding the “living dead” Latino(a) as a “mere corporeal 
Thing” that is “unalive” (282/232).  The Latino(a) would be the unliving entity who has death 
looming over it to the point of being dead already.  When applying Heidegger’s view of the 
unliving to Gonzalez’s conception of the Latino(a), we have an idea of a zombie, popularized 
throughout cinema and television.  However, both living and dead Latino(a)s individuals are not 
zombies.  When Gonzalez speaks of them as the unliving, he is treating that community as if he 
is already mourning them, as if they have already “been torn away from those who have 
‘remained behind’” (282/238).  Latino(a)s become unliving present-at-hand objects of concern 
that Gonzalez is “tarrying alongside” by “mourning and commemorating” them “in a mode of 
respectful solicitude” (282/238).   
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Fear Existentiell and the Faux Certainty of Death 
 Gonzalez is certain that specific groups pass away, and an abundance of data makes this 
empirically certain; however, the certainty is made possible by Gerede about fear existentiells.  
Heidegger is not trying to dissuade individuals from the certainty of empirical data about people 
passing away.  He is pointing out that empirically assessing death, no matter how robust the data 
or feeling of its nearness, does not approximate death’s existential significance for Dasein.  
Rather, Heidegger’s point about empirical certainty is that it is part of a fallen discourse and 
cannot account for Dasein’s authentic ending.  Such a distinction about authenticity demonstrates 
the extent to which an issue can psychologically and empirically seem near without existentially 
being an issue for Dasein.      
Heidegger’s assessment of how “averageness” plays a role in Dasein’s commitment to 
certainty is reflected in Gerede.  For Dasein, “everydayness concedes something like a certainty 
of death,” but not all certainty is the same (299-300/255-256).  When Dasein is Being-certain, its 
death is realized as a possibility for itself and no one else.  The other certainty about death, 
referred to already as “empirical certainty,” emanates from inauthentically Being-toward-the-end 
when it is empirically probable for Dasein.  Instead, if Dasein is a fear existentiell that is 
probably-certain-about-its-death, then this understanding will be idle to the extent that this is a 
common event for everyone with a similar existentiell.  Death is shared in empirical certainty.  
Such an empirical certainty does not single out Dasein to authentically own its death but compels 
Dasein to fall back into an ableben narrative that das Man can experience.79 
Through fear existentiells, “certainty” is attained insofar as Dasein is a member of a 
group that is led into believing that their ableben is imminent.  For a fear existentiell, one is a 
                                                 
79 Heidegger writes, “Dasein lets the testimony of the thing itself which has been uncovered (the true thing itself) be 
the sole determinant for its Being towards that thing understandingly” (300/256). 
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member of an identity that is taken as a body or life destined to an expedited death, Being-
hurried.  Part of the averageness of that existentiell is existing in a role wherein one understands 
he or she to be a member of a prejudicially or racially targeted community.  Heidegger writes 
that “Everydayness confines itself to conceding the ‘certainty’ of death in this ambiguous 
manner just to weaken that certainty by covering up dying still more and to alleviate its own 
thrownness into death” (299-300/255-256).  Because the idea of death has a Gerede-motivated 
kind of certainty, death loses its singularity.  In contrast to such qualities, ableben increasingly 
becomes defined in this empirical certainty.  Dasein’s “Being-certain” of its Sein zum Tod 
becomes concealed. 
Expecting Ableben as a Fear Existentiell Versus Anticipating Sein zum Tod 
 For a fear existentiell, Dasein must overcome an especially concealed framing of its 
existence because the They ascribes death notes about its ableben or verenden.  The consistency 
of such death note talk for a fear existentiell instructs Dasein to expect ableben rather than 
anticipate existential death (Sein zum Tod) as a possibility that is integral to its existential 
structure.  Sein zum Tod, for Heidegger, is as follows: 
The full existential-ontological conception of death may now be defined as follows: 
death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility--non-relational, certain, and 
as such indefinite, not to be outstripped.  Death is, as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this 
entity towards its end (302/258). 
 
For Heidegger, existential death is something that Dasein takes over once it exists.  Sein zum Tod 
is an individualized phenomenon that Dasein always holds as a possibility.  The individuation of 
death and its possibility are misinterpreted through das Man via Dasein’s expecting ableben.  
Such an expecting contrasts with Heidegger’s point that “when Dasein dies … it does not have to 
do so with an Experience of its factical demising, or in such an Experience” (291/247).  Even 
more so with fear existentiells, ableben is expected to be actualized and such an expecting is 
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constantly reinforced by the They.  For Heidegger, death can never be actualized, but remains 
always possible.  If death were to be actualized, its status as being possible would no longer be in 
effect.  Sein zum Tod is a possibility for Dasein that is always there so long as Dasein is in the 
world; however, death’s being a possibility does not depend on experience or even thinking 
about it all the time.  Yet, as I have demonstrated, we see that this is precisely what das Man 
does for Dasein as a fear existentiell.  When one has a fear existentiell, one is always thinking 
about death. 
This is the way one comports oneself when one ‘thinks about death’, pondering over 
when and how this possibility may be actualized.  Of course, such brooding over death does not 
fully take away from it its character as a possibility.  Indeed, it always gets brooded over as 
something that is coming; but in such brooding we weaken it by calculating how we are to have 
it at our disposal (305-306/261).  Thus, while these ideas of death are perpetuated, Dasein as a 
fear existentiell is engrossed in a brooding idle talk about death.80 It is this atmosphere that 
makes anticipating existential death increasingly out of reach for a community of individuals. 
Conclusion 
Rather than wait to understand the individual in question, das Man jumps to a conclusion 
that it finds likely but still too general.  Why is this so?  Das Man of our contemporary society is 
inclined to encourage Dasein to take notice of death’s perceived proximity for it.  Heidegger’s 
point is that “The dying of Others is seen often enough as a social inconvenience, if not even a 
downright tactlessness, against which the public is the guarded” (298/254).  Yet, if we take that 
                                                 
80 Hubert L. Dreyfus’ foreword for Carol White’s Time and Death (2005), goes further, saying that “the constant 
closing of possibilities could not be the kind of ontological dying Heidegger has in view.” This would remove the 
bio-, historio, ethno-, and psychological as ontological possibilities, and more like roles that can no longer be when 
Dasein existentially dies.  Dreyfus continues, “The gradual closing down of possibilities does not have the right 
ontological structure to deal with death of one world and the birth of another,” and what Heidegger is talking about 
is more like a Kierkegaardian “discontinuity or leap” xxi. 
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quote in a contemporary setting, with the current Gerede about death, we see that one who is a 
fear existentiell is motivated by das Man to concede to the threat of death and suffering even 
though it may not be there in Dasein’s averageness.  Dasein as a fear existentiell does not 
encounter criticisms of “tactlessness” or “social inconvenience” when discussing its verenden 
and ableben as a body in today’s U.S. society; rather, to concur with claims of suffering and 
death becomes a sign of one’s acumen about societal conditions for the marginalized and 
oppressed.  As a person who tends to be considered a fear existentiell, it becomes socially 
acceptable and advantageous to “speak your truth” about the threat of death and the proximity to 
it through one’s marginalized existence, even if one’s connection to ontic death and suffering is 
remote.  Rather than tactless, it becomes a sign of social acuity to which the public is supportive. 
Such encouragement and fostering of speaking one’s truth about what we can call 
“oppression” or “marginalization” creates a nebulous ambiguity where death, oppression, and 
marginalization are conflated, so that one need not actually experience any of these things, but 
may only subscribe to the ambiguity of how one belongs to these issues.  One might simply be a 
member of the marginalized identity group to subscribe to such issues.  As such, what affects the 
group would then be thought to affect the member.  This type of membership is ambiguous 
because it suggests that someone is simultaneously part of an issue while not being part of the 
issue.  Ambiguity is also demonstrated by the fact that in our current technological expression of 
das Man in social media, we can see various notions about death as they are relevant to racial 
groups that are discussed as near death.  The result favors the influence of das Man over the 
existentiell and ontical everydayness of the individual.  Heidegger discusses how the They talk 
about death with a sense of authority, relegating Dasein’s concerns to being cowardly.  However, 
at least in U.S. society, das Man seems prone to accept the probability of expected death from 
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marginalized people.  They absorb Dasein’s fear existentiell, telling the individual their death is 
imminent.  Even if death is not near, the problem of such death notes being imposed becomes the 
greater issue, creating a problem of how one is authentically related to such talk.  Reduced to a 
fear existentiell, Dasein must figure what about the idle talk is genuine to its existence.  Such a 
Dasein may ask, “Am I somehow a problem?”  In chapter 5, I call those fear existentiell Dasein 
who are talked about as near death “Being-a-problem,” and I will argue that the issue of Dasein’s 
end becomes a serious problem for such a Dasein because its identity as a fear existentiell is 
viewed through Gerede about death, covering up its existential end.81 The idle talk conceals 
Dasein’s Angst (anxiety) and the ontological fact that it is always Sein zum Tod (Being-toward-
death).  Rather than an individual considering existential death for itself, a fear existentiell 
Dasein who is talked about as being near death becomes a problem for itself and society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 “Being-a-problem” comes from Du Bois’ Souls of Black Folk (1903) where he states, “Between me and the other 
world there is ever an unasked question: unasked by some through feelings of delicacy, by others through the 
difficulty of rightly framing it.  All nevertheless, flutter around it.  They approach me in a half-hesitant sort of way, 
eye me curiously or compassionately, and then, instead of saying it directly, How does it feel to be a problem?” 9.  
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Chapter 5 
Inauthentic Being-a-problem and Du Bois’ Double Consciousness 
“… Being a problem is a strange experience…”82 
- W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk 
Introduction  
 “Being-a-problem” is Dasein’s having an identity that is perpetually associated with 
verenden and ableben.  Sein zum Tod is Dasein’s existential death, its end as an ontico-
ontological being, but this death is a problem for all Dasein and is not discussed in idle talk.  
Verenden and ableben, however, are often discussed in Gerede and frequently attributed to 
certain existentiells in the form of what I call “death notes.” Dasein is spoken of as near death 
because its embodied color, race, and ethnicity are conceived of as proximate to verenden and 
ableben.  Dasein bears ontic and existentiell characteristics that leave it open to identification by 
others, but not only is death covered up, so is Dasein’s conscience, which Heidegger 
characterizes as Dasein’s existential possibility of hearing its own call.  The fear existentiell, 
coupled with a death note, takes Dasein as being a perpetual problem in its world, what I call 
“inauthentic Being-a-problem” (iBap).  This categorizing has an extra layer comprised of a death 
note which muffles Dasein’s possibility of hearing its conscience.   
 I begin this chapter by reviewing the background of inauthentic Being-a-problem.  I 
discuss it as a way to be, an existentiell, that is interpreted through a Heideggerian lens, but the 
                                                 
82 W.E.B Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, ed. Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Terri Hume Oliver, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1999), 9. 
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origin is from W.E.B. Du Bois’ Souls of Black Folk.  Du Bois discusses the problem of being a 
black person in society, manifesting a double-consciousness where black Americans deal with a 
divided self-perception: being seen through the eyes of white America and oneself.  I use this 
division to understand how the existentiell of inauthentic Being-a-problem deals with a veil of 
perceptions between Dasein spoken about and das Man speaking about Dasein. 
 I elaborate on how we get a fear existentiell, as discussed in the past two chapters, to the 
existentiell of inauthentic Being-a-problem.  Inauthentic Being-a-problem is a combination of a 
fear existentiell and a death note brought together through idle talk in which Dasein’s everyday 
societal issue is the idea that ableben and verenden are near, depending on which narrative is 
impressed upon an individual (sometimes it is both).  Because of the death note, existential death 
becomes concealed.  In place of Heidegger’s analysis that discussions of death are public 
annoyances, I argue that the opposite happens with iBap, for in contemporary U.S. society, 
recognizing ableben or verenden is a sign of social awareness, creating a feedback loop of 
reinforcement regarding identity and death.  
One might then inquire as to why this is even an issue in the first place, since it would be 
important for marginalized identities to know about impending death, in an ontico-existentiell 
sense, but I counter that inauthentic Being-a-problem contains an inherent tendency to conceal 
Dasein’s Angst while advancing fear.  For this reason, I compare fear to Angst, showing how fear 
conceals Dasein’s Angst, which then blocks any possible catalyst for existential death.  In an 
analysis of Angst, I show that because inauthentic Being-a-problem is mired in fear and death 
notes, anxiety is effectively covered over.  Since Sein zum Tod is thought to spark Angst by both 
Heidegger and Heidegger scholars.  I examine how this catalyst is inoperative for Being-a-
problem.  If a “spark” is normalized through a persistent death note attached to a fear existentiell, 
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then Gerede about iBap effectively prevents Dasein from engaging with its fundamental mood of 
anxiety, Angst.  Instead, Being-a-problem is kept in the mode of fear, which prevents it from 
being an authentic Being-a-problem.  This keeps Dasein in a levelled down discourse about 
death and implicates both itself and other Dasein like it in the urging of death narratives upon 
certain individuals, obscuring Angst. 
W.E.B. Du Bois’ Double Consciousness and How One Can Be a Problem 
 I have discussed how das Man, through Gerede, influences certain Dasein into regarding 
themselves as particular existentiells.  When fear is attributed to an existentiell, it is then taken as 
a “fear existentiell.”  If a person of color is part of a demographic that is largely connected to the 
talk of marginalization and oppression then that person is likely being linked to a kind of death 
note talk.  If this person is curious about whether this is evident in life then the proof is with das 
Man, where the current news and social media, discuss an existentiell in the mode of fear.  Upon 
doing this, one will find a distinction: those identities often talked about as near death or threat 
and those that are not often spoken of in this way.  Gerede death discussions signal that some 
identities are discussed in terms of being problems in society.   
The origin of my concept of Being-a-problem is from Du Bois’ question from The Souls 
of Black Folk where he asks, “How does it feel to be a problem?”83 Du Bois’ question is about 
black Americans’ self-perceptions and how they see themselves through the eyes of others, white 
Americans.  For Du Bois, the white American seeks to ask this question almost out of sheer 
confusion and curiosity (in the usual non-Heideggerian sense of the word) about how black 
Americans handle existing in this country.  Not having a clear answer, the white American 
simply sees black people as peculiar problems.  Because of this conclusion of black Americans 
                                                 
83 Du Bois, 9. 
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as feeling like problems, Du Bois speaks of the white American self-perceptions as goodness, 
light, virtue, and lawfulness.  From such a positive assessment about themselves, white 
Americans are puzzled by black Americans.  In Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil, Du Bois 
writes about “whiteness” as the “dominant world” that “discourses about me” with a tone that 
says 
My poor un-white thing!  Weep not nor rage.  I know, too well, that the curse of God lies 
heavy on you.  Why?  That is not for me to say, but be brave!  Do your work in your 
lowly sphere, praying the good Lord that into heaven above, where all is love, you may, 
one day, be born—white!84 
 
For white America, if everything is so good on the white side of life then how can a black person 
be in this country?  From the whiteness perspective that Du Bois considers, how can a black 
person really be anything but a problem?  Recognizing this reduction to being considered a 
problem, Du Bois writes that “being a problem is a strange experience,” which produces  
a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self 
through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in 
amused contempt and pity.  One ever feels his two-ness,-- an American, a Negro; two 
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, 
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.85 
 
For Du Bois, you are conscious of yourself as a black individual and, as a black American, you 
are judged by white America.  You understand yourself as a warring composite.  To have this is 
to possess an ambivalence and you are tasked with constantly sorting it out because your mental 
well-being (even physical, sometimes) depends on it.  Du Bois’ “double consciousness” and the 
notion of “ambivalence” that pervades it, has even influenced Robert Ezra Park’s concept of the 
“marginal man,” where such a person “is not accepted because of racial prejudice and because he 
                                                 
84 W.E.B. Du Bois, Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil (New York: Dover, 1999), 18. 
85 Du Bois, 11. 
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shares the cultures of two distinct peoples.”86 However, in Du Bois’ double consciousness, the 
concept is “explicitly formulated to capture a situation created by racial oppression that led to the 
oppression of black Americans.”87 The “situation” is one that not only resembles the problem of 
“marginality,” but is also an issue where a person becomes a site of ambivalence.  
The internal war Du Bois describes through his concept of double consciousness is about 
self-interpretation and the interpretation of others, a phenomenon like inauthentic Being-a-
problem.  With iBap, Dasein has a fear existentiell with a death note.  The fear existentiell is 
rooted in a basic notion of identity that I discussed in chapter 2 as an existentiell, which comes 
from thrown-projection.  The link between one’s existentiell and thrown-projection leads to 
Dasein’s racial identity as a possibility that one can own up in take hold of or neglect.  However, 
since Dasein tends toward inauthenticity due to its fallenness, this racial identity is taken up by 
das Man before Dasein gets a chance to “win” it and lay claim to it.  Das Man has already 
weighed in on it and taken hold of it as an identity with fear of verenden and ableben.  
Consequently, Dasein as iBap is limited by das Man’s take on this existentiell by promoting how 
it is an identity wherein threats of death loom.  The addition of a death note to a fear existentiell 
incorporates ambiguity and curiosity because then Dasein becomes confident of this fear element 
and uses the gossip of das Man to get what it thinks is a genuine understanding of itself and the 
world.  Thus, with inauthentic Being-a-problem, there is an internal war in Dasein’s fear 
existentiell because the Gerede about death is inauthentic, whereas Dasein’s real death as Sein 
zum Tod remains its possible, albeit concealed, authentic end. 
For Heidegger, Dasein’s inauthentic end is shared by all and relational while the 
authentic end is singularized in Dasein as its ownmost, not to be shared.  Inauthentic Being-a-
                                                 
86 Aldon D. Morris, The Scholar Denied, (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 145. 
87 Morris, The Scholar Denied, 145. 
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problem has the potential to move from this conception of inauthentic end to authentic death.  It 
can resolve this internal war by acquiring a genuine understanding of how fear operates as a fear 
existentiell.  When this self-interpretation is understood, Dasein can siphon the fear from its 
inauthentic Being-a-problem, no longer be a fear existentiell with a death note about 
inauthentically ending, and finally claim its authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).   
Encouraging Concealment 
Out of this analysis of fear existentiells and death notes is the problem that Dasein 
encounters itself as both a social issue that is idly discussed and an existential issue for itself that 
das Man is structurally incapable of understanding.  This is important because Dasein must 
decide whether the expected ableben ascribed to it is real or whether it is Gerede.  To this end, 
Dasein must wrestle with overcoming the They talk about death because this talk targets its 
racial identity. 
In inauthentic Being-a-problem, das Man encourages a kind of fleeing in its death talk.  
Instead of running from the talk, the They leans toward the extreme of more death talk about a 
fear existentiell.  For instance, recently in popular culture, which I take to be a social media 
version of das Man, the actress Anne Hathaway said the following in an Instagram post:  
 White people- including me, including you- must take into the marrow of our privileged 
 bones the truth that ALL black people fear for their lives DAILY in America and have 
 done so for GENERATIONS.  White people DO NOT have equivalence for this fear 
 of violence.88  
 
The statement demonstrates that rather than a nuisance, such death talk is welcomed.89  
However, her all-encompassing statement about black people fearing for their lives talks about 
                                                 
88 Anne Hathaway Instagram post on the death of Nia Wilson, July 25th, 2018. 
89 Her statement is an example of how a Dasein can fear for, on behalf, of another Dasein and “leap in” for Dasein, a 
point I discussed in the previous chapter. 
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death as something for blacks to expect as an imminent event of which black individuals 
constantly live in fear about.  Rather than Heidegger’s assessment of Dasein fleeing from 
ableben talk, here we see how the They delves into it as a method of highlighting an emergency 
plight about racial identities.  Such a framing of one’s passing away as an event to fear, expect, 
and await, means that Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem is being existentially concealed. 
How the Fear in Inauthentic Being-a-problem Conceals Angst 
 As a fear existentiell with a death note, inauthentic Being-a-problem is an identity that 
lends itself to brooding over one’s end.  Fear is the root of Dasein’s dwelling on death.  The 
union of fear existentiells with death notes in inauthentic Being-a-problem shows that fear is 
integrated into such an identity. Since fear plays a key role and since this fear is about death, 
inauthentic Being-a-problem turns out to be an identity that is structured to conceal Dasein’s 
Angst in favor of expressing its “kindred,” albeit fallen, mood of fear (230/185).  Understanding 
Heidegger’s distinction and relationship between fear and anxiety reveals how troublesome iBap 
can be for Dasein as its Gerede about death compels it to expect its end. 
Angst is Dasein’s basic state-of-mind, which allows for the world to reveal itself to 
Dasein.90 Because of Angst, “ontical ‘information’” and Dasein’s “existentiell point of view” are 
disclosed as aspects that Dasein flees towards for comfort and reliability because such 
information and points of view have always been ready-to-hand for Dasein.91 An individual’s 
security also lies in the fact that the ready-to-handness of the world is definite, providing a sense 
                                                 
90 Heidegger writes “that the world as world is disclosed first and foremost by anxiety, as a mode of state-of-mind” 
(232/187). 
91 Heidegger writes, “One of Dasein’s possibilities of Being is to give us ontical ‘information’ about Dasein itself as 
an entity.  Such information is possible only in that disclosedness which belongs to Dasein and which is grounded in 
state-of-mind and understanding” (228/184); about an “existentiell point of view,” he says, “From an existentiell 
point of view, the authenticity of Being-one’s-Self has of course been closed off and thrust aside in falling; but to be 
thus closed off is merely the privation of a disclosedness which manifests itself phenomenally in the fact that 
Dasein’s fleeing is a fleeing in the face of itself” (229/184). 
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of “being-at-home” (zuhause-sein) for Dasein.  “Being-at-home,” Dasein flees itself as Angst 
reveals Dasein’s groundlessness, whereas “Being-at-home” lets Dasein settle such a dreadful 
basis by covering it up with inauthentic points of view about how to exist in the world.  In 
contrast to the comfort of inauthentic points of view, Angst unsettles Dasein as it feels a sense of 
uncanniness (unheimlich) or not-being-at-home (Un-zuhause) about a world that has been shown 
as indefinite, as groundlessness and nothingness.  In such disclosure, one finds nothing at all.92  
Heidegger writes that, “In anxiety one feels ‘uncanny’” (233/188).  In Angst, all that ready-to-
handness that Dasein is accustomed to and supported by simply “sinks away.”93 For iBap, this 
sinking away would mean that the information and perspective about what it is (fear existentiell 
with a death note) would sink away in Angst.   
Fear is the physical manifestation of Angst and das Man instructs inauthentic Being-a-
problem to brood over death. “Fear is anxiety, fallen into the ‘world’, inauthentic, and, as such, 
hidden from itself” (234/189).  Angst reveals itself in the “world” as physiological. “Only 
because Dasein is anxious in the very depths of its Being, does it become possible for anxiety to 
be elicited physiologically” (234/190).  With Angst’s being done away with and addressed as 
fear, Dasein dwells on the threat of death and becomes confident about this death through 
ambiguity and curiosity. Settled in this fear, Dasein is at “home” with its identity as a fear 
existentiell.  Heidegger writes 
And only because anxiety is always latent in Being-in-the-world, can such  Being-in-the-
world, as Being which is alongside the ‘world’ and which is concernful in its state-of-
mind, ever be afraid (234/189).  
 
                                                 
92 “What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the 
possibility of the ready-to-hand in general; that is to say, it is the world itself.  When anxiety has subsided, then in 
our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that ‘it was really nothing’” (231/187). 
93 “In anxiety what is environmentally ready-to-hand sinks away, and so, in general, do entities within-the-world” 
(232/187). 
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If inauthentic Being-a-problem dwells on ableben or verenden then it mulls over an inauthentic 
expression of anxiety, and in this fear it still continues to be absorbed in the world.94 The 
constant Gerede in society about the threat of one’s end keeps fearful Dasein encumbered in its 
flight from Angst.95 Dasein’s existentiell may be threatened, but it prefers the security of fear’s 
definiteness to the indefiniteness anxiety brings.  Angst abruptly occurs, relentlessly pursues 
Dasein, and does not require an emphatic way to see a bare nothing or darkness.96, 97 Clearly 
defined fear and the Gerede of threat are unnecessary to elicit anxiety, counterproductive to the 
reflection that Angst brings about.  If Dasein makes everything dark and fearful to better “grasp” 
at the nothing of Angst then one’s absorption into the world becomes more immersive and self-
concealing.98, 99  
Brooding and Empirical Public Certainty for Being-a-problem 
 If “anxiety individualizes” one because it grips Dasein in uncanniness, then fear 
communalizes as it brings one back into the normalcy of das Man (235/191).  When Dasein as 
iBap dwells on ableben or verenden it does so with a community of similar existentiells.  
Fretting over death occurs because the talk of fear and death is principally about Dasein’s group 
membership, not how it exists as an existential and ontological whole.  However, this shared 
brooding about one’s life or body ending does not automatically cause Sein zum Tod or Angst.  
                                                 
94 “On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the ‘world.’  Everyday familiarity 
collapses.  Dasein has been individualized, but individualized as Being-in-the-world” (233/189). 
95 “This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible 
to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such” (229/185). 
96 “Anxiety can arise in the most innocuous Situations.  Nor does it have any need for darkness, in which it is 
commonly easier for one to feel uncanny” (234/189). 
97 “This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the ‘they,’ though not 
explicitly” (234/189). 
98 “In the dark there is emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, though the very world itself is still ‘there,’ and ‘there’ more 
obtrusively” (234/189). 
99 Heidegger writes in Introduction to Metaphysics (2014) that “Original anxiety can awaken in existence at any 
moment.  It needs no unusual event to rouse it.  Its sway is as thoroughgoing as its possible occasionings are trivial.  
It is always ready, though it only seldom springs, and we are snatched away and left hanging” (160). 
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Instead, Dasein weakens death by dwelling on it.100 The Gerede about death as ableben or 
verenden never means that Dasein is near Sein zum Tod.  Rather, this distinction between the 
shared Gerede about kinds of death and actual Sein zum Tod highlights a critical issue for 
inauthentic Being-a-problem, which is dealing with whether the idle talk is true of its existence 
as an individual.  The concern is that since Dasein immerses itself in the Gerede of das Man, 
Sein zum Tod will be concealed, and that will be especially detrimental to Dasein as inauthentic 
Being-a-problem because it is steeped in the mode of fear.   
 Fear is integrated into an existentiell and it conceals anxiety.  This hiddenness proffers a 
sense of communal dwelling, mulling, and brooding, making certainty about ableben or 
verenden a community effort.  Certainty is having a belief that one believes to be true and having 
the support of the They in such a claim, but Being-certain does not depend on the support of das 
Man.  Inauthentic Being-a-problem is supported by the communal and empirical certainty of 
death.  As we come to recognize how the They talk about Dasein, we see an ambiguous but 
accepted public grammar about death, whether implicitly or explicitly expressed, and we are 
taught this grammar all our lives.  We feel “certain” of issues like death.  Empirical certainty 
about group death makes it easy to speak monolithically about racial groups.  For instance, in the 
newsletter The Harvard Crimson, Ruben E. Reyes, Jr. writes in an article entitled “Black and 
Brown Bodies” that as black and brown skinned people 
We have different histories, and our black and brown bodies move through the world 
differently, but there is much more that connects us than divides us. Solidarity feels 
natural because it is our black and brown bodies, saturated with the dark melanin of our 
                                                 
100 Denis McManus, in “Being-Towards-Death and Owning One’s Judgment,” suggests “that the reason that the 
inauthentic’s ‘brooding’ on the ‘when’ of death ‘weakens’ it is that true readiness for death—like that for 
parousia—is not knowing when it will happen but readiness for it to happen at any time.  That is to treat death as a 
constant possibility rather than focusing on its ‘when,’ its character as an event that will come to pass at some 
particular moment” (260).  McManus says that conceiving of Being-towards-death in the sense of being truly ready 
for it allows death to have its sting. 
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ancestors, that are buried in the soil as nutrients for the plants and riches of this 
country.101 
 
Reyes uses words like bodies in a verenden sense, rejecting any sense of personhood about his 
subject matter.  If the reader is black or brown, then this person may even take on the fear 
expressed by the author, a fear that is a manifestation of a produced mood from das Man.  And 
while this expression is undoubtedly meant to shine a light on the plight of a whole group of 
people (black and brown people in the United States), it reifies certainty about one’s being a 
deathly problem. 
 Whether or not death is publicly verified as certain becomes the consequence of what 
matters to the They and not Dasein.  Heidegger is concerned with Dasein’s existential 
assessment of itself, not for Dasein to seek confirmation about itself from das Man.  Heidegger’s 
issue is not that everyone ought to experience existential death but that everyone has an 
existential and ontological structure, and that its ownmost, non-relational, and unshareable 
possibility toward death is the case for everyone to individually be.  The fact that we usually do 
not deal with this feature of ourselves is a testament to Dasein’s continual fallenness.  The 
continual fallenness of Dasein, as it tries to relate its death to itself, is a problem for those Dasein 
that are iBap and who also receive and perpetuate the talk of verenden and ableben through death 
notes.   
Normalizing Death Notes and Obstructing Possible Angst Disruptions 
 Sein zum Tod allows Angst to come through a significant death related event and this 
implies a distinction between anxiety and Being-toward-death.  Angst is Dasein’s basic and latent 
mood.  Existential death is different from Angst in that some extraordinary event occurs for 
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Dasein, which becomes the vehicle for anxiety to take over.  Sein zum Tod can be a catalyst for 
Angst, whereas Angst just happens.  Angst does not need a spark.  The role of such a catalyst for 
death is crucial for Dasein, but especially for inauthentic Being-a-problem when it comes to the 
issue of normalized Gerede about death.  If death is normalized for inauthentic Being-a-problem 
then the talk of verenden or ableben may nullify a catalyst for Sein zum Tod.  Gerede already 
complicates Dasein’s possible authentic connection to death.  Since inauthentic Being-a-problem 
is mired in idle talk about death, such a Dasein will have difficulty recognizing a catalyst for Sein 
zum Tod. 
 Scholarship on Dasein’s death suggests that Dasein has a normalcy to its existence 
(average Dasein) that is breached by Angst or the onset of Sein zum Tod.  Iain Thomson writes 
that 
Our sense of uncanniness or not-being-at-home in the world derives from and testifies to 
this anxiety-provoking lack of fit between Dasein and its world.  This means that, insofar 
as one lives in an unquestioned sense that one is simply doing what one should be doing 
with one’s life, confronting one’s Angst will expose one’s fundamental lack of fit with 
the world and thereby catalyze the temporary collapse of the life projects one has been 
pursuing with a sense of naïve good conscience.102    
 
The part about Dasein living “in an unquestioned sense” is interesting as it supports the notion 
that Dasein has a normal way, a default mode, of engaging its world.  One is normally not 
questioning (from) uncanninness.  One is normally fallen into the world.  Furthermore, Dasein’s 
default “way to be” seems to be in the pursuit of plans with what Thomson calls a “naïve good 
conscience.”103   
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 Individuals are normally not troubled in this existential sense of crisis that Heidegger 
discusses, and Thomson alludes to this normalcy.  However, in general people are usually not 
discussed as near death in an existentiell sense either, so even the presence of lay discussions 
about verenden and ableben are atypical from what we see in the usual assessments of Dasein.  
However, certain people are discussed as near death.  William Blattner characterizes Angst and 
Sein zum Tod as more like “depressive episodes” that breach the regularity of one’s existence.104 
Blattner writes, “By ‘death,’ Heidegger means the condition of existential anxiety (or 
depression), and of this condition we cannot be epistemically certain.”105 Inauthentic Being-a-
problem would be atypical and abnormal in comparison to the normalcy that pervades a typical 
existentiell Dasein existence, where an individual does not question itself regarding how soon he 
will die. 
 The distinction regarding the normalcy of Dasein and the atypical way of inauthentic 
Being-a-problem emphasizes how a “lack of fit” and “naive good conscience” are both things 
that are actually normal for inauthentic Being-a-problem.  Such talk allows this Dasein to wrestle 
with a lack of fitness in society and to cultivate a skeptical approach to society.  This lack of fit 
goes back to the sense of existentiell alienation discussed in my earlier chapter with respect to 
Wright’s Native Son.  While such a stance may grant one a certain kind of social awareness 
about threats to one’s fear existentiell in society, the existential issue remains, where the 
phenomenon that will “catalyze the temporary collapse of the life projects” becomes increasingly 
out of reach when verenden and ableben are normalized.106 With Dasein as Being-a-problem, 
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such catalysts may not be able to breach through to a Dasein who is consistently discussed in the 
context of fear and death; consequently, such a Dasein may not have a collapse of life projects.   
 The issue of the catalyst being weakened by Gerede about death compounds when 
interpreting Angst as fear because when ambiguity and curiosity combine with fear, Dasein 
thinks it “knows it all” in terms of its self-understanding and why it is afraid of perceived threats.  
Dasein, with fear and idle talk, knows what it needs to know about itself in relation to threats. 
For instance, Blattner writes that  
No self-understanding is immune to being undercut by anxiety; anything we take for 
granted about ourselves can be dissolved by the corrosive effects of anxiety.  Dasein’s 
existential finitude (limitedness) is its constant, because essential, vulnerability to 
anxiety/death.107 
 
Angst abruptly arrives, and it might be that it can puncture through any kind of self-
understanding, even that of iBap.  However, the kind of self-understanding Blattner has in mind 
might be what Thomson refers to as “naive good conscience,” unreflective and unquestioning.  
Indeed, anxiety may be corrosive to that understanding, but I question Angst’s efficacy and Sein 
zum Tod being a spark for anxiety as applied to inauthentic Being-a-problem.  This Being-a-
problem is essentially set-up to see itself through the filter of a constant fear that muddies a clear 
distinction between the death of an existentiell Dasein and the death of existential Dasein.  
Existentiell Conscience Versus Existential Conscience 
 Working with the distinction between existentiell and existential, Dasein has a they-self 
conscience and its own conscience, where the former is determined by das Man, while the latter 
is by itself in uncanniness.  Thus, there is a They conscience (existentiell conscience) and an 
uncanny conscience (existential conscience).  This existential conscience tries to pull you out of 
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yourself “as a crowd-absorbed being.”108 The manifestation of this conscience is the “call,” 
(322/277). One’s conscience is a They-less and homeless Dasein.  Dasein, in its uncanniness, 
silently announces itself as a call.  Dasein calls itself and the effect of this call is that Dasein can 
authentically become itself, as opposed to continue to live inauthentically.  This call bypasses 
das Man, with the They not understanding it.  Instead, das Man calls Dasein to attend to non-
existential matters that are related to a traditional kind of existentiell conscience, like how a 
conscience is mainly about morality and psychological assessments of what Dasein should do, 
should have done, should feel guilty about, should blame, etc.  Thus, when Dasein self-interprets 
as an existentiell conscience, it is “at home” but it tends to misconstrue things like guilt, 
accountability, and responsibility.  Combine this existentiell conscience with fear and the 
problem forms into misconstruing the source of a threat, and who may be accountable for the 
existence of its feeling fearful.  Such a misunderstanding of who is responsible for the fear has a 
problematic effect on how Dasein even registers what counts as a threat, as Dasein may believe 
threats and fears to be constant, and from various sources. 
The problem with misconstruing this threat is how it affects anticipation, attestation, and 
what Heidegger calls “abrupt arousal.” In anticipation, Dasein must be ready for Sein zum Tod.  
Anticipation is leaving oneself open; however, the issue with the threat from fear, is that while it 
may be empirically true that fear existentiells are affected, the empirical reality for the group that 
is feared for, and feared psychologically, compels Dasein to be in a fear mode to keep itself 
alive.  The talk effectively closes Dasein off from the existential issue of itself.  Closing off also 
means suppressing attestation because now that Dasein is giving into the notion of death as 
looming over it in an empirical sense, Dasein cannot anticipate and hear the call of itself in its 
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own uncanniness.  It cannot attest via this fear.  The death note and idle talk normalize “abrupt 
arousals.” Consequently, if something jostles Dasein as iBap, who may not have the benefit of a 
“naïve good conscience,” it requires something more disruptive to bring into Angst.  However, if 
the idle way of talking about death targets certain existentiell Dasein, then it is difficult to see 
how death-related Gerede will provide an adequate disruption to arouse Dasein into Angst.   
Attestation and the Inadequacy of Abrupt Arousal for Dasein’s Inauthentic  
Being-a-problem 
 Attestation requires canniness’ disruption, but this is difficult when Dasein is inauthentic 
Being-a-problem.  Attestation is Dasein hearing the call of its conscience.  Dasein’s uncanniness 
originates from Dasein’s constant and latent mood of anxiety.  We can understand the term 
uncanniness by the juxtaposition of this mood with the general calming mood that They 
prescribes, the sense of being at home (canniness).  Attestation opens the possibility of hearing 
the call to itself because Dasein is its own possibility.  Das Man is constituted in such a way as to 
muddle Dasein’s hearing itself; therefore, Dasein struggles to hear itself.   Heidegger writes, 
“The presenting of these possibilities, however, is made possible existentially through the fact 
that Dasein, as a Being-with understands, can listen to Others.  Losing itself in the publicness of 
the They, it fails to hear its own Self in listening to the they-self” (315/270-271).  Dasein’s 
existential structure is for hearing, but the They, also an existentiale, must hear the call to be 
“modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self” (313/268).  
Thus, if Dasein is an inauthentic Being-a-problem, then it must be wary of the normalizing of the 
very thing required to bring out attestation: Disruption.  Dasein as inauthentic Bap must be 
concerned about this because the normalizing comes from its they-self. 
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When the disruption is significant enough, Dasein’s conscience is in preparation mode, 
ready to hear a call.  And this is where we start seeing the blueprint for what one’s conscience is 
to Dasein and how ordinary interpretations of conscience resemble Heidegger’s more 
foundational explanation of conscience.  Heidegger writes, “When one is confronted with such a 
phenomenon as conscience, one is struck by the ontologico-anthropological inadequacy of a 
free-floating framework of psychical faculties or personal actions all duly classified” (316/271). 
As for inauthentic Being-a-problem, if the upheaval is significant enough, then like all other 
Dasein, one’s conscience can be ready to hear, to attest.  Yet, with the upheaval having to be 
more than just an abrupt arousal to break from disruptive normalcy, we must be careful not to 
assess the quality of the upheaval from the vantage point of psychical faculties that are reacting 
to events, words, and ontic moods, all of which are traditionally referred to as one’s 
“conscience.” Put another way, the requirement of an upheaval for inauthentic Being-a-problem 
puts the psychical evaluation of one’s societal problems into perspective: The issue of 
inauthentic Being-a-problem may not be sufficiently captured by hearing unpleasing statements 
or even thinking one’s self to be near verenden or ableben.  Therefore, inauthentic Being-a-
problem is not just about the They’s talk that floats around, but also the way one’s psychological 
disposition, the “existentiell conscience,” is affected by Gerede.  If, from the outset, the  
conscience is solely understood as a set of floating psychical faculties, then we risk evaluating 
the They’s talk on present-at-hand terms from a present-at-hand conscience, which bolsters the 
idea that the determinations of death and racism are suitably captured by one’s feelings of being 
close to death, which solidifies Dasein as iBap. 
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Conclusion  
 We seem to be dealing with a current discourse about death that incentivizes das Man 
into thinking that recognizing people as inauthentic Being-a-problem via perceived death notes 
grants awareness and understanding.  It is, perhaps, a mark of empathy and social understanding 
to grant these narratives as true, even if the existential issue goes unexamined.  Thus, if I believe 
your certainty and I take the certainty of your death as truth then I affirm your “truth.”  However, 
what if I am affirming your claims of death because they come from your existentiell as a feared 
about member of society?  Doing this may help me recognize your position in society, but not 
necessarily your existence.  It appears that this might be the case for many Dasein classified as 
Being-a-problem, which means that the Gerede may not substantively be about your death, but 
about the death of the group you are thought to be a member of.  Dire consequences result from 
such assumptions, as the push into inauthentic Being-a-problem may simply cause Dasein to 
immerse itself more in death notes.  One may become an unofficial spokesperson of the group, a 
nobody-in-particular, only a “somebody” in the sense of being a member of the racial group that 
is always dying.   
Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem endures the concealment of the call to conscience 
because of the specific death narrative attached to certain Dasein.  I have focused on race 
because I am familiar with existing as a raced individual where I must deal with Gerede about 
race on a personal and public level.  Coming from a community that shares in the same racial 
existentiell characteristics of color, one tends to be at least minimally aware about death notes 
regarding one’s racial identity.  Perhaps not the specific term, “death notes,” but one knows that 
the social conversation often relates to issues of fear, threat, and death.   
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I have used the U.S. as an example in various chapters by appealing to Du Bois, Malcolm 
X, and Mariana Ortega, but the idea of iBap and of fear existentiells goes beyond this.  
Inauthentic Being-a-problem can apply to other fear existentiells with death narratives.  No 
matter the kind of inauthentic Being-a-problem, the issue remains that one’s self-interpretation 
conceals authenticity.  The “muffling” of Dasein’s existential issue is real, but when this occurs 
for inauthentic Being-a-problem, “hearing” the call and dealing with one’s authentic connection 
to this existentiell becomes a great issue of self-identification.  In the next chapter, I develop a 
solution for Dasein to modify itself from inauthentic to authentic Being-a-problem. 
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Chapter 6 
“Second Sight” and the Augenblick: Seeing Authentic Being-a-problem’s Situation 
“He turned his attention to it. 
‘Yes, here it is. Well, what of it? Let the pain be.’ 
‘And death … where is it?’ 
He sought his former accustomed fear of death and did not find it. ‘Where is it? What death?’ 
There was no fear because there was no death.”109 
 
- Leo Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilych 
Introduction   
Inauthentic Being-a-problem fears verenden and ableben.  As this existentiell, Dasein 
endures a struggle between the Gerede about its death and the averageness of its existence.  
Dasein who is essentially “marked for death” can only attest via a genuine understanding of its 
world, which comes from answering its own call to conscience.  Dasein needs to “see” this 
Situation, but how?  In the last two chapters I discussed how Gerede covers up Dasein’s 
ownmost Being as a structural whole.  The talk about Dasein’s death for iBap normalizes 
verenden and ableben to the point of concealing Dasein’s Angst, quelling the “call to 
conscience.” As such, iBap cannot be resolute and cannot be authentic.  How will authenticity 
emerge from this dire situation for inauthentic Being-a-problem if Heidegger writes that “the call 
is precisely something that we ourselves have neither planned, nor prepared for, nor voluntarily 
performed, nor have we ever done so. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against our 
will” (320/275).  Furthermore, Angst cannot be called forth by inauthentic Dasein.  I cannot 
                                                 
109 Leo Tolstoy, Death of Ivan Ilych and Other Stories, (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 
Inc.,1960), 155. 
 121 
brood over death as inauthentic Being-a-problem and summon Angst because it is not a psychical 
event that I can summon.   
I argue in this chapter that the best inauthentic Being-a-problem can do is to prepare to 
hear the call by taking the Gerede about its death as a phenomenal fact about its racial identity.110 
This does not mean that iBap appropriates the content of the talk as its own.  I posit that Dasein, 
to be authentic, accepts the talk as talk, and nothing more.111 This notion of acceptance is rooted 
in the juxtaposition of the Gerede about one’s existence and the everydayness of one’s ontical 
affairs.  Using this method helps Dasein prepare to hear the call to conscience.  Once heard, 
Dasein begins to quiet down the “loudest idle talk” and leaves open the possibility of being 
resolute toward the “moment of vision” (Augenblick), wherein Dasein authentically “wins itself” 
by seeing its Situation.  My existentiell model for this method is Du Bois’ “Second Sight,” in 
which Du Bois says that black Americans can see the different interpretative angles from a white 
American perspective and from their own perspective.  My goal for this is a positive analysis of 
authentic Being-a-problem where Dasein lets fear go, meaning that when Dasein chooses itself 
as an existentiell problem, it can be authentic existentiell that no longer fears verenden and 
ableben.  Rather, Dasein chooses itself as a fearless authentic Being-a-problem who recognizes 
Gerede as an obstacle to its genuine self-interpretation. 
Who’s “Calling” Me? 
Dasein calls itself. “This call is an appeal to the they-self” (319/274).  However, Dasein 
still has the capacity to win itself and be authentic (68/43).  Even with inauthentic iBap, despite 
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all the chatter about death and fear, this Dasein can possibly hear the call to choose its 
existentiell existence.  The problem is with how the call can actualize itself.  Irene McMullin 
writes in Time and the Shared World (2013) about the problem with the “call to conscience:”  
The difficulty, as Heidegger recognizes, is how this neglected capacity for responsibility 
can become a possibility for actualization if Dasein has given in to the tendency to fall 
away from itself: how to choose choice when the capacity for choosing has been 
forgotten?112   
 
Dasein has neglected its own capacity to take responsibility for existing.  Dasein tends toward 
falling and the more absorbed it is in the world, the more it maintains itself in fallenness.  Thus, 
the actualization of the “call” is a crucial issue.  The problem seems more grim for iBap as 
Gerede is more explicitly about fear and death than with other Dasein who are non-iBap.  Yet, 
the fact that certain Dasein are more heavily interpreted than others when it comes to death does 
not change Angst’s capacity to suddenly grip iBap, but the over-interpretation of one’s iBap can 
muffle the hearing of the call.  What can change with inauthentic Being-a-problem is its ability 
to prepare to hear the call, to be ready for that call in an existentiell way, which Heidegger calls 
“wanting to have a conscience” (334/288).  Thus, iBap cannot summon authenticity by just 
psychologically willing it, but it can get ready to hear the call that comes from uncanniness by 
being silent rather than participating in death note talk. 
Dasein’s readying itself is necessary because of a meddlesome They who help constitute 
Dasein’s they-self; therefore, when the They hear a message communicated to Dasein, the They 
has trouble registering it because the call is coming from uncanniness, a state-of-mind that the 
They only registers as an alien voice.  Dasein’s they-self, however, can hear this foreign voice 
and understand it as somewhat familiar.  Heidegger writes, “The call reaches Dasein in this 
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understanding of itself which it always has, and which is concernful in an everyday, average 
manner.  The call reaches the they-self of concernful Being with Others” (317/272).  The They 
does not know what to do with such a foreign message, so the They talks over the call and tries 
to reach Dasein as a they-self that is always absorbed in its fallenness. 
Das Man has limitations in knowing Dasein, but almost especially so for Dasein as iBap.  
When the They call to iBap, the entity called to is what the They have already taken Dasein to 
be, namely its existentiell.  It is how They take you; hence, the call is more to Dasein as an 
ethnographic and anthropological present-at-hand subject because these are the usual ways that 
the They regard Dasein as a they-self.  Consquently, when the They appeals to Dasein as 
inauthentic Being-a-problem, the pah conception is reinforced.  The process is a feedback 
between Dasein as a they-self and das Man, the They.  Dasein is not a pah entity, but is taken as 
such through these perspectives.  Rather than hearing a call, the They hears a plea from the they-
self of inauthentic Being-a-problem.  Das Man registers iBap as a problem it might have to 
solve, and so the plea das Man “hears” from the they-self is “Solve me.”  Das Man turns the 
individuality of Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem into a moral cause that is far from 
interrogating this iBap’s latent existential Being (317/273).  
 If I am cast as a problem then, using the common sense idea of guilt, I look for the 
culprit.  I might blame myself, historical circumstances, and maybe even current powerful 
systemic conditions.  For every problem, the They will have an answer, per Heidegger’s 
discussion of idle talk.  The They will attempt to solve me on my behalf, determining itself as 
responsible to the extent it must do something with this traditional guilt and possible framework 
of relationships that it may find itself caught in with me as a problem.  Therefore, other 
representatives of das Man will even attempt to “leap in” for iBap under the guidance that it has 
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some typical guilt connection to iBap.  However, this move by das Man absolves iBap from 
determining a solution for oneself.  Rather than other Dasein “leaping ahead” to allow me to 
exert ownership of my existence, the They will try to take my place and be part of the solution to 
my existence as a problem.  Of course, Heidegger says that the “call” has no message or voice 
and that it is simply Dasein calling to itself for Dasein to be responsible for its own existence.  
However, since the They do not understand that plea, they will take Dasein as a certain ontico-
existentiell identity and will speak to that version of Dasein since it is the only one it registers as 
a salient voice to respond to.  Das Man will automatically heed the plea to “Solve me,” though 
this plea does not come from Dasein’s existential conscience. 
Traditional Guilt Hides Being-Guilty 
Das Man takes up the “Solve me” issue for iBap, attempting to answer by tranquilizing 
Dasein into common narratives about “who is at fault.” Heidegger explains that the everyday 
understanding of guilt is a “sense of ‘owing,’ of ‘having something due on account.’ One is to 
give back to the Other something to which the latter has a claim” (327/281).  One way that das 
Man deals with inauthentic Being-a-problem’s claim is that the They will not consider itself 
responsible for iBap’s existence.  A second answer is that it will determine it is guilty for 
inauthentic Bap’s condition.  In the first case, the They will not do anything at all, but in the 
second case das Man may do something to absolve itself of this guilt: das Man may “leap in” for 
the inauthentic Being-a-problem.   
The Gerede about inauthentic Being-a-problem holds that, when race is discussed in 
society, the guilty party must constantly recognize the culpability of the social group to which 
they belong to.  All of these narratives could be true, and we could come to learn how historical 
events lead to a present situation of racism, sexism, or just about any other unjust inequality 
 125 
between people; however, the existential issue remaining for Dasein as inauthentic Bap is that 
the ontological guilt of taking responsibility for one’s existence is concealed by traditional 
notions of guilt which are bolstered by historical narratives about fear existentiells.  Dasein’s 
existential conscience does not decree what is moral or about the norms of society: It does not 
say to itself that it should “feel” guilty because it has done someone wrong or that it must 
compensate another aggrieved individual.  Rather, the conscience simply hears the call to take 
responsibility for its own Being. 
The They will not look to Dasein’s existentiality, but instead remain focused on the 
existentiell and ontic factors of Dasein to determine who and what is responsible for Bap’s 
plight.  The They may even fear for Dasein as Being-a-problem and perpetuate ambiguous 
notions of responsibility.  To be sure, in a society that discusses and idealizes notions of justice, 
equality, and morality, the normal approach to understand who and what is responsible for 
someone experiencing injustice is necessary.  It would be important to then keep in mind that das 
Man may say that one should fear for Dasein as iBap, as those who are considered iBap are 
discussed as victims of historical and systemic injustices.  Yet, such ethical significance is part of 
the issue as to why Dasein’s existentiality is hidden from itself amid all the talk.   
Overstating the Problem of Being-a-problem and Dasein’s Hyper-awareness of Its End 
For Heidegger, the ontological idea of guilt is at the basis of those ontic guilt narratives to 
which Dasein has adopted through fallenness.  The ontological guilt Heidegger advances is that 
which sees that the basis of Dasein is thrownness and that one must still own one’s existence as 
this null basis.  Owning one’s existence would be an affirmation of existence in the form of 
choice.  Dasein’s inauthentic Being-a-problem blocks this ownership because the narratives 
about its existence are caught up in traditional understandings of guilt and responsibility.  The 
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They has constantly “inauthenticated” Dasein’s existence through chatter and Dasein has always 
acquiesced.  Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem requires a reflective inventory to determine 
the extent to which Gerede has overstated the case for its Being-a-problem in the first place.  In 
other words, for iBap the question would be whether the Gerede about one’s existence as a fear 
existentiell is genuine to Dasein.   
Dasein’s inauthentic Being-a-problem has a connection to guilt that is a hyper-realized 
assessment of how we ordinarily understand traditional guilt, wherein the content of the idle talk 
is focused on two things: one’s death and who caused it.  Death does not show up in Heidegger’s 
analysis as a common discourse in one’s everydayness, but what happens when such a death 
discourse is rampant?  Kevin Aho talks about death in relation to terminally ill individuals who 
are jostled out of the normalcy of their lives due to the knowledge of their imminent death and 
the subsequent frailty of their bodies.  Aho writes that, “Illness reminds us not only of the frailty 
and vulnerability of our own bodies, but of the structural vulnerability of our own self-
understanding and ‘ability-to-be.’”113 Aho says that some terminally ill patients are caught off 
guard with their newly discovered vulnerability.  Such a person might determine the 
physiological cause and perhaps “accept” that he or she will die.  However, Aho’s analysis still 
retains death as a disruption that sometimes sends an individual into anxiety.  The character of 
disruption is key.  When the knowledge, feeling, and idea of death loses the disruption, then 
Angst continues to be concealed.  Dasein becomes hyper-aware of death, decreasing the potency 
of the disruption to act as such.  Furthermore, the cause of death for inauthentic Being-a-problem 
is attributed to society and institutions, making such a Dasein hyper-aware of who and what may 
be responsible for its death.   
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In iBap’s hyper-awareness of death, das Man overstates the case and the responsibility 
for one’s existence is lost in favor of a traditional guilt narrative that supports the notion of a 
debt.  For instance, the oppressor owes the oppressed.  Heidegger argues that responsibility 
towards owning one’s existence lies at the root of our ontic and existentiell translations of guilt 
as “owing” someone or paying a “debt.” Dasein is existentially structured to have this Being-
guilty as its authentic possibility.  However, inauthentic Being-a-problem is discussed by the 
They in such a patent way that the relationship between iBap and whoever is thought to be 
responsible for iBap’s condition takes over one’s ownership of existence as one’s ownmost. 
With inauthentic Being-a-problem cast as the subject that requires attention, the They has 
a general entity to which it is in debt.  Inauthentic Being-a-problem is an opportunity for das 
Man to exhibit everyday guilt and to then atone.  Hence, the They will support a fear existentiell 
Dasein to fully embrace Being-a-problem, even if it is inauthentically appropriated.  To be a bit 
more specific, as it is with U.S. society, the collective guilt of racism (a manifestation of 
traditional guilt) makes the They want to make-up for its debt and in so doing, the They will 
believe in any semblance of the notion of iBap and concede all that it entails without scrutinizing 
the existential consequences for the Dasein embodying it.  By being involved in das Man’s 
everyday guilt matrix, iBap Dasein further immerses itself in a situation that siphons its 
appropriative power of understanding that constitutes its Being.  It is with the Augenblick that 
Dasein can see through this kind of guilt narrative, gain clarity about its Situation that is genuine 
to its existence, and understand how that collective guilt plays a role in covering up its ownmost 
Being. 
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Du Bois’ “Second Sight” 
 I use Du Bois’ idea of “second sight” as a model for how iBap can break away from 
Gerede and fear and “see” its Situation in the “moment of vision.”  As I discussed in the last 
chapter, Du Bois discusses an emerging ability out of the black individual’s “double 
consciousness:” this ability is called “second sight.” Referring to African American folklore, Du 
Bois writes that 
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the 
Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this 
American world,--a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world.114 
 
Second sight tends to suggest a prophetic vision, but with Du Bois’ use of it, one sees the 
diminishment of their humanity by another, and the “seeing” of the black American as Being-a-
problem.  The “seventh son,” according to folklore, could see the future and ghosts.  Henry Louis 
Gates Jr. even points out that these abilities were allotted to “those children born with a caul, a 
membrane that sometimes covers the head at birth.” 115 Du Bois seems to merge the meaning of 
both the caul and the abilities, wherein the caul serves as the veil the black person is born into, 
creating a layer that prevents “true self-consciousness” but motivates seeing oneself through the 
veil.  Born into such a filter that obfuscates one’s true self, the individual becomes aware of 
himself as a problem, an irreconcilable difference between the world’s view of black people as 
such, and the black person’s attempt to self-identify as a black identity in a white world.  A 
dynamic process unfolds and turns into the ability called “second sight.”  
 A significant feature of second sight is that it enables distinctions about identity.  Nahum 
Dimitri Chandler writes in The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought that Du Bois’  
                                                 
114 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 10. 
115 Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 10. 
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privileged example, that by which he was led to question this racialized logic, recognized 
through a mode of reflection that we are certainly within rights to remark as “second-
sight” (first of all existential and given in the form of an autobiographical reflection) was 
the problem of intermixture.116 
 
Chandler expresses Du Bois’ issue that a racial logic of race hierarchies and categories is 
monolithic, yet such a logic did not square with Du Bois’ understanding of the varieties of issues 
within racial categories.  Dealing with “intermixture” meant that Du Bois’ black person dealt 
with his European ancestry, which then lent itself to the possibility of European features.  Du 
Bois writes that, “All this theory, however, was disturbed by certain facts in America, and by my 
European experience.  Despite everything, race lines were not fixed and fast.”117 Thus, one 
crucial feature of second sight is that monolithic categories about racial identities were not 
nuanced and had to be pitted against one’s experience to recognize possible disconnects between 
the theoretical Gerede (“all this theory” and “race lines”) against one’s daily existence (that 
“theory” was “disturbed by certain facts in America, and by my European experience”). 
 The Augenblick in authentic Being-a-problem is like Du Bois’ “second sight.” Whereas 
Du Bois looks at the issue of identity from a racialized perspective, the Augenblick in authentic 
Bap sees the difference between the Gerede about any kind of fear existentiell identity and one’s 
daily ontical affairs.   For this reason, this main feature of the Augenblick is useful for figuring 
out the value of pitting monolithic ideas about identity against one’s daily existence.  From the 
Augenblick, Dasein resolutely faces its existentiell in terms of one’s autobiographical inventory 
and the kinds of Gerede that are relevant to Dasein’s existence.  While one may take the 
inauthentic and authentic to be monolithic categories in themselves, they are necessary and they 
help ground distinctions about Being-a-problem: 1) that as iBap, Dasein is often told by others 
                                                 
116 Nahum Dimitri Chandler, The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought (New York: Fordman University 
Press, 2014), 94. 
117 Chandler, The Problem of the Negro as a Problem for Thought, 94. 
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about what its existentiell means in society; 2) that Dasein is both its inauthenticity and its 
possibility for authenticity, and as such, resoluteness toward the “moment of vision” lets 
Dasein’s authentic mode of itself emerge, which means that Dasein does not have to be “fixed” 
into present-at-hand categories. 
 The second point carries on an aspect of the original folkloric notions about second sight: 
knowing one’s future.  However, in the sense of authentic Bap, this is not about predictions, but 
more about understanding oneself as futural and possessing all the possibilities of its being that it 
could either take hold of or neglect throughout its existence.  With this futural aspect of the 
Augenblick, one can gauge how its chosen existentiell emanates from Dasein’s being a thrown-
projection wherein Dasein finds itself in the world with certain ontic characteristics and 
existentiell histories, determines its way of being, and projects on authentic possibility of itself.  
This complex relationship, fostered by resoluteness toward the Augenblick, allows Dasein as 
iBap to recognize the interplay of its facticity and appropriative determinations of its identity.  
The Augenblick, as a kind of second sight, sees one’s present existence for what it is, chooses it, 
and can fearlessly distinguish between Gerede and the discourse that is genuine to its existence.  
However, the Augenblick must start somewhere.  Du Bois’ second sight emanates from a 
bivalence of interpretations and from it, one begins to see through the veil of interpretations 
about being one’s racial identity and being American.  With the Augenblick one sees a Situation 
and breaks down the interpretative disconnects, seeing the talk as talk.  However, as discussed 
earlier, one cannot will Angst, the “call of conscience,” and summon the Augenblick.  Dasein as 
iBap can only prepare by keeping-silent. 
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Preparing for Authenticity While Being Inauthentic 
  Du Bois’ “second sight” is an existentiell model to understand how Dasein can prepare 
for authenticity.  “Second sight” is the ability that Du Bois observes in black Americans in which 
life becomes a constant matter of racialized interpretations to contend with.  Dasein as iBap 
wrestles with multiple fallen interpretations that block it from its ownmost authentic Being.  
Authenticity produces its own kind of sight in which it lets Dasein see through these 
interpretations.  Authenticity comes about through Dasein’s “resoluteness,” which is its “reticent 
self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety” (343/296-
97).  Resoluteness lets Dasein be responsible for its existence and makes one anticipate its whole 
potentiality for Being by letting Dasein see the various ready-to-hand involvements and 
solicitous Being-with others in its Situation (344/298).  The wholeness of Dasein implies that 
Dasein, as care, is its end.  Part of Dasein’s structural whole is its Being-toward-death.  Dasein 
sees this as the “Situation” and anticipates the completion of its wholeness right to the end of 
itself.  Dasein’s authenticity is its choosing itself as an ownmost whole potentiality-for-Being, 
even choosing the possibility of its impossibility (354/306).  When Dasein sees the Situation, it 
understands that it cannot go beyond an existentiell possibility for itself, so it must resolve itself 
to choose a way to be in the world.  Resolved, Dasein lets itself be vulnerable to existence by 
“letting itself be encountered undisguisedly by that which it seizes upon in taking action” 
(374/326.  In this way, Dasein not only sees the Situation, but resigns itself to it by making itself 
free for whatever occurs, even its end.  
 Recall that, for Du Bois, “second sight” lets black Americans see through the veil, and 
with Dasein, Heidegger explains that one must let go of being committed to our absorption in 
das Man and its talk.  However, inauthentic Dasein (by extension, iBap) cannot summon this 
 132 
seeing of the Situation that authentic Dasein sees.  This brings me to the way that Dasein can 
prepare itself to be authentic: Dasein as iBap must want to hear the call.  It must want to have a 
conscience in the sense that it wants to be responsible for its existence (342/295).  In letting go of 
its absorption in das Man, Dasein can take a deliberate, voluntary, willful, and intentional step 
toward cutting back on the noise of das Man.  I submit that Dasein does this by the following: 1) 
It calls out Gerede about death as Gerede; 2) It overcomes fear through such “calling out.”  
Calling out Gerede about death seems like a simple device, but doing so, in my view, is effective 
because it highlights the disconnect between a Gerede that explicitly and loudly talks about 
ordinary interpretations of death for racial identities, and the daily affairs of inauthentic Being-a-
problem.   
The problem with ordinary interpretations is that they tend to misunderstand phenomena 
that have deeper meanings.  Charles Guignon writes in Heidegger and the Problem of 
Knowledge that Heidegger “leads us past the ‘surface’ meaning of our language to light up the 
forgotten deep meaning.”118 Guignon observes, as Heidegger does, that phenomena like death 
have these common understandings, and that most often these are misleading ways to know how 
to make sense of a phenomenon.  Heidegger writes, “Whenever we see something wrongly, 
some injunction as to the primordial ‘idea’ of the phenomenon is revealed along with it” 
(326/281).  Guignon says that Heidegger’s dialectical method is a handy way of making sense of 
the distinction between the ordinary and the latent meaning of phenomenon.  Although 
Guignon’s method represents an approach that has superficial discourse oppose underlying 
phenomena, I posit that Du Bois’ “second sight” serves as a model for a comparative analysis of 
one’s everydayness to fear and death laden discourse about inauthentic Being-a-problem.  More 
                                                 
118 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 82. 
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effective than a dialectical method, “second sight” allows Dasein to assess a disconnect and call 
out what is seemingly wrong and superficial when pitted against everyday ontical affairs.  How 
could this be done with the Gerede about iBap?  First, by calling death notes idle talk, Dasein 
declares some sense of “offness” about Dasein’s alleged verenden and ableben.  These kinds of 
death are real for organisms and humans, but they only feel close for Dasein, and one might 
guess that there would have to be more to these kinds of death than just feeling close.  Using 
“second sight” would also reveal how overly emphasized the talk of these deaths is for certain 
racial groups in society.  “Second sight” would let iBap distance itself from the common use of 
death notes, thereby quieting the “loudest idle talk,” giving Dasein the opportunity to lower das 
Man’s volume on the Gerede about these deaths, so that Dasein can “hear the call” and 
resolutely take action on its Situation. 
From “Second Sight” to Coherence and Anticipatory Resoluteness 
Dasein did not initially choose the existentiells it found itself inhabiting, even if it ends 
up choosing some of them in the future.  The same outcome holds for Dasein as inauthentic 
Being-a-problem.  Heidegger writes, “Although it has not laid the basis itself, it reposes in the 
weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by Dasein’s mood” (330/284).  Dasein can 
never get this kind of power to “throw” itself into Being, so it is left to inauthentically or 
authentically choose.  However, through anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein can gain the power 
over its existence to remove the self-inflicted concealments.  Heidegger writes 
Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the ‘overcoming’ of 
death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees 
for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein’s existence and of basically 
dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments (357/310). 
 
For the most part, Dasein inauthentically chooses but in anticipatory resoluteness, one 
understands that it exists as a possibility to no longer be in the world and that it still must choose 
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a way to live.  Dasein “chooses to choose” an existentiell, but out of its own accord. Heidegger 
writes about “hearing” the “call of conscience” that “in this phenomenon lies that existentiell 
choosing which we seek—the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one’s-Self which, in 
accordance with its existential structure, we call ‘resoluteness’” (314/270).  If Dasein, as 
inauthentically Being-a-problem hears this “call” after having prepared itself to hear, then it can 
genuinely and existentielly, choose to choose itself, thereby, affirming its Situation as its own.  In 
this regard, Being-a-problem can be authentic. 
In understanding itself as having inauthentically absorbed all the Gerede and fear about 
its identity as a problem, Dasein presents to itself the opportunity to “win” what has been lost.  
Dasein as iBap must then face the fear and Gerede that has been part of the gossip of its 
existence and how this has concealed its Situation.  Dasein may determine that a false 
appropriation of identity narratives occurred based on the influence of das Man.  However, even 
if this happens, Dasein must take responsibility for itself to the extent that Dasein subscribed to 
these narratives, whether he fell into them or chose them.  The process of coherence between the 
narrative of this existentiell and the ontical affairs of Dasein is necessary because it leads to 
Dasein admitting to what is and is not; thus, Dasein becomes honest in what belongs to itself on 
an existentiell level, so that it can prepare to “choose to choose,” to be authentic.  Without 
preparing for such a resolution, inauthentic Being-a-problem cannot understand its responsibility 
to itself. 
Keeping-Silent  
At the point of applying this existentiell inventory to oneself, Heidegger explains that 
Dasein is ready for resoluteness and must keep silent so as not to participate in the fallen chatter 
about one’s existence.  For Heidegger, Dasein’s resoluteness must reckon with its ontological 
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guilt and, consequently, the way of discoursing about it.  Dasein deals with guilt in “keeping-
silent” (342/296).  This is how Dasein becomes authentic, by resolutely meeting itself, face to 
face, in its uncanniness.119 This uncanniness is Dasein’s anxiety and the resoluteness toward it 
must exist so that, unlike its they-self, Dasein will not shirk from it.  Therefore, Heidegger says 
that “Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety” (342/296). The recognition 
of such a readiness will help prepare Dasein for authenticity.  
Heidegger explains that Dasein’s confrontation is new to it as Dasein is always 
postponing itself, evasively turning away.  I have already discussed how this turning away is 
always reified by the They for iBap.  I argued that it seems to happen on a more intense scale 
because of das Man’s discursive associations with death by the They.  For Heidegger, the They 
has continuously welcomed this existentiell escapism; consequently, Dasein is never really with 
another Dasein.  Even in the moral rhetoric that aims to recognize and bring the plight of the 
racially oppressed to light, the narrative of inauthentic Being-a-problem by das Man standards 
offers a present-at-hand escapism for such a Dasein afflicted by the talk.  Dasein cannot really 
understand and listen to another Dasein because its structural fallenness always makes it 
alienated from itself and from Others.  Dasein does not even know itself, let alone know the 
Other. Heidegger writes, 
Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with 
one another—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the 
“they” and in what “they” want to undertake (345/298). 
 
                                                 
119 Michel Haar writes, “Anxiety and boredom both lead to a narrowing of time, a decisive instant where Dasein, 
squarely facing the repeatable character of its past and anticipating its future to the extreme limit, finds itself able to 
assume its own temporality.  Now the silence of anxiety—which makes possible the silence of the resolution by 
which Dasein projects itself authentically, temporalizes itself – is situated, it would seem, outside all epochal 
continuity, outside the ‘universal’ history of being” (161).  The “silence of anxiety” is, I think, an appropriate 
ontological model for our ontico-existentiell existence, in which getting a moment of quiet time from the noise of 
everyday life is an ordinary and common-sense way to regroup and reinsert oneself back into daily affairs.   
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Dasein, Heidegger says, is “already in irresoluteness” and so when Dasein is ready to meet itself 
authentically, Dasein resolutely “appropriates untruth authentically” (345/299).  This is helpful 
for figuring out how inauthentic Being-a-problem deals with the untruth that permeates its 
existence.  If you are a fear existentiell who is talked about in connection with a death note, then 
you must deal with the possible untruth of the talk as it relates to Dasein’s ontical affairs.  You 
may know the “truth” of your “general situation,” but this amounts to just Dasein “losing itself in 
those ‘opportunities’ which are closest to it, and pays Dasein’s way by a reckoning up for 
‘accidents’ which it fails to recognize, deems its own achievement, and passes off as such” 
(347/300).  As discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation, Dasein’s constitutive spatiality ensures 
that, in fallenness, it will tend to hold on to what is nearest, even when what is nearest are the 
death notes about one’s existentiell as a racial identity.  Even things unplanned for, like 
“accidents” are things Dasein can appropriate, though they may be untrue to its ontical affairs.  
For example, I, as a Mexican-American man, may hear about Mexicans dying at the U.S. and 
Mexico border and appropriate the plight of those individuals to my existence, even though my 
relationship to those deaths is peripheral to my existence.  Thus, we can imagine a racial Dasein 
who reckons up the “general situation” of his community and takes the death of the fellow 
members of his racial category as his death.   
Gauging Untruth 
As Heidegger explains, Dasein’s ability to properly gauge untruth is helpful to it because 
it can begin to understand that through its existence, it has been “‘lived’ by the common-sense 
ambiguity of that publicness” (345/299).  We even saw this value in “second sight.” Through this 
this sight, Dasein as iBap can prepare itself to hear the call to authenticity and then “take action.”  
However, this idea of “taking action” should not be confused with a practical sense of “taking 
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action.” Dasein realizes that it never authentically subscribed to the “common-sense” and 
ordinary interpretations of its identity and its death, but that it just accepted them this whole time.   
All this time, the They lived through Dasein as a they-self, inauthentically Being-in-the-world.  
The fact that Dasein gets to the resolute way of Being will not change the dominance of the 
They, but now Dasein’s resoluteness cannot be moved and it can live through itself (345/299). 
The proper gauging of untruth also allows Dasein to know more clearly its thrown Situation as 
immersed in the They.  Heidegger writes, “For the “they,” however, the Situation is essentially 
something that has been closed off” (346-347/300).  The They remains ignorant to the Situation 
that resolute Dasein understands.  Here, we see yet another reason why it is dangerous to 
appropriate inauthentic Being-a-problem for oneself when it is not authentic to oneself: The 
They does not easily let such a Dasein escape its influence because inauthentic Being-a-problem 
presents an opportunity for das Man to have more influence over Dasein.  
The Augenblick Reckoning with Time  
When Dasein as Bap resolutely chooses itself, it does so toward the Augenblick, a 
“moment of vision” (376/328).  The Augenblick is Dasein’s “authentic Present” as opposed to 
the inauthentic present, which is how we commonly think of the term “now.” “The moment of 
vision, however, temporalizes itself in quite the opposite manner--in terms of the authentic 
future” (388/338).  The Augenblick allows Dasein to authentically project itself toward the future 
in an existentiell way.  In terms of authentic Being-a-problem, Dasein chooses itself in the 
Augenblick.   
 The Augenblick allows Dasein to see through the common guilt matrix that it plays a role 
in with others.  Due to its inauthentic Being-a-problem, this seeing through means Dasein has the 
possibility of appropriately reckoning with time.  Towards the end of the second division of 
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Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how Dasein reckons with time in a common and fallen 
way, distinguishing this way from Dasein’s primordial temporalizing.  There is a key section 
when he discusses the “temporality of fear” that I hold is pertinent for a fear existentiell with a 
death note: Being-a-problem (391/341).  When Dasein is faced with fear, it is “bewildered” and 
Dasein “forgets” itself (392/342).  Something is always expected to happen.  We discussed 
expecting in relation to the empirical certainty of death in chapters 4 and 5, but here the 
expecting of some “oncoming evil” begins to bewilder Dasein’s reckoning with time in such a 
way that time is reinforced as a traditional “sequence of ‘nows,’” which is the more common 
way to understand that time is a linear and sequential relationship among the past, present, and 
future (475/423).   
 Fear affects our bewilderment with ourselves and the world.  Resoluteness puts this fear 
into perspective by seeing the Situation.  Heidegger says, “He is who resolute knows no fear” 
(395/344).  Dasein can gauge truth versus untruth when it resolutely reckons with time: To see 
that time is not a matter of a constant being taken away, but a structural feature of Dasein’s 
existence, so that it can never actually be taken away.  Yet, given my elaboration of inauthentic 
Being-a-problem, the notion of time being something that can be taken away becomes the 
dominant theme for one who has such an identity.  That is, when one is inauthentic Being-a-
problem, one is placed in a mode of Being-hurried, an emergency state of existence, wherein 
“time is not on your side” because death is always looming over the fear existentiell.  Thus, all 
the more relevant are Heidegger’s words for Being-a-problem when he states that “Here it is not 
as if the finitude of time were getting understood; quite the contrary, for concern sets out to 
snatch as much as possible from the time which still keeps coming and ‘goes on.’  Publicly, time 
is something which everyone takes and can take” (477/425). 
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 Yet, in applying the Augenblick as an ontological form of second sight for Being-a-
problem, Dasein resolutely sees through these imposed themes of time and the fear of death, 
which would compel one to be in a state of Being-hurried, a phenomenon that constantly afflicts 
those who are Bap.  The Augenblick allows Dasein to see through the “inauthentic awaiting” of 
the moment of death by reflecting on the distinct factors that support such inauthentic time-
reckoning (478/425).  Those factors range from the Gerede about identity, the notions of death as 
ableben and verenden, and one’s structural fallenness.  Once Dasein gets a grasp on this, then it 
may be able to finally determine that the issue has been its constant subscription to an 
uninterrogated idle talk in inauthentic Bap and from this, it can “see” its Situation and be 
authentic. 
Conclusion 
I have concentrated on how das Man helps Dasein frame narratives about identity and 
death, such that people are “seen” in a certain way.  This is a contentious approach.  I do not 
wish to take away the impact of historical marginalization from individuals, as I hold that 
oppression is real and a fact about the world.  Rather, I question one’s certainty of it for one’s 
self.  It is important to problematize the way we talk about death in connection to marginalized 
groups because those groups are comprised of individuals with vastly different experiences in 
virtue of being their own persons.  More importantly, when death is discussed in a general way, 
we are likely losing out on a critical and existential approach to a given member of this 
community’s perspective on death.  We are effacing what is essential about their historical 
Situatedness, that which we usually call “personhood,” but which for Heidegger would amount 
to world and the history of Dasein. 
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The question of Dasein’s authenticity from Bap is integral to the talk of the They.  In 
some societal beliefs, the They propagates the belief that whole groups are near death.  These 
groups are often called “marginalized” or “oppressed.” Discourses about the plight of 
marginalized communities allow society to recognize problems of various forms of inequality.  
However, the issue of Being-a-problem is whether the authentic connection one has to such 
narratives is true or if an individual who is Bap is inauthentically appropriating a narrative about 
death in virtue of Dasein being a member of a racial group.  The issue for inauthentic Being-a-
problem is not whether it is true that certain groups are marginalized, oppressed, and near death; 
I take such claims, non-controversially, to be true.  The main point for inauthentic Being-a-
problem is whether Dasein is genuinely or non-genuinely connected to those claims of death, 
oppression, and marginalization.   
Dasein as iBap cannot be resolute with fear and Gerede determining its existentiell.  The 
issue is not that violence does not exist, that suffering does not exist, that ableben does not exist 
for communities who have endured historical oppression; the issue is that das Man idly skims 
over these issues with attempts to engender a discourse about marginalization through a present-
at-hand way that does more to conceal the notion of authentically Being-in-the-world by 
relegating the conversation to a present-at-hand analysis about ableben, verenden, conscience, 
and guilt.  This influences Dasein to be unprepared to hear itself and normalizes a narrative about 
a proximity to ableben and verenden, in cases where the talk is about the “body” and “bodies.”  
The reason why this influence is so powerful is because it is about surviving, which is an issue 
that short-circuits Dasein into a fearful mode of existence, a kind of Being-hurried.  There is a 
way out, though, for Dasein as Being-a-problem.  For Dasein to be authentic, coming from the 
existentiell of Being-a-problem, one must resolutely critique these death notes and see if they are 
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true to one’s existence.  The question that one must ask is the following: Is there coherence 
between Gerede about my identity and my everyday existence?  Another way to put the 
question: Am I viscerally near the death that is frequently discussed in social media and 
academic discourse?  I suspect many individuals will answer no.  If the answer is no then one 
gains a critical insight into the workings of the “veil” that exists between what They say and how 
one, as Dasein, lives every day in its existentiell understanding of itself.  But what if the answer 
is yes?  In that case, one still gains the critical insight about what is said in Gerede versus how 
one lives.  A racialized Dasein may even affirm its Situation and authentically choose Being-a-
problem.   
The development of this ontological and existential version of a “second sight,” as the 
Augenblick, establishes that Gerede about death, marginalization, and feelings threaten nuanced 
distinctions that are relevant to individuals.  We are not all the same in our marginalization, 
oppression, connections to racism, and so forth.  However, when idle talk treats us the same, we 
have a problem.  I have provided a template for inauthentic Being-a-problem and what it looks 
like from the preparation of hearing the call to be authentic to how one can “see” its Situation 
and reclaim itself as time in one’s authenticity, bypassing the idea of Being-hurried and silencing 
das Man’s “loudest idle talk” about death.  In the next chapter, I discuss race and iBap in terms 
of an academic racial discourse that tends to lose out on important distinctions regarding 
individual racial marginalization and oppression.  I examine how scholars tend to use terms like 
“white privilege,” “white supremacy” and even “racism” in ways that reassert Dasein as a 
traditional ontological subject, rather than an inauthentic Bap that has the possibility of 
emancipating itself from these discourses to prepare for authenticity. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Tottering Ontical Reports: The Crisis of Race Studies 
 
“I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me.  Like the bodiless heads you 
see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, 
distorting glass.  When they approach me, they see only my surroundings, themselves, or 
figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.” 120 
- Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man 
Introduction 
At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger writes that  
The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in 
its basic concepts.  In such immanent crises the relationship between positively 
investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a 
point where it begins to totter (29/9).  
 
I explain how we can use the notion of Being-a-problem to critique what I will call “race 
reports,” ontical reports about racially marginalized communities.  In doing this, I will 
demonstrate how race reports are themes based on a present-at-hand conception of Dasein.  Such 
themes are as follows:  They are binary methods for framing racial talk, psychological profiling 
of racial communities, the scholarly reduction of Dasein to bodies, and the seemingly necessary 
concealment of Dasein’s existential situation to advance the narrative of being a threat and being 
threatened.  I examine how the present-at-hand analyses of the race report make racial discourse 
problematic: that is, terms like “white privilege” or “white supremacy” (I use these concepts as 
examples throughout this chapter) can be demonstrated to be too general to be appropriately 
                                                 
120 Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man, 3 
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assigned to one’s individual existential situation.  Another result of my analysis is that we find 
something I will call “marginal appropriation,” where those who are inauthentically Being-a-
problem may assign themselves the issues of the marginalized based on a subscription to these 
race reports about their fear existentiell.  Furthermore, with such appropriations from Dasein as 
inauthentic Being-a-problem, we see a reinforcement of such a Dasein as a problem needing to 
be solved.  With that, I introduce what is normally called “the white savior” complex, but here I 
call it the “savior’s gaze” in which individuals who wish to “leap in” and save the objects of their 
gaze only reinforce the ontical race reporting about Dasein; consequently, such a “leaping in” 
skips over Dasein’s existential situation.  I discuss the positive contributions of my work, 
wherein I hold that authentic Being-a-problem allows Dasein to affirm its racial identity while 
also re-forging an opportunity for a new racial discourse that is less reliant on fear and more 
focused on “leaping ahead.”  In this “leaping,” Dasein rediscovers itself as its ownmost Being by 
centering on the importance of its daily engagements with other Dasein and with the world.  
Dasein then resolutely reaffirms the Augenblick, holding to its Situation as it is, rather than being 
driven into existential concealment by das Man’s idle talk about racial dynamics and 
marginalization.  
Being “Critical” 
The problem with distinguishing authentic Being-a-problem (aBap) from inauthentic 
Being-a-problem (iBap) is that both existentiells have their version of “seeing” the Situation for 
what it is.  With aBap it is the resoluteness toward the Augenblick and with iBap it is 
Heidegger’s ambiguity, but cloaked in the notion of being “critical” of race.  Heidegger writes 
that ambiguity is a form of communication where “Everyone is acquainted with what is up for 
discussion and what occurs.” In racial discourse, we all already know what the “body,” “lives,” 
 144 
“white supremacy,” “white privilege,” and even “racism” mean (217/173).  Furthermore, in this 
ambiguous “critical” way to think, “everyone also knows already how to talk about what has to 
happen first” (217/173).  And finally, with “critical” racial discourse Dasein (as well as other 
Dasein) are “in the know,” and are “Being ‘in on it’ with someone [das Mit-dabei-sein] when 
one is on the scent, and so long as one is on it, precludes one’s allegiance when what has been 
surmised gets carried out” (218/174).  In other words, when one is “critical” in racial discourse, 
certain assumptions about terms have already been made and if we all follow along with this 
shared discourse, then everyone is “on the scent” for racism.  In being “critical” we are all on the 
trail to identify the terms of racial discourse instantiated in our ontical affairs.  We effectively 
read racism into our lives.  It could be argued that being “on the scent” could be applied to any 
academic endeavor with its own presuppositions.  Heidegger writes early on in Being and Time 
that “Every inquiry is a seeking [Suchen].  Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is 
sought” (24/5).  Thus, the ambiguous claim about racial discourse may be true, but it is also true 
for other inquiries.  A “seeking” that is “guided beforehand by what is sought,” in Heidegger’s 
view, is an acknowledgment that questions are always about some object of inquiry, as opposed 
to an inquiry that is not only “seeking,” but already knows the details of the object of inquiry.  
Such an “already knowing” is the case when one investigates the existence of racism  as it exists 
in systems, structures, and within people’s intentions. 
The Issue with “Ontical Reports” 
I will use “ontical report” as a general label for those research projects, theories, and 
ideas that serve as an ontical classification of the racially marginalized.  I call them “race 
reports.”  A race report is a fitting label because the talk about the marginalized is often about 
alarming and shocking assessments of people suffering and dying under oppressive conditions.  
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Theories about marginalization often use ontical reports as they allow practitioners to ground 
their ideas in a concrete experience of suffering and death. 
Section 26 in Being and Time entitled “The Dasein-with of Others and Everyday Being-
with”  supports this notion of an “ontical report,” wherein Heidegger writes that, “Theoretically 
concocted ‘explanations’ of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too 
easily” (155/119).  The fact that we exist within a world of the They means we end up using the 
explanations of that world to understand it.  These explanations (ontical reports) are nearest to 
us.  In chapter 3’s discussion of “fear existentiells,” I discussed nearness in terms of a concept I 
called “societal de-severance,” in which the factical and ontical aspects of Dasein are thought 
more salient to other Dasein as they are external, providing the quickest access to getting a 
picture of identity.  Since it is an ontical fact about Dasein’s ontico-ontological constitution that 
Dasein uses the concepts closest to it to deal with the world, the idea of Dasein taking hold of 
what appears nearest to it is consistent with Heidegger’s interpretation of Dasein.  All Dasein 
assess other Dasein and all Dasein are already with each other in the sense that everyone is 
existentially and ontologically already Being-with.  However, as discussed in chapter 3, Dasein-
with is what most concerns our inquiry into existentiells because Dasein-withness is essentially 
Dasein and other Dasein having a shared engagement with the world, always involved in each 
other’s projects.  Because present-at-hand taking in of other Dasein initially occurs on the purely 
ontical level, Heidegger writes that the problem with the ontical reports is that they do not get 
into the ontological foundation of the subjects they are interrogating.   
Philosophers of Struggle 
I think Heidegger’s criticism applies to some philosophers of struggle as well.  Within the 
domain of philosophy, the philosopher of struggle must engage with ontical reports, but this 
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introduces a possibility that the reports themselves will negate ontological considerations 
because the essence of the individual’s philosophical plight will already be assumed under the 
category of marginalization.  For instance, if an ontical report is about the marginalized 
experience of the black man, then the assumption about the ontical report is about the struggle of 
black men.  One must seek the general struggle.  If an ontical report is about the marginalized 
experience of the brown-skinned woman, then the ontical report is then about the struggling 
brown-skinned woman, not as an existential being dealing with the world, but as an entity, an 
object reduced to the status of a body.  The particular person is effaced, leaving the general 
identity to be the focus of the inquiry.  The assumption is that if the ontical report is about 
marginalized people, then the history of those people as a mass group is the central story to be 
told about the individuals assumed under that category.  The reports turn into general profiles 
about masses of people and those schemas about those individuals can be in the form of 
psychological profiles (i.e., Samuel Ramos writing about “the Mexican man” in The Profile of 
Man and Culture in Mexico); they can be ethnologies, sociological studies, and anthropological 
explanations. 
Each of these disciplines is, to repeat a Heideggerian phrase, an “inquiry guided 
beforehand by what is sought” (25/5), only in these cases, “what is sought” is already disclosed 
in a heavily interpreted way because of the regional ontological assumptions required for those 
disciplines to be what they are .  In the case of philosophies of struggle, “what is sought” in each 
investigation is an all-encompassing notion of marginalization and oppression.  These kinds of 
research projects foster results that necessarily become monolithic in their descriptions of people.  
For instance, Enrique Dussel, a philosopher of struggle, assumes power relations of the center 
and the periphery in The Philosophy of Liberation (1985), even stating how power relations start 
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with the “I conquer,” which then supports his search for the “conqueror” and the “conquered” in 
his philosophical inquiries.121 Thus, he is “on the scent” for power in his investigations and, 
wherever division is found, power has already been determined as the main feature of a 
center/periphery model.  In Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity (2008), Nelson 
Maldonado Torres similarly searches for a “warrior paradigm” promulgated by Western colonial 
powers that have dominated the oppressed through the spread of reason and violence all over the 
world.122 
How Ontical Reports Conceal Dasein 
Ontical reports, with their emphasis on present-at-hand understandings of Dasein, conceal 
an ontology of Dasein.  Combining Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of appearance with 
his analysis of what is immediate, we can see how research projects can conceal Dasein’s 
ontological existence.  Heidegger says that the idea of semblance is about a relationship between 
what is apparent and what is hidden by it, and therefore things seem to be; things have a 
semblance.  Heidegger writes, “Indeed it is even possible for an entity to show itself as 
something which in itself it is not” (51/28).  When something “shows itself” by appearance, this 
does not have to mean that we see what that entity is.  In fact, Heidegger says that this “showing 
itself” by appearance signals that the entity is not showing itself, as it always has a hidden 
element (52/29).  Thus, when something appears evident through immediate experience, we need 
                                                 
121 Dussel writes in Philosophy of Liberation (1985) about traditional Western ontology that begins with Descartes’ 
“I think.” Dussel says, “That ontology did not come from nowhere.  It arose from a previous experience of 
domination over other persons, of cultural oppression over other worlds.  Before the ego cogito there is an ego 
conquiro; ‘I conquer’ is the practical foundation of ‘I think.’ The center has imposed itself on the periphery for more 
than five centuries,” 3.  
122 Nelson Maldonado Torres’ Against War: Views from the Underside of Modernity (2008) critiques Heidegger for 
being 1) too abstract as we saw with Mariana Ortega in In-Between; and 2) a proponent of the “war paradigm” due 
to his ties to the Nazi party.  
 148 
to be cautious as to whether this is just a kind of appearance.  Additionally, it may be a problem 
to generalize and report from such an appearance. 
The use of ontical reports conceals Dasein’s existential situation by way of generalizing 
ontic and factical aspects of Dasein’s existence.  Although these are key to Dasein’s going about 
in the world, the focus places the ontology of Dasein on ontic features and pah themes.  Because 
we see that this ontical report functions as a present-at-hand analysis, we infer that this serves as 
a layer over Dasein that makes us think we understand its existential situation, when a present-at-
hand notion is actually taking over.  A result of such an approach is that Dasein is concealed by a 
psychological profile of a people and their closeness to ableben.  It is no wonder why thinkers 
like Frantz Fanon determine there can be no ontology of the oppressed because Dasein’s 
possibility of authentically Being-a-problem is always concealed by present-at-hand analyses of 
the suffering of the oppressed.   
Heidegger’s claims about scientific research projects (whether in the life sciences like 
biology or human studies like sociology) reflect his understanding of the limitations of how a 
common theoretical study of Dasein can lend itself to an incomplete understanding of Dasein.123  
Heidegger writes, “Sciences are ways of Being in which Dasein comports itself towards entities 
which it need not be itself” (33/13).  Practitioners studying the marginalized need not be those 
Dasein that they study.  By the very nature of the “study of marginalization” or the “study of the 
oppressed,” one is likely “studying” at a distance from the object of inquiry.  Such a point does 
not mean scholars cannot inquire and produce knowledge about the marginalized, but it does 
                                                 
123 In German academia, the sciences take up a majority of the disciplines, while humanities are in the minority.  
Thank you to Dr. Joshua Rayman for pointing this out. 
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mean that there are limitations to what can be known and generalized about.124 Especially 
troublesome is the fact that these ontical reports disregard Dasein’s singular existential situation, 
in favor of attributing and associating verenden, ableben, and suffering to certain groups.   
Although Heidegger’s aim was not to look at the experience of the marginalized, his 
analysis of Being can be applied to how we tend to study the racially marginalized in present-at-
hand ways.  Heidegger writes 
Whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than 
that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein’s own ontical structure, 
in which pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic 
(33/13).   
 
When we apply a general theme about Dasein in a way that is other than what and how it is 
Being-in-the-world, we reinforce false ontological assumptions in the form of Dasein just being a 
present-at-hand subject.   Furthermore, by merely seeing Dasein as just marginalized or raced, 
race reports about Dasein focus on the ontical to the point of declaring that individuals are 
simply too different to have a similar existential structure.  Even by differentiating Dasein in this 
manner, some may even use this as a basis to deny Dasein with a race report as having any kind 
of ontological structure at all, as they would be reduced to an object, a non-Dasein entity.   
                                                 
124 Stephan Mulhall writes in “Human Mortality: Heidegger on How to Portray the Impossible Possibility of Dasein” 
that “The moral is clear: if we are to find a way through this impasse, we must begin from our best available 
understanding of Dasein’s distinctive kind of being as such, or in general.  And this implies a further constraint on 
the resources available to us: we can no more help ourselves to the deliverance of ontic sciences at this point in our 
ontological inquiries than we can at any point.  Heidegger argued extensively in the opening chapter of Division I 
that fundamental ontology in general and the existential analytic of Dasein in particular, must be sharply 
distinguished from the business of anthropology, psychology, biology, and theology, and he reiterates his objections 
in the opening chapter of Division II.  To begin with, the results of any ontic science will presuppose a regional 
ontology that it is necessarily incapable of validating, but which no fundamental ontology can take for granted.  But 
more importantly, the prevailing division of cultural labor between psychology, biology, and anthropology also 
presupposes a particular conception of the human being that is their common preoccupation; it assumes the human 
mind, body, and spirit can be studied in isolation from each other, and hence that the human being is a composite 
construction from these isolated elements” (301). 
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It is important to identify how such an ontical report conceals Dasein in reports 
attempting to reveal one’s struggle because philosophies of marginalization and struggle usually 
connect to an idea about a marginalized group’s expedited death.  These reports conceal Dasein 
an reduce him to an inauthentic Being-a-problem in which Gerede about death notes and fear is 
prominent in its identity, while the possibility of an authentic Being-a-problem lays dormant.  
From the outset, understanding what authentic Bap is would help problematize the ontical 
reporting about marginalized people.  Authentic Being-a-problem does not lend itself to 
overarching themes of oppression or marginality in the way ontical descriptions do.  Instead, 
authentic Bap aims to gain insight from individual ontical affairs, and this is so when we 
consider how the Augenblick or “second sight” can serve as ways to “see” one’s Situation and 
then to deliberate about the Gerede regarding one’s own existence versus the existentiality of 
Dasein.  Authentic Bap allows there to be an in-between, interrogating Being in Heidegger’s 
existential analytic while questioning das Man’s use of ontical reports to understand the 
marginalized.  As an in-between, aBap does not reject the disciplines whose practitioners aim to 
understand the marginalized.  Rather, aBap as an existentiell uninfluenced by fear and Gerede, 
can complicate the applicability of those reports because it does not pivot from obvious 
assumptions related to death notes, race, and fear.  Rather, the preparation for one to be 
authentic, as well as what aBap is in its authenticity, demonstrates a development from iBap to 
aBap.  In this development, the identity of both existentiells have the capacity to prepare for 
authenticity (iBap) and then to be authentic (aBap).  In iBap, this happens consciously: it is the 
decision to prepare by simply comparing Gerede and one’s ontical affairs.  In aBap, one is 
authentic by “seeing” the Situation and choosing to Be-a-problem, wherein, ironically, Dasein 
critiques the ways in which one has been problematized by ontical reports and Gerede.  
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Problematizing Race Reports 
Familiar to each race report is that they inform the talk about identities in society, filling 
out the idea of Dasein being close to death and struggle, which in turn reinforces the meaning of 
that fear existentiell in society.  The race report displays a threat of continued and imposed 
subordination due to historical injustices with a type of death found in narratives about 
invisibility and reductions to nothingness.   
Frantz Fanon writes in Black Skin, White Masks, “Whatever the field we studied, we were 
struck by the fact that both the black man, slave to his inferiority, and the white man, slave to his 
superiority, behave along neurotic lines.”125 Fanon’s approach is psychological here, 
emphasizing the internal sense of inferiority to describe the black man.  Heidegger would 
construe this psychological approach as present-at-hand because Fanon is seeing Dasein as a 
“concrete possible idea of existence” (69/43).  Rather than focusing on the Being of the black 
man, Fanon focuses on the ontic features that are facts about the individual.  Heidegger writes 
that Dasein “can with some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand,” 
but that doing this means that Dasein’s Being-in must be disregarded or just not seen in an 
existential way (82/56). By present-at-hand, Heidegger means to say that something is external, 
held up for analysis and separated from everyday Being-in-the-world.  The present-at-hand 
analysis takes the subject of its inquiry out of its world, placing it in separate “subject” and 
“object” categories.  Heidegger addresses this point about pah analyses when he says that Hegel 
took the concept of spirit “As something present-at-hand and thus external to spirit” (485/434).  
Additionally, present-at-hand can be “unchanging” and “stable” as when Heidegger writes, “The 
idea of a standard implies unchangingness; this means that for everyone at any time the standard, 
                                                 
125 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 41-42. 
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in its stability, must be present-at-hand” (470/417).  Disregarding Dasein’s existential state 
requires focusing on ontic features of Dasein that are external, unchanging, and stable.  Fanon 
examines such features for his purposes as he wants to uncover how the black man is displaced 
from the idea of what a human being is and how this displacement psychologically affects both 
him and other black men.   
To understand the marginalized is to interrogate their experiences.  However, I question 
whether what is being provided by these thinkers is an investigation into marginalized 
experiences and testimonials or simply the schema of a present-at-hand report, which informs the 
reader about experiences from marginality.  What if the ontical and present-at-hand schema 
imposed upon the marginalized negates their Being in an existential manner?  I think this 
negation occurs in view of Heidegger’s conclusions regarding taking Dasein as present-at-hand.  
However, the emerging issue is that there is effectively no choice but to discuss Dasein of the 
periphery or oppressed than in this present-at-hand manner.  I have demonstrated this in previous 
chapters in my analysis of inauthentic Being-a-problem and the way U.S. society idly discusses 
death as verenden and ableben, thereby participating in the concealing of Dasein’s authentic 
death and authentic understanding of itself.  In what follows, I will explain how my use of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time develops the concept of authentic Being-a-problem so that I can 
positively complicate this issue of ontical race reporting.  Authentic Bap will break down the 
constructs produced by these ontical reports, thereby questioning their utility to help in revealing 
more about the existential plight of the marginalized.   
Building on my analysis and distinction between inauthentic Bap and authentic Bap in 
the last chapter, I hold that the monolithic appraisal of peripheral communities through present-
at-hand “ontical reports” does more to conceal these marginalized communities than reveal their 
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individual and existential struggle.  These reports prevent us from adequately theorizing due to 
idle synopses of inauthentic death and struggle in the form of generalizations, and the 
monolithically characterized interactions between the powerful and the oppressed.  
Fanon on the Race Report: The Phenomenon of Race Gerede 
Frantz Fanon argues that colonialism cannot breed an ontology of the oppressed; 
however, Fanon introduces a critical ontical report to his postcolonial analysis: he discusses what 
I am calling a “race report.” In my explanation of a race report, I have said that such a report 
hinges on a connection between the narrative about one’s race and fear of death.  Fanon 
expresses this fear of annihilation in Black Skin, White Masks by explaining how Western 
philosophy’s lack of ontology about the lived experience of the black man turns the black man 
into a null object.  He writes, “I came into this world anxious to uncover the meaning of things, 
my soul desirous to be at the origin of the world, and here I am an object among other 
objects.”126 Fanon sees that others view him as and reduce him to an object, which leads to a 
scathing critique of ontology where he states:  
Any ontology is made impossible in a colonized and acculturated society.  Those who 
have written on the subject have not taken this sufficiently into consideration.  In the 
weltanschauung of a colonized people, there is an impurity or a flaw that prohibits any 
ontological explanation.  Perhaps it could be argued that this is true for any individual, 
but such an argument would be concealing the fundamental problem.  Ontology does not 
allow us to understand the being of the black man since it ignores the lived experience. 
For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.  
Not at all.  The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.  
From one day to the next, the Blacks have had to deal with two systems of reference.  
Their metaphysics, or less pretentiously their customs and the agencies to which they 
refer, were abolished because they were in contradiction with a new civilization that 
imposed its own.127 
 
                                                 
126 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 90. 
127 Fanon, 90. 
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Fanon mentions the “being of the black man,” but then we must ask what that being means.  
Throughout his text, he appeals to his lived experience and psychological analyses of his 
experiences with white people.  In appealing to his ontical affairs, Fanon is moving outside the 
scope of general talk about racial identities.  Yet, “the being of the black man” is linked to both 
the “white man” and the “eyes of the white man,” suggesting an appeal to an essential “being” of 
the black man, which is a categorical move that obstructs one’s own experience since it appeals 
to the broad notion of the “being of the black man.”  Also, the “white man” and “eyes of the 
white man” suggest a binary relation of white/black that occludes an individual connection to 
one’s ontical affairs by framing oneself as half of the issue (the other half is white).  To be fair, 
Du Bois employs a black/white binary as well, but in his case, he develops a break from that, a 
disruption through “double consciousness” and “second sight,” which sees through the veil of 
that binary.  Instead, Fanon moves from a psychological profile and then to a binary.  He takes 
himself out of a fallen discourse of totalizing narratives toward his everydayness, but then goes 
back to the pah assessments in the form of a binary and a general profile of the “being of the 
black man,” which cannot be ontological, given his critique of ontology. 
Another interesting point about race reports is that they conceal other race reports.  As I 
have discussed in previous chapters, U.S. talk (to give a specific context) about race is replete 
with discussions about racism, prejudice, white privilege, the annihilation of marginalized 
bodies, language that acts as psychological “triggers,” and black/white binaries.  In fact, as Juan 
Pereda has demonstrated with his analysis of the black/white binary, U.S. history often overlooks 
the historical impact of Latinos in racial matters because of the concealing talk about black/white 
binaries.128 Another way to put this is that race reports conceal other race reports and other racial 
                                                 
128 Delgado and Stefancic make a similar, albeit brief, point in Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (2001). 
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discourses.  This concealing is not only consistent with Heidegger’s concept of Gerede, but with 
Mitsein (Being-with) and Mitdasein (Dasein-with) because Dasein and other Dasein are always 
in the project of co-creating Gerede, and this co-creating of Gerede includes discussions of race, 
racism, oppression, and marginalization. 
Mitsein and Mitdasein 
 One of the productions of Gerede is race reports; these reports are projects that function 
through Gerede (idle talk) and are co-produced by Dasein’s Mitdasein, which emanates from 
Dasein’s Mitsein.  Being-with is Dasein’s mode of Being, whereas other non-Dasein entities fall 
under ready-to-hand or present-at-hand.  When Dasein encounters other Dasein, it is not two pah 
subjects as if an “I” is with another “I.” “By ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me--
those over against whom the ‘I’ stands out” (154/118).   Instead, Mitsein is a shared engagement 
with the world through the work and projects we all share in.  For example, race reports conceal 
other race reports.  These reports have authors responding to each other, influenced by the work 
of others, making a race report a shared project that is in “The world of Dasein,” which is a 
“with-world [Mitwelt]” (153/118).  To be “in” this ontological world of shared work is Dasein’s 
“Being-in,” which itself “is Being-with Others” (153/118).  While Being-with is Dasein’s mode 
of Being, Dasein-with reveals itself as we work on projects that require ready-to-hand tools and 
materials produced by other Dasein.  Heidegger writes that “the Dasein-with of Others is often 
encountered in terms of what is ready-to-hand with-in-the world” (156/120).  Thus, if we take 
race reports as a shared project about present-at-hand understandings of Dasein’s racial identity 
then we can see these reports as productions of Mitdasein (originating in Mitsein). 
 Race reports are a co-production of Mitdasein that allow Dasein to encounter other 
Dasein, but the content of those reports represent another issue: Their explanations of Dasein 
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hide both Mitsein and Mitdasein.  For instance, Heidegger writes that “Theoretically concocted 
‘explanations’ of the Being-present-at-hand of Others urge themselves upon us all too easily” 
(155/119).  Race reports are such explanations, created from Dasein-with and grounded in 
Being-with.  The reports of racial identities as groups disclose Dasein as Being-present-hand, 
when ontologically what is the case is that “Others are encountered environmentally” (155/119).  
Hidden behind these pah explanations is how Dasein is essentially Being-with. “This Dasein-
with of the Others is disclosed within-the-world for a Dasein, and so too for those who are 
Dasein with us, only because Dasein itself is essentially Being-with” (156/120).  These reports 
distance Dasein from other Dasein instead of disclosing that Dasein is essentially with other 
Dasein.  Consequently, the race reports serve to ontologically create a distance among Dasein, 
even though such reports seem designed to bring Dasein closer to each other. 
 To understand this withness, Dasein must “look away from ‘Experiences’” seeing itself 
as “the ‘centre of its actions’” (155/119).  Race reports, however, focus on profiles and 
generalizations about experiences, even making one the center of actions in the form of 
testimonials about racial marginalization.  This focus turns “Others” into “themes for study,” 
even though we always encounter Dasein when being engaged in our usual everyday projects.  
Experiences are important to Dasein as authentic Being-a-problem because they represent 
Dasein’s everyday dealings and projects.  Yet, when experiences become homogenized into a 
narrative or theme of oppression, Mitsein and Mitdasein are concealed. 
From my examination of Mitsein, Mitdasein, and Gerede, one can see how an ontical 
report about race is the output of Gerede, and that what we understand about race through what 
we read and see is susceptible to idle talk’s authoritative rule and indistinct generalizations about 
people.  Idle talk productions of ontical reports (race reports included) are already set-up to fail 
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at capturing the existentiality of Dasein, yet the issue remains: These reports have an internally 
discursive difficulty with existentially understanding one’s existence when one is a fear 
existentiell and thought to be close to death.  Authentic Being-a-problem deals with the idle talk 
about one’s fear existentiells, but what if the already monolithically determined person is not 
suffering oppression?  What if that person would not identify with marginalization?  What if the 
idle chatter negates an individual’s genuine connection to oppression, but that individual remains 
concealed because she does not adhere to the fear existentiell of oppression?  These questions are 
the result of applying authentic Being-a-problem to race reports; that is, Dasein as authentic Bap 
problematizes race reports by the very individuals marked as Being-a-problem via Gerede. With 
aBap, we admit an obvious point that some Dasein are talked about idly (Gerede) and we also 
admit that because the talk falls under Gerede, there is ambiguity to the idle talk about race just 
as there is ambiguity about any other subject idly discussed by Dasein.   
The Problem with Uniting a Race Report and One’s Ontical Affairs 
By admitting this Gerede point about authentic Being-a-problem, we introduce the 
possibility of how the They can disingenuously and nominally co-opt oppression when one is 
only dealing with the idle chatter about oppression and not necessarily the imposition of it on 
their daily lives.  Dealing with an experiential versus a primarily discursive form of 
marginalization forces us to contend with tough questions about whether people who are thought 
to be facing ableben or facing oppression are indeed facing it.  The phenomenon of talk versus 
experience is a tricky issue as even the mere attempt at assessing a distinction means some 
individuals run the risk of feeling invalidated in what they believe to be their enduring of 
marginalization or nearness of death.  However, if scholars do not interrogate the distinction, 
then we run a higher risk of conflating people’s psychological and lived experiences, perhaps 
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even invalidating the lived experiences of the marginalized while attempting to validate the 
solely discursive psychological connections to oppression and death.  For example, the comedian 
Chris Rock, once joked that “An old black man went through some real racism.  He didn’t go 
through that ‘I can’t get a cab’ shit. He was the cab! White man just jump on his back, ‘Main 
Street!’”129 Rock provides insight into his assessments regarding the claim to a form of 
marginalization, racism.  His joke is both an epistemological suggestion and social commentary: 
that we need to remember historical and contextual differences about racism so as not to resort to 
saying that all racism is equal.  I provide Rock’s joke as an example of how we have intuitive 
notions of differences about degrees of marginalization and oppression, whether those degrees 
take place under the categories of racism, sexism, and classism.  Thus, since we acknowledge 
distinctions (in Rock’s case, we uncomfortably laugh about them), then they seem worth 
interrogating to get a better handle on how we understand marginalization and proximity to death 
within ontical race reports. 
Frantz Fanon, as evidenced in his works Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White 
Masks provides the example of a psychological profile within a race report, but racism was also 
imposed upon him.  The actual imposition of race versus a discursive one is an important 
distinction.  As Emmanuel Hansen explains 
Corresponding to the exaltation of the French way of life was a deprecation of the 
African way of life.  Training at home was no different.  Fanon recounts that whenever he 
misbehaved he was told to “stop acting like a nigger.”130 
 
For Frantz Fanon’s psychological explanation of the phenomenon of racism, he says that 
elements of fear, inadequacy, a yearning to stand out and expose one’s being in facing 
annihilation are all issues the black man has suffered.  Not only did he speak from firsthand 
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experiences, but he also elaborated on how there was an essence to the lived black experience.  
Thus, as with Rock’s commentary, there is a history of objectification, and for Fanon, there is the 
psychological element that fears ableben.  The Gerede about the black man’s ontical report 
steeps itself in history and experiences of gazes, reinforcing the fear existentiell.  Yet, the 
problem remains as to what occurs when a discursive idea of racism unites with one’s ontical 
affairs, shedding light on whether Dasein endures racism.  
An ongoing historical discussion of Dasein’s fear existentiell contributes to the confusion 
about whether racism occurs or if Dasein is reflecting on his being a member of a historically 
oppressed group.  That Dasein is historical means that it is its past, whereas the ontical race 
report about Dasein includes a traditional account of the past.  Dasein contends with its 
historicality through das Man’s on-going historical discussion about racial identities in general.  
For Frantz Fanon, a black man, there is a historical talk about him even if that talk is not about 
who Fanon is on an existential and singular level.131 Even if the talk is generally about him, the 
generality can still affect how Fanon navigates the world and interacts with other Dasein.  
Furthermore, if the material circumstances of Fanon’s existence are his being a black man in 
Algeria in which he served in the French Forces, studied in France, worked in French hospitals, 
and then worked to free Algeria in the mid-twentieth century, then we also have the idle talk of 
ableben concerning the political turmoil of that time and place.  Fanon’s fighting in the Free 
French forces brings him ontically near ableben, and his experiences of marginalization bring 
him near to a kind of oppression, though not as vividly as him fighting in battles.   
Fanon’s appeal to the past also helps him underscore the importance of his experience 
and how the past informs confrontations with the white gaze.  Fanon writes that the “real world 
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 160 
robbed us of our share.”132 Fanon says that his black body sets him apart from the white body.  
The gaze of the white body upends the black body, making the black body hesitate.  For Fanon, 
the world denies his presence because he is a black body and rather than being integrated into 
society, his body becomes a disruption.  Disruption is imposed upon him by the gaze and by the 
past.  By contrast, the world normalizes the white body.  Fanon provides an example, engaging 
in a phenomenological analysis of grabbing a pack of cigarettes; he says that this (his act) is not 
an imposition, that he is doing this by his own volition and that this movement is “a genuine 
dialectic between my body and the world.”133 Fanon responds to this racial imposition by 
imposing himself.  Fanon writes, “Since the Other was reluctant to recognize me, there was only 
one answer: to make myself known.”134 Fanon describes a situation wherein he enters a train car, 
and the white people leave, and he suggests that rather than fall back into a public default model 
of being a docile black man, he asserts his presence.  His assertion allows him to disrupt the 
space, demonstrating that marginalizing confrontations are co-produced: Other Dasein impose 
their gaze and Dasein reacts. 
Marginal Appropriation and the Savior’s Gaze 
Unlike Fanon, what about others who are discussed as inauthentic Being-a-problem but 
cannot attest to having experiences where they can claim a genuine connection to death and 
struggle?  For these individuals, they are Being-a-problem, but it is still left to them to 
understand their connection to ableben, verenden, and struggle.  Perhaps their connection is 
nominal.  Perhaps idle talk from the They just categorizes them within an existentially concealed 
zone, firmly encased by present-at-hand analyses that focus on more psychological components 
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that emphasize their fear of ableben and their alleged endurance of struggle.  For instance, Fanon 
examines the inferiority complex (a psychological concept) experienced by blacks who went 
through the pressures and violence of colonialism.  One of the first aspects of this complex is a 
two-fold experiencing of oneself through one’s self-reflection and the reflection of whites. 
The black man possesses two dimensions: one with his fellow Blacks, the other with the 
Whites.  A black man behaves differently with a white man than he does with another 
black man.  There is no doubt whatsoever that this fissiparousness is a direct consequence 
of the colonial undertaking.135  
 
The black man engages with this intense fusion of dichotomous gazes.  However, this is an 
ontical report about “the black man.” It is valuable, and it helps us understand Fanon’s 
experience, but it does not tell us about the “being of the black man.” To an extent, Fanon’s 
description can help us understand the experiences of the black man, but once such a report goes 
beyond him, the report moves from his existential space to an existentiell space about the black 
man.  Thus, while it helps us understand Fanon, the description may only serve as idle talk 
regarding the black experience.  At that point, we risk concealing a different kind of existential 
situation for Dasein only because we may be using the given report to provide us with a blanket 
overview of individual Dasein that resembles the author. 
I argue for de-layering the concealment of Dasein’s existential plight so that Dasein can 
deliberate about the issue of its existence being genuine to its everyday existence, which is the 
main thrust of authentic Being-a-problem.  As noted earlier, inauthentic Being-a-problem has not 
dealt with removing fear or the Gerede about verenden and ableben.  Dasein as inauthentic 
Being-a-problem must disclose itself in an authentic way by resolutely facing itself in Angst.  In 
removing the fear first, Dasein is closer to dealing with Angst and then closer to the “moment of 
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vision” in which it can claim its present in a resolute fashion.  And for a racial identity, this 
means distancing oneself from the present-at-hand thematizing about its Being.  Removing the 
pah concealing layers from ontical reports allows us to better recognize how idle talk about fear 
existentiells imposes itself onto individuals, which is a dynamic that lends itself to marginal 
appropriation.  An example of marginal appropriation is when other people make historically 
marginalized individuals believe in their present marginalization by trying to save them from 
injustice.  This kind of gaze is like the notion of a “savior complex,” where one identifies the 
injustice against another person and steps in to save that individual from enduring more injustice.  
Such a gaze is different from the kind of white gaze that Fanon talks about because the white 
gaze has no goodwill involved: it is a matter of a person objectifying another person to siphon 
off that person’s humanity, to make that person feel less like a person.  For example, Fanon 
writes,  
So what are we getting at?  Quite simply that when Blacks make contact with the white 
world a certain sensitizing action takes place.  If the psychic structure is fragile, we 
observe a collapse of the ego.  The black man stops behaving as an actional person.  His 
actions are destined for “the Other” (in the guise of the white man) since only “the Other” 
can enhance his status and give him self-esteem at the ethical level.136 
 
Fanon’s assessment of the gaze severs him from his “actional” quality.  It makes him think twice 
and “check” himself.  Fanon becomes obligated to live through another person’s gaze. 
Heidegger’s point recalls that Dasein is lived by the world. “Dasein, as a they-self, ‘lived’ by the 
common-sense ambiguity of that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything, but which 
has always made its decision” (345/299).  Regarding inauthentic Bap, one is a walking problem 
pleading to be solved, allowing us to see how Fanon fits within the iBap category as he tries to 
secure his self-esteem and sense of ethics through the white man. The “savior’s gaze” also 
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removes the “actional” quality of a person by “leaping in” for a Dasein reduced to his fear 
existentiell, judging Dasein by an ontical race report.  The savior’s gaze is “good” for the savior 
because the savior understands its service to the fear existentiell; thus, when saviors “leap in” to 
help they are doing something positive for the bearer of the fear existentiell.  This “leaping in” 
for iBap is also an imposition as it may even force such a Dasein to think through the inauthentic 
Being-a-problem inquiry that I have been discussing thus far, compelling one to ask, “Am I a 
problem?” The savior’s gaze, guided by a race report that is both psychologically and historically 
motivated, “takes over” and robs Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem of a sense of agency 
about controlling its situation.  This “leaping in” affects Dasein by reinforcing the fear of death 
notes (verenden and ableben).  In Dasein-with, other Dasein that leap in for inauthentic Being-a-
problem are saying, “You are a suffering subject.  I can handle your fear for you.” However, for 
Dasein to resolutely deal with its existence, it must face that fear and continually claim itself as 
authentically Being-a-problem to extinguish that fear.  Leaping ahead is different.  In this kind of 
solicitude that comes from Mitsein, what Dasein does for the Other is “leap ahead of him [ihm 
vorausspringt] in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but 
rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time” (158/122).  Dasein does this 
for other Dasein that are iBap by not participating in the fear-laden racial discourse.  In this lack 
of participation, Dasein will relate to other Dasein in its existentiell possibility to be authentic, 
“not a ‘what’ with which he is concerned” (159/122).  By not participating in racial Gerede, 
Dasein exhibits the kind of solicitude that “helps the Other to become transparent to himself in 
his care and to become free for it” (159/122).  Given the distinction between “leaping in” and 
“leaping ahead” as it pertains to the “savior’s gaze,” we can see how individuals who profess to 
be “allies” can be thought of as “leaping in.” Also evident is that race reports perform a similar 
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kind of “leaping in” in the broad covering over that is performed by such ontical reporting.  Such 
reports are used to “save” the fear existentiell Dasein, yet they do not lay a path for Dasein to 
eliminate that fear from their identity in a way that allows individuals to be authentic. 
Authentic Being-a-problem and the Problematizing of Concepts from Race Reports 
 The concept of authentic Being-a-problem as an existentiell helps us re-evaluate the 
dynamics and utility of concepts like white privilege, black/white binaries, racism, and prejudice 
within U.S. racial discourse.  So far, I have reassessed how marginality is discussed and 
appropriated by appealing to distinctions between inauthentic Bap and authentic Bap.  I have 
done this by examining how influential ontical reports are when we examine marginality from 
the perspective of race.  Essentially, an ontical report sets up a way of talking about issues, and 
this way tends to conceal Dasein’s existentiality.  From Frantz Fanon, we have seen how ontical 
race reports utilize individual psychological profiles linked to a fear existentiell.  We have also 
seen the Gerede about certain fear existentiells and how this talk produces ambiguity by 
conflating historical and personal experience with the talk about marginality.  Because white 
privilege, black/white binaries, and racism are dominating the intellectual landscape in the 
United States, aBap can help us understand our specific racial dynamics.  I use Charles Mills as 
an entry point to elaborate on what these terms may mean.  In Blackness Visible Mills discusses 
white privilege and the inability of whites to understand their privilege.  Mills writes,  
Without even recognizing that it is doing so, Western philosophy abstracts away from 
what has been the central feature of the lives of Africans transported against their will to 
the Americas: the denial of black humanity and the reactive, defiant assertion of it.  
Secure in the uncontested sum of the leisurely Cartesian derivation, whites find it hard to 
understand the metaphysical rage and urgency of the non-Cartesian sums of those 
invisible native sons and daughters who, since nobody knows their name, have to be the 
men who cry “I am!” and the women who demand “And ain’t I a woman?” From the 
beginning, therefore, the problems faced by those categorized as persons and those 
categorized as sub-persons will be radically different.  One can no longer speak with 
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quite such assurance of the problems of philosophy; rather, these are problems for 
particular groups of human beings, and for others, there will be different kinds of 
problems that are far more urgent.  A relativizing of the discipline’s traditional 
hierarchies of importance and centrality thus becomes necessary.137 
 
Mills discusses a sense of privilege from the Cartesian cogito and how whites do not understand 
the “metaphysical rage” of those reduced to nothingness by Descartes’ formulation.138 His 
comments about this kind of philosophical privilege are consistent with what I have discussed so 
far regarding the features of ontical race reports.  Whites are generalized as being “Secure in the 
uncontested sum of the leisurely Cartesian derivation,” implying how Descartes’ formulation of 
the “cogito” sprang from a relaxed state, likely due to his being white.  Meanwhile, Mills affirms 
that non-whites are in an emergency situation, where rage and defiance become the cornerstones 
of their philosophical input.  Mills’ analysis speaks to the indisputable historical fact of African 
slavery, but he allows that history of a people to take over individual existential situations that, 
within the category of blackness, undoubtedly hold radical differences.  Ironically, Mills wants to 
affirm radical differences between groups (whites and blacks), but he could go further and 
examine the existentially radical differences of people within the assumed black category.  
However, this is not his project.  His project, as I have noted with respect to race reports, relies 
on the monolithic categorizing of individuals.  With his project, he can arrive at the urgency and 
difference of non-white philosophical problems versus the leisure of white philosophical 
problems by preserving generalizations based on historical reports about races.   
Mills’ commentary is also consistent with the general notion of white privilege.  In their 
article, “Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible,” Stephanie M. Wildman 
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and Adrienne D. Davis write that “Whites do not look at the world through a filter of racial 
awareness, even though whites are, of course, a race.  The power to ignore race, when white is 
the race, is a privilege, a societal advantage.”139 Similarly, Mills points out that whites have a 
kind of metaphysical obtuseness because they are “secure in the sum.”140 Both points of view 
about white privilege tell us that 1) whites cannot see their privilege; 2) whites have a societal 
advantage that lies in their inability to see race.  Others, like Jose Medina in The Epistemology of 
Resistance, have argued that this inability of whites is an epistemological disadvantage and vice 
that makes them less knowledgeable about the world.141 These various views on the matter of 
white privilege reveal that the terms used within an ontical race report construct a racial binary 
divide between those “in the know” (non-whites) and those “not in the know” (whites).  With 
discussions of white privilege, we have a binary within a race report.  Individual assessment of 
racial experiences is disregarded, which is a critical change because in the previous section we 
had Frantz Fanon’s work advancing individualized assessments of one’s racial experiences to 
uncover existential dimensions in experience, yet the concept of white privilege seems to 
inherently deny individual reflexivity.  The individualistic point is removed to advance a larger 
systemic feature about white privilege: It is a product of a system of white supremacy.  To 
resolve this debate between those seemingly categorized as “in the know” versus those “not in 
the know,” we can let our ontical affairs dictate how we existentially confront issues like white 
privilege.  By taking this approach, we can cache out the pragmatic fruit of white privilege for 
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Dasein on an average and practical level, rather than imbuing our everydayness with the concept 
of white privilege. 
The concept of white supremacy has an essential function within a racial binary because 
it severs us from the individual approach to assessing racism from the individual perspectives of 
white people; thus, white supremacy places racism on a systemic level.  For instance, in Critical 
Race Theory: An Introduction, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic discuss the basic tenets of 
Critical Race Theory (CRT) that 1) “racism is ordinary, not aberrational—‘normal science,’ the 
usual way society does business, the common, everyday experience, of most people of color in 
this country,” and 2) “most would agree that our system of white-over-color ascendancy serves 
important purposes, both psychic and material, for the dominant group.”142 From these tenets, we 
see that the field of CRT assumes a binary report of dominance and subordination, that most 
people of color in this country experience racism on an everyday level, and that this is part of a 
system of “white-over-color” ascendancy.  Critical Race Theory assumes white supremacy.  If 
one were to remove the systemic assumption of these tenets, individual determinations of racial 
dynamics are left over.  However, to have individual reflexivity left over would mean that issues 
in racism would lean towards non-systemic and more subjective assessments.  Yet, if we remove 
an individual perspective from discussing racial dynamics and keep the systemic tenet then white 
supremacy is automated, operating irrespective of whether someone holds a racist position and 
regardless of whether a racial minority feels that he or she is going through a form of racialized 
injustice.  Once again, there are two results: 1) A white person has white privilege because of 
white supremacy, irrespective of individual recognition of it; 2) A non-white person is, in virtue 
of their non-whiteness, automatically thrown into an unjust system of white supremacy, 
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irrespective of whether they recognize this or believe it to be true.  With the first result, we have 
a sort of “racial surrender” to white supremacy where if one is white, one must surrender to the 
racial dynamics of a system of white supremacy.  With the second result, we have another kind 
of racial surrender to white supremacy where if one is black then one resigns oneself to the idea 
that the white supremacist system operates by subordinating the black individual, whether or not 
this subordination is expressed in that non-white individual’s ontical affairs.  An example of the 
first result is from Wildman and Davis, who both write that “I simply believe that no matter how 
hard I work at not being racist, I still am.  Because part of racism is systemic, I benefit from the 
privilege that I am struggling to see.”143 An example of the second result comes from Shelby 
Steele, writer of The Content of Our Character, who says 
I see in people’s eyes from time to time, and often hear in the media, what amounts to a 
judgment of people like myself: You have moved into the great amorphous middle class 
and lost your connection to your people and your cultural roots.  You have become a 
genuine invisible man.  This is a judgment with many obvious dimensions, many arrows 
of guilt.  But, in essence, it charges me with selfishness and inauthenticity.144 
 
As Steele points out, by living as if one does not recognize this system, then he is charged “with 
selfishness and inauthenticity.” Steele’s personal reflection also denotes a common element in 
racial discourse from both the media and the judgment of others:  For one to be authentic in a 
certain racial group means one must subscribe to assumptions of what authenticity means.  This 
is like when Heidegger writes about ambiguity that “Everyone is acquainted with what is up for 
discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses it” (217/173).  “Everyone” is acquainted 
with the idea that an unjust system exists.  If one does not believe this or appears to benefit from 
that system, then one’s authenticity is questioned.  Dasein’s daily engagement in the world and 
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with other Dasein is disregarded with such assumptions, as demonstrated by Steele’s reflection.  
The acceptance of such assumptions suggests that even the everyday Being-in-the-world of 
inauthentic Being-a-problem would possibly be diminished in favor of more systemic analyses 
and assumptions about racism.  Furthermore, such assumptions make Dasein’s reflexivity about 
its life practically unnecessary for understanding racial dynamics.  The “race report,” and the 
theoretical assumptions made within it, are already thinking for Dasein. 
Conclusion 
Ontical race reports are part of the problem regarding how we understand racial dynamics 
in the United States.  Fear existentiells help produce ontical race reports and ontical race reports 
help sustain fear existentiells on an academic level.  Meanwhile, the individual existence 
reported on has two choices: 1) subscribe to the talk; 2) keep silent so as not to participate in the 
talk.  The issue is that our racial discourse takes just the Gerede and fear as enough to believe 
oneself and to believe others as marginalized.  Thus, if idle talk is concerned with “white 
supremacy,” racial binaries, and historical facts about marginalization, then the mere link 
between those concepts and the one’s identity is thought to be enough to make one marginalized 
or oppressed.  However, this obfuscates Dasein’s ownmost Being because the concepts of racism 
and marginalization do not disclose Dasein’s ability to choose itself, but instead act as external 
present-at-hand concepts that speak about Dasein’s Being from outside of Dasein’s ownmost.      
Linking Dasein to a present-at-hand category of marginalization becomes a work of 
Gerede, ambiguity, and curiosity.  Dasein, marked as an inauthentic Being-a-problem, is 
“everywhere and nowhere,” as almost anyone can fall under that category by claiming 
marginalization (221/177).  Iris Marion Young wrote that, “all oppressed people suffer some 
inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, 
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thoughts, and feelings.”145 As discussed in my introduction, this is a broad narrative.  If 
oppressed Dasein is hindered in any manner of expressing needs, thoughts, and feelings then 
Dasein is oppressed.  With a view to oppression, Dasein ambiguously knows all it needs to know 
about oppression.  In curiosity, this oppression can be experienced with little depth, so long as 
Dasein gets some sense of hindrance in expressing itself.  In this way, oppressed Dasein is “in a 
mode of groundless floating” because it just as easily could not feel oppressed; therefore, Dasein 
cannot genuinely own such an oppression if it is grounded on a generalization about suffering, 
rather than a genuine connection that is constitutive of Dasein’s everyday ontical affairs 
(221/177).  As such, terms like marginalization have too much explanatory power and may be 
rendered meaningless. Furthermore, if the ambiguity continues, then there may be real 
consequences that affect Dasein who are genuinely and authentically Being-a-problem.  For 
example, an undocumented Central American family that is split up at the U.S./Mexico border 
endures a form of authentically Being-a-problem in the sense that there is a genuine present 
moment to attend to and own up to that the Dasein of that family can see as their own Situation 
and they can see this through the Augenblick.  Discourses of marginalization and oppression that 
are “everywhere and nowhere” put genuine claims to marginalization at risk of existential 
concealment through the proliferation of that idea that marginalization and oppression can be 
anything one lays any kind of claim to.   
Distinctions are necessary for practical and ethical reasons because they allow us to make 
determinations about groups and individuals, so we can focus and attend to people in need.  
Thus, it may seem as if we are theoretically gaining something by pointing out differences of 
privilege and power in a racialized system.  However, the gain may not outweigh the cost of 
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perpetuating concepts like marginalization and death where they might not be genuine to 
Dasein’s ownmost Being, thereby concealing the existential plight of people who may need to be 
seen the most so we can begin to help them to alleviate their conditions.  The problem is that by 
talking about race, oppression, and marginalization in the tottering ontical reporting way, we 
conceal the individuals we try to help through the discourse that seems designed to free people of 
such marginality and this dynamic is precisely what puts these race reports in crisis.  Handling 
this crisis will require a reevaluation of how we use these reports to understand Dasein. 
Authentic Being-a-problem is incompatible with the concept of white supremacy, racial 
binaries, and terms like “white privilege” because each of those items requires that an individual 
interprets them into his daily existence.  What if they are not?  What then?  Is Dasein not 
authentically its racial identity, discussed as under threat, because it cannot claim these issues as 
one’s ownmost?  Such questions come about because the concepts originate in a racial discourse 
that is in crisis.  The purpose of such concepts is to diagnose the products of racism on a 
systemic level, with its focus on race reports, the narratives about how racism epistemologically 
spreads are paramount.  For example, the idea of white supremacy is theorized as a kind of 
metaphorical contagion, which turns white people into unwitting racists, or at the very least, 
beneficiaries of white supremacy.  Wildman’s and Davis’ points follow from this as they infer 
that white supremacy makes a white person racist no matter what.  The notion of authentic 
Being-a-problem is incompatible with these views because it requires the Augenblick, a more 
primordial form of Du Bois’ “second sight,” about the very assumptions thought to be self-
evident by philosophers of race and critical race theorists.  Authentic Being-a-problem frames 
issues of racism regarding Gerede about fear existentiells, and whether they genuinely or non-
genuinely are being discussed about Dasein.  Because authentic Being-a-problem frames racial 
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dynamics in this way, the accompanying fear of white supremacy and racism is relegated to 
being a byproduct of the phenomenon of idle talk.  From the perspective of authentic Being-a-
problem, the terms themselves (i.e., “white supremacy,” “white privilege,” and the like) are built 
around ontico-existentiell categories and assumptions that cannot deal with the question about 
the meaning of Being for Dasein because the terms reinforce present-at-hand thematizing, rather 
than freeing Dasein to both authentically choose and see its own Situation. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
Throughout this dissertation, I have demonstrated that an existentiell, grounded in 
thrown-projection, is an identity.  I showed in chapter 2 that an identity, as an existentiell, has 
existential features that ontologically satisfy what is commonly referred to as an “identity.” I 
subjected my reevaluation of an identity as an existentiell to Mariana Ortega’s critique of 
Heidegger’s conception of Dasein in BT as being too abstract to elaborate on marginalized 
identities like a racial identity.  However, Heidegger’s idea of an existentiell, reevaluated as an 
identity that is founded on thrown-projection, can account for the abstraction critique by 
incorporating Dasein’s history as one of its ontical affairs, as well as its culture, skin color, 
ethnicity, and race.  Additionally, the ontical circumstances of Dasein’s existence help shape its 
ontical affairs, therefore, Dasein’s living through a culture, having values, shaped by a past, tied 
to different personal and public commitments, are all part of what makes Dasein’s ontical affairs 
what they are.  With some of these circumstances, Dasein finds itself either taking hold of the 
possibilities from them or neglecting them.  Dasein finds itself in a situation where its issue is 
always about being these possibilities or not, and this is where we have the idea that Dasein can 
have an identity, more specifically, a racial identity. 
In chapter 3, I explained how Gerede and fear forge this racial identity in a certain way, 
making a “fear existentiell.” I explained that fear is Dasein’s fallen mood that influences the 
Gerede about Dasein’s identity.  Heidegger explains a tripartite notion of fear: the fearsome, the 
definiteness of our fear, and what is feared about.  These types of fear participate in Dasein’s 
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racial identity.  Dasein deals with the “fearsome” when it is threatened by something or some 
Dasein.  Dasein wrestles with the definiteness of fear when concerned about impending threats in 
its world.  In “what is feared about” Dasein fears on behalf of another Dasein.  Dasein’s racial 
identity is always subject to these kinds of fear and is “taken as” a present-at-hand threat, even 
though that is not Dasein’s mode of existence.  Rather, Dasein’s mode is in Being-with; 
however, this is often concealed when Dasein takes another Dasein as a present-at-hand threat to 
be concerned with.  Present-at-hand conceptions come in the form of taking Dasein as a “body” 
that is subject to destruction.  I used Ta-Nehisi Coates’ work on “bodies” as an example of 
Dasein being taken as an object that is feared about, but I observed how this is a fallen 
obfuscation of Dasein’s ownmost Being.  Rather than revelatory, such a fallen understanding 
blocks Dasein from being disclosed in its existentiality.  I used Malcolm X’s speech “The Ballot 
or the Bullet” to demonstrate how his critique of Americanism is a way to understand how black 
Americans have been marked by society as objects of fear, those for other Dasein to be 
threatened by.  I used Heidegger’s notion of spatiality to point out that this kind of phenomenon 
occurs because Dasein has been construed as a spatial object in relation to other subjects and that 
Dasein has certain notions and ideas (however prejudicial or racist) of identity that are nearer to 
it, which help it view other Dasein as threats to fear.  I call this phenomenon “societal de-
severance.” 
In chapter 4, I showed that “death notes” are often attached to a fear existentiell, 
explaining that the Gerede about these notes are manifestations of two concepts of death from 
Heidegger: 1) verenden, the death of an organic body; 2) ableben, Dasein’s human life passing 
away.  I showed that Gerede in social media and in academia discuss a fear existentiell as 
sometimes “bodies” and sometimes “lives,” sometimes fear existentiells are discussed as both 
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“bodies” and “lives.” The discussion of Dasein as a “body” represents verenden discourse about 
Dasein’s death and reduces Dasein to a mere ontic entity, effacing Dasein’s claim to its 
ontological existence.  Dasein becomes the “body” that will die, but as discussed in a present-at-
hand way where it turns into a theme for a marginalized racial identity, as in when one discusses 
the destruction of the “black body” or the “brown body.” Dasein also turns into a present-at-hand 
theme when construed as a “life,” hence, the discourse of racialized communities as “lives” 
under threat is a fallen discourse that obfuscates Dasein’s ownmost Being. 
In chapter 5, I discussed how fear, as a fallen mood, and Gerede, as fallen discourse, 
create what I call “Being-a-problem.” However, this Being-a-problem is inauthentic, and 
Dasein’s issue is how it can reclaim itself as its ownmost Being despite being inauthentically 
covered up by fear and Gerede.  I discussed the ways in which Dasein is inauthentic in its Being-
a-problem, and how the usual way of understanding Heidegger’s concept of Dasein takes a 
different turn here because of how the Gerede about inauthentic Being-a-problem stifles 
disruptions into Angst, that mood that allows Dasein to confront itself so as to reclaim the 
possibility of being authentic.   
In chapter 6, I examined how Dasein can be an authentic Being-a-problem existentiell 
after a seemingly bleak outcome for inauthentic Being-a-problem in chapter 5, wherein it looked 
like there was no exit for inauthentic Dasein to emerge out of that existentiell mode.  However, I 
proposed an exit that tried not to make the movement from authenticity to inauthenticity a 
psychologically willful decision in the common sense understanding of choice.  My solution for 
a way toward authenticity comes from Du Bois’ “second sight” where one sees the discourse for 
what it is in comparison to one’s daily existence and then calls it out.  This, I hold, is consistent 
with Heidegger’s Being and Time in which Dasein begins to compare the ordinary interpretation 
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of death with the lack of such a phenomenon occurring in Dasein’s ontical affairs, which should 
suggest a disconnect for Dasein.  This disconnect may reveal the possibility that death is more 
constitutive of one’s existence than the way death seems to be advanced in society.  For Du Bois, 
“second sight” is an ability that Du Bois observes about black Americans in which they can see 
through the veil of interpretations about their identity as Americans.  I took this as an ontico-
existentiell model for what Heidegger calls the Augenblick, Dasein’s “seeing” its Situation, 
which compels it to take action by choosing to choose its existentiell of Being-a-problem.  The 
Augenblick allows Dasein to “see” and then return to its Situation as having responded to a call 
to conscience that makes Dasein choose itself in an authentic sense.   
I discussed how the call of conscience presents an unusual problem as Dasein does not 
present-at-handedly understand the call to conscience only to then choose authenticity.  This 
would inconsistent with Heidegger.  Rather, my solution is that Dasein examines the 
incongruence between Gerede and its undifferentiated everydayness.  This helps Dasein reframe 
the Gerede as an obviously inconsistent talk when compared to daily existence.  My solution is 
consistent with Heidegger’s basic point about using ordinary interpretations to uncover one’s 
averageness, so that Dasein may win itself again.  Furthermore, when it comes to the specific 
issue of inauthentic Being-a-problem, we have a fear existentiell with a hyperawareness of the 
ordinary interpretations of death as the body perishing and the life passing away.  Such 
interpretations of death become so bold and patent in their presentation to iBap, that a 
phenomenological distinction between the two may lead to Dasein’s distancing itself from the 
fear promoted by such idle talk.  Once such distancing occurs, Dasein though still inauthentic as 
Being-a-problem is at least attempting to prepare itself to hear a genuine and authentic call that 
will reveal its Situation.  In that effort, Dasein can quiet the chatter about its supposed death, 
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which then allows it to be silent.  Through silence Dasein can prepare itself to hear the call of 
conscience to be an authentic Being-a-problem. 
In chapter 7, I showed how the constructs from race reports can only go so far in helping 
us understand the existential situation of racial identities.  In fact, such reports support masking 
Dasein in a fallen discourse.  I discuss Frantz Fanon as an example of a psychological kind of 
race report and how he subscribes to both psychological profiles of the black man and 
black/white racial binaries.  The binary does not reckon with what belongs to Dasein in a 
genuine way, but instead promotes an idle talk that even conceals other race reports.  The fact 
that this happens is, I hold, an issue that requires more attention in a field that is increasingly 
focusing on the plight of the marginalized, especially under our current presidential 
administration.  For the oppressed, bearing existentiells with a history of subjugation, enduring 
the oppressive treatment of others, and dealing with the closing of actual material possibilities 
means that for Dasein as inauthentic Being-a-problem, existence becomes an issue for it.  While 
I examine these race reports using Heidegger’s terminology of inauthenticity, existentiells, and 
the present-at-hand, the revelations are as follows:  When one attempts to interrogate the 
meaning of Dasein’s racial identity out of Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, one notices 
how racial discourses that incorporate death, marginalization, and oppression talk inevitably hide 
an existential Situation that authentically belongs to Dasein.   
Critiques 
I conclude with some critiques and replies.  The first major critique of my work would be 
that the idea of inauthentic Being-a-problem makes the feeling of death less real, less important.  
This critique would suggest that my argument is downplaying the suffering and death of 
marginalized and peripheral people.  This concern can be restated in the following question: Am 
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I, the writer, disregarding the feelings and stress that people of color feel about the issue of their 
individual deaths in society?  No.  Instead, I argue that my thesis demonstrates how inauthentic 
Being-a-problem, that fear existentiell with the death notes of verenden and ableben, devalues 
the life-shattering experience of Angst where one understands one’s self as Being-toward-death; 
in such devaluation, one’s Sein zum Tod is covered by a death that is always about to end, a 
conception of “body” and “life” that is the unalive, yet still in society.  There is a chance that 
Dasein could, as inauthentic Being-a-problem, use this discourse to somehow access this Angst 
that would allow Dasein to be resolute toward the Augenblick and then be fearlessly Being-a-
problem (aBap).  However, Dasein would have to separate from this mood and Gerede.  There 
would have to be a disruption, but this returns to a problem we already examined: The “loudest 
idle talk” about iBap’s verenden and ableben conceals that disruption.  The first step then is to 
extricate oneself from the fear of verenden and ableben.  This would be a step toward the goal of 
authentic Being-a-problem, where inauthentic Being-a-problem is modified from originating in a 
fallen discourse and from being a das Man influenced existentiell to Dasein having no fear in 
choosing itself as Being-a-problem.  It is with making this choice that Dasein, as authentic 
Being-a-problem, can actually affirm its racial identity and genuinely confront its problematic 
status in society, as demonstrated by the work of W.E.B. Du Bois.  Du Bois does not open The 
Souls of Black Folk by saying that he is not a problem in society.  He affirms this status and then 
uses it to problematize the idea of his Being-a-problem.  I find this to be an emancipatory 
approach to one’s racial identity, and I believe my work provides both an existentiell and 
existential justification of the necessity of one’s racial identity to be free from a totalizing racial 
discourse that obfuscates one’s situation.  In this freedom, Dasein can “win” its racialized 
existentiell back from being lost in fear. 
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All claims to racism and marginalization are not the same.  A philosophical analysis of 
racial discourse must confront the problem of false equivocations about racial marginalization as 
we see increased claims of racism and prejudice throughout society.  Such an analysis would also 
allow us to observe what may be an apparent disconnect between claimants’ lives and their racist 
claims.  Once again, we cannot say of another’s racial experience that he or she is not going 
through something, but we can observe the appearance of a disconnect and ask questions about 
it.  We cannot judge someone to be authentic or inauthentic.  However, through Heidegger’s 
analysis of how fear and Gerede operate, we can delve into claims that clearly demonstrate that 
racial identities ought to be in a perpetual state of emergency.  And in inquiring about such 
urgent claims, we can attempt to maintain the different claims to racial oppression so as not to 
falsely equivocate what could be drastically different claims to racial experiences.  Maintaining 
distinctions in what individuals go through, although tedious, would allow us to have the kind of 
racial discourse that requires individuals to “see” one another in a way that does not restrict them 
to present-at-hand categories of identity. 
The second critique of my view is that the suffering and death that people endure and/or 
find themselves experiencing are relegated to the level of existentiells in my account and so 
thought of as unreal.  This critique may come from a misunderstanding of the function of 
existentiells and existentials as discussed by Heidegger in Being and Time.  For Heidegger and, 
per our discussion in chapter 2, existentiells are ways of being.  We, as Dasein, inhabit these 
roles.  We genuinely perform them.  They belong to us because we are thrown into them, but we 
come to a point in our lives where we may have to question how genuine they are to our ontical 
affairs.  What prompts us to question this is not only our relationship to these identities, but in 
observing how others relate to those identities.  As Being-with (Mitsein), Dasein is always 
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already with other Dasein because this is a structural feature of who Dasein is.  And as Dasein-
with (Mitdasein), Dasein engages others in the world, always sharing in each other’s projects, 
even when we do not think we are doing so.  As such, Dasein is structured into socially 
constructing various things we engage with in the world, one of those things being existentiells.  
Inauthentic Being-a-problem is an existentiell that is not just made up by a single Dasein, but 
many Dasein participate in it.  Historical narratives, prejudices, stereotypes, and fears are all 
items involved in the creating and sharing done by Dasein in their Dasein-with, grounded in 
Being-with.  Dasein has grown up in these existentiells and so is socially constructed to act 
through them as well.  This is all real.  Heidegger, by discussing Gerede and existentiells, does 
not say that such concepts are fake.  He simply says we are swept up in talk and absorbed into a 
world in which we have lost ourselves, which suggests that the identity concepts we traditionally 
subscribe to may not genuinely belong to us.  
This critique might continue with the claim that I am still reducing something like 
systemic racism and prejudicial practices in institutions to idle talk.  One might say that white 
supremacy exists with or without an existential analysis of fear, death, and Being-a-problem, and 
that nothing will change by analyzing these real life concerns of racism and prejudice with terms 
of inauthenticity and a fallen discourse.   
My reply to this critique moves from the practical explanation of my project to the 
existential one.  We have all been talked about and gossiped about in our lives.  People have 
talked about you.  For example, perhaps someone has said that you are not a good driver and, 
upon hearing this, you start thinking twice about your driving techniques, second guessing 
yourself on the road.  Let’s add to this situation and say that now the gossip is that you are a 
dangerous driver, that your being on the road puts all other drivers at risk.  Let’s say that some of 
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those drivers are told the same thing about their driving skills.  We now have an atmosphere of 
fear on the road, which makes many people on the road defensive and overly cautious when 
driving, to the point of even causing a couple of accidents and hours of heavy traffic.  Now 
imagine that we are no longer talking about people gossiping about driving that leads to fear, but 
now we are discussing people gossiping about racial identities and how this perpetuates fear.  In 
both cases we have a kind of idle talk.  In some cases, we might reply that we need to know 
certain things about drivers, and that, analogously, we need to know about racism, 
marginalization, and oppression as they afflict racial identities.   
I think that this last need is not controversial.  I agree with that need.  However, we also 
need to know what that same discourse does not tell us, namely, how that needed discourse tends 
to obfuscate the existential situation of the individual “gossiped” about.  As Ralph Ellison points 
out in Invisible Man, “When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or 
figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.”146 Saying that 
systemic racism is real does not change the need to evaluate issues of what a discourse about 
death and suffering mean to Dasein who appear to be especially targeted by such a fear and death 
discourse regarding their individual identities.  When we idly talk about systemic issues and then 
connect them with ableben and verenden, we phenomenologically cover Dasein with empirical 
and psychological generalizations.  These pah assessments encase Dasein in inauthenticity.  If 
we want to “see” others in their situation then we must be cautious to not phenomenologically 
construct an edifice of fear in front of their existence because such constructions risk covering up 
Dasein, and we end up merely seeing our construction of that Dasein reflected at us.  Thus, a 
critique of such discourse is needed for the sake of practically quieting the concealing features of 
                                                 
146 Ellison, Invisible Man, 3. 
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such talk.  Existentielly, quieting aspects of this talk in our lives means we can prepare ourselves 
to hear a call to reclaim our Situation.  Existentially, by preparing, we give ourselves the 
opportunity to authentically make a choice to affirm our identities, which means we can affirm 
how we exist in the world, even if it means we affirm that we are authentically Being-a-problem.     
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